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Summary of Thesis submitted for Ph. D. degree 
by Patrick Masanja 
on 
The Politics of Workers' Participation: A Study of 
Industrial Relations in Tanzanian Public-Sector Factories 
This study of industrial relations attempts to throw light on the 
impact of ujamaa on the organisation of Tanzanian public-sector factories, 
especially the role played by Workers' Councils, Party branches and 
other work-place agencies in decision-making. The thesis draws on 
case studies of two enterprises in Dar es Salaam as well as data of 
a more general kind. 
The orientation of the thesis is historical and action-oriented; 
the study eschews a priori, economic reductionist and functionalist 
perspectives in favour of an approach which is more amenable to throwing 
light on the politics of participation at work-place level. Chapters 
1-3 argue that Tanzania since independence has been-characterized by 
attempts by the political leadership to construct a corporatist type 
of political and industrial-relations system whose main features are 
stability, national integration, consensus, controlled popular partici- 
pation and central control. 
In Chapters 4-6 case studies are presented of management and 
participation in two factories, both located in Dar es Salaam. Drawing 
in part on documentary sources, the research also utilised in-depth 
interviews and observation.. The case studies focus especially on 
the roles of the different factory agencies and the way managers and 
employees relate to them in dealing with factory issues. 
Three conclusions are tentatively offered. First, the control 
-, 
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of public factory managements exercised by the national political 
leadership is uneven, with the effect that managers are able to use 
their dominant position within a factory to advance their private 
interests. Second, the influence of workers' representatives in 
factory decision-making is very limited (although normative pressures 
mitigate the cruder management practices towards employees), but 
chiefly for reasons other than those which have been stressed in the 
literature. Third, union and Party branches remain arenas of contention 
between management and workers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Public sector enterprises in Tanzania are largely a phenomenon of 
the period since the Arusha Declaration of 1967. Measures taken by 
the Tanzanian government in the wake of the above policy document led 
to a significant increase in the state's involvement in different sectors. 
During the colonial period, state ownership was limited to a few activities 
in public utilities, rail transport and some shares in a handful of enter- 
prises. In 1964, the newly independent government created the National 
Development Corporation (N. D. C. ) as an instrument for boosting industrial 
growth and increasing the state's involvement in economic activities. 
It was, however, only with the measures following the Arusha Declaration 
that there was a considerable increase in the size of the state sector. 
This expansion was achieved either through new government investment, 
or through the acquisition of shares in private firms, or else through 
a complete state take-over of existing private enterprises. Taken 
together, these measures resulted in a marked expansion of the state's 
role in the services, banking and transport sectors, as well as in export 
agriculture (mainly sisal) and manufacturing industry. 
As well as affecting the structure of ownership of the economy, 
the. Arusha Declaration led to political changes, especially in the organ- 
isation of the political party. The same document also formulated the 
policy of ujamaa (socialism) and self-reliance. These new policies 
affected various areas of the country's life and economy, and included 
notably the encouragement of ujamaa villages and the introduction of 
new meausres related to labour and labour organisation. Especially 
important under the latter heading was the introduction of political 
party branches in work places and the creation of Workers' Councils in 
parastatal enterprises in 1970. 
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These developments provoked widespread interest in Tanzania's 
political economy, in the character of the Tanzanian state and in the 
meaning and impact of Tanzanian ujamaa (socialism). In this context 
questions were raised about the organisation of the state sector and 
more particularly about the position of labour and the functioning of 
workers' organisations in this new ujamaa experience. What was the 
impact of ujamaa on the organisation and running of public sector factories? 
What was the position and condition of workers in those factories? How 
did employees relate to the work-place organisations set up to give 
expression to Tanzania's socialist aspirations? Twenty years on, these 
are still questions that any study of Tanzanian industrial relations 
must seek to answer. 
This thesis, a study of industrial relations in public sector 
factories in Tanzania, attempts to shed light on some of the above issues 
with particular reference to work-place processes, especially the practice 
of workers' participation in decision-making. Special attention is 
devoted to how workers' representatives and management relate to one 
another in dealing with work-place issues affecting them. The thesis 
is also centrally concerned with the role played by party branches and 
other relevant agencies in decision-making in parastatal factories. 
Introduced by decisions from "above", how do employees relate to these 
agencies purportedly created to cater for the interests of the workers, 
and how and under what conditions do they operate in relation to decision- 
making? How do employees articulate their relationship to the party 
and trade union in dealing with enterprise issues? And so on. 
How one should go about exploring issues of the above kind is a 
far from simple matter. Some further explanation of the particular 
approach adopted in the thesis is therefore required. It is also 
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necessary to explain more specifically how the research presented relates 
to previous work in its field. This introductory chapter reviews the 
major approaches in the literature on industrial relations while simul- 
taneously assessing some of the strengths and limitations of the approaches 
adopted. The objective is to illuminate, through this review, the aims, 
orientation and scope of the study. The argument can be summarised 
as follows: 
Firstly, in terms of the two basic approaches in the general industrial 
relations literature (section 1 below), this study adopts the historical 
or'radical" approach as the one more susceptible to throwing light on 
the character of industrial relations in Tanzania. 
Secondly, in contrast to several well-known perspectives on the 
state and industrial relations in Tanzania, the approach adopted is action- 
oriented, in the sense that the actions and interactions of workers, 
managers and others are taken as a focus for empirical research, not 
as something which can be deduced or "read off" from the existence of 
certain formal structures, particularly if the latter are seen in terms 
of a reductionist theory of the state. Section 3 develops this point. 
Thirdly, unlike the bulk of the research on African labour and labour 
movements (section 2), the thesis is based mainly on a work-place study. 
The particular methods of research and the reasons for adopting them 
are further discussed in section 4. 
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1 CONVENTIONAL VERSUS HISTORICAL /'RADICAL APPROACHES TO INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
a) Summary 
The development of industry in different parts of the world has given 
rise to a vast amount of literature on labour and industrial relations. 
This literature encompasses a number of themes and is distinguished by 
a variety of approaches. Among the themes considered relevant in this 
study are: (a) processes and patterns of industrialisation, which identify 
the historical circumstances under which wage-labour was created, thus 
shaping its character and its relationship with employers; (b) the 
character of the political processes in the country concerned; and 
(c) the conditions of workers' associations or trade unions. The above 
three issues are interrelated and shape the form and content of industrial 
relations. Two basically different approaches to the study of industrial 
relations can be discerned in the treatment of these themes. These 
have been termed as the "liberal", "orthodox" or conventional approach 
on the one hand, and the "radical", "marxist" or historical perspective 
on the other. [Hyman, 1975; Gourevitch, et. al., 1978]. The differences 
between the two perspectives stem from their theoretical approaches to 
industrial societies and from their unit of analysis of industrial relations. 
Thus, in summary, conventional perspectives (as exemplified in the 
human relations school, and the liberal pluralist approach) tend to 
concentrate on the work-place, in isolation from wider economic and 
political factors. These are assumed, rather than integrated into the 
account. The radical perspective, on the other hand, places factory 
dynamics in their economic and political contexts. Further, the con- 
ventional approaches perceive enterprise-level relations and the development 
of, for example, trade unionism as manifestations of an evolving industrial- 
ism towards which all societies are moving. Radical approaches, in 
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contrast, perceive these as historical products of socio-economic and 
political circumstances of different countries and different regions. 
b) Conventional Perspectives 
Pioneer studies in work-place relations like those of Western Electric 
in Chicago carried out by Mayo and his associates [1949] were inspired 
by managerial concerns concerning the behaviour of workers and in particular 
their restriction of output. The researchers focused on work-places 
and the behaviour of workers within them, neglecting to take into 
consideration the questions of ownership and control (i. e. the economic 
and political dimensions). The work-places were treated as isolated 
units within which workers' behaviour could be satisfactorily explained 
through consideration of the interpersonal relations between workers, 
the behaviour of supervisors and the amount of communication between 
management and workers. Liberal and conventional approaches to work- 
place analysis inherited this central methodological bias from the human 
relations school. 
According to the liberal or conventional approach to industrial 
relations developed in the 1950's and the 1960's, as exemplified by the 
work of Dunlop [1958] and Kerr et al. [1962], modern industrial societies 
are moving towards institutionalised social consensus and harmony. After 
the initial social conflicts which corresponded to the period of early 
industrialisation lacking in social coherence, social cohesion is becoming 
the main feature of modern industrial societies. Social conflict in 
these pluralist societies is absorbed and controlled by a multiplicity 
of institutions (e. g. trade unions) catering for a variety of interest 
groups (employees) which compete and compromise. The end result is 
a social consensus which takes into consideration the interests of the 
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whole community. This logic of industrialism is reflected in the 
definition of industrial relations as the agreed system of regulations 
and rules controlling the relations between employers and employees or 
between managers and workers. Through the system of collective bargain- 
ing, social peace and cohesion is realized at enterprise or factory 
level. Since, in this perspective, the enterprise or factory is also 
considered as an autonomous unit, industrial relations are viewed as issues 
basically between management and workers, at work-places. The state 
or government tries to "maintain some kind of dynamic equilibrium" [Fox, 1966, 
p. 2] and the common interest of all parties. National level politics 
are neglected or considered as peripheral to industrial relations. 
This "liberal or orthodox perspective" has been subjected to a number 
of telling criticisms [for example, Hyman and Fryer, 1975]. But perhaps 
the most telling critique has been the course of historical events, which 
can hardly be grasped comprehensively by the perspective. Gourevitch 
et. al. [in Doeringer, 1978] have aptly summarised recent developments, 
with particular reference to America and Western Europe. In the wake 
of "economic difficulties, inflation, stagnation and other economic ills", ip. 405] 
the state has come to the centre of management-worker relations. State 
policies relating to labour, incomes, prices and social welfare measures 
as well as unemployment compensation have all had a profound effect on 
industrial relations. In response to such changes, analysts have been 
forced to take political processes and state policies as centrally 
relevant in the study of industrial relations. 
Two main criticisms have been levelled against the conventional 
approaches to industrial relations. The first inadequacy is the isolation 
of industrial relations from the wider socio-economic circumstances and 
political processes in the country concerned. The resulting neglect 
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of differences in access to various resources, of the way domination 
and control are exercised in society and of the differences in interests 
among members of an enterprise, makes it hard to explain industrial 
conflict, which in turn helps to reinforce the idea that industrial 
conflict is an aberration due to early industrialism. The approach 
which focuses on the nature of the technology at the plant level such 
as advanced in the work of Blauner [1964] neglects the wider socio- 
political factors in a similar way, resulting in an overemphasis on the 
role of technology in determining industrial relations. Another 
variant related to what can be called organizational theory focuses on 
the way people are distributed into different occupational categories 
or jobs as a logical-rational development of industrial society. This 
approach shares a similar a-political and a-historical character. The 
bureaucratic hierarchy and the differential power relations are not 
perceived to be rooted in specific socio-economic circumstances but are 
seen as the logical consequence of modern industrial society [Thompson, 
1984]. 
The second inadequacy in conventional approaches to industrial 
relations is related to its tendency to focus on the formal or legal 
aspects of the institutions or structural mechanisms which regulate work 
relations. On the one hand the legalistic perspective does not 
necessarily give an insight into the actual processes between management 
and workers. On the other hand, the perspective neglects to account 
for the social basis of the labour legislation which, as products of 
human purposeful action, are elements in the relations between groups. 
c) The Radical/Historical Perspective 
The second general approach to industrial relations is the "radical" 
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or historical perspective, generally influenced by "Marxist" theory on 
the development and character of capitalism. Within this broad 
perspective, industrial relations are considered as the "activities" 
of employers and of workers and their organizations [Nichols, 1980, 
p. 12] or as "processes of control over work relations" [Hyman, 1972, 
p. 12]. They are elements in the social relations and therefore rooted 
in the political economy of the country concerned. They relate and 
correspond to the phase and level of development of the capitalist mode 
of production and related social relations. With the development of 
capitalism, control and organisation of production passes to the owners 
of capital. The increasing technical division of labour leads to the 
deskilling of the greater part of the workforce. The alienation of 
the workers in a system of production oriented towards profit is the 
basis of constant friction and conflict between employers and employees. 
Enterprise-level activities are non-autonomous; they are closely linked 
to the evolving economic and political processes in the wider society, 
of which industrial relations are a part. Industrial relations are 
the historical product of the technical, economic and political processes 
of each country. Such an approach has inspired some writers and provided 
several insights into labour and industrial relations . 
For example, in a penetrating summary of the"diversity of the 
capitalist labour process" and attendant industrial relations (especially 
the character of unionism) Burawoy [1979, p. 231] proposes a scheme within a 
theory of the uneven development of capitalism which distinguishes 
competitive and monopoly capitalism and incorporates the historical 
and national diversities within and between countries. He considers 
the period between 1890 and 1920 in the U. S. as the transition between 
competitive and monopoly capitalism. During the earlier period of 
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competitive capitalism, the relation between employers and workers is 
marked by intense, often brutal struggles, with each party trying to 
get the best deal out of the unregulated situation in which workers' 
associations are unacceptable to employers. In the 1920's company 
unions became acceptable and this is linked by Burawoy to the rise of 
"welfare capitalism". Later, with the extension of monopoly capitalism, 
more autonomous unionism engaged in collective bargaining emerged. 
Burawoy also identifies national differences in the general character 
of industrial relations and trade unionism. He argues that the 
differences between Britain, Japan and the United States arise from the 
timing, the pattern of industrialisation and the role of the state in 
the development of these countries. Citing the comparative study of 
Dore [1974], Burawoy sees the emergence of strong trade unionism in 
Britain as linked to the early period of competitive capitalism, with 
its strong craft and industrial unions, "considerable mobility of 
employment, a market-based wage and salary system" etc. [p. 257]. This 
character of trade unionism tended to continue in the era of monopoly 
capitalism. In Japan, however, capitalist industrialisation took place 
at a later stage, with the state playing a central role in the process, 
which enabled Japan to "build a viable monopoly capitalism without the 
intense class struggles associated with the transition from competitive 
capitalism and the destruction of crafts" [ibid, p. 258]. This created 
a pattern of industrial relations in which there was collaboration between 
capital and labour through enterprise unions. 
In contrast, as other authors have argued, early industrialisation 
in the United States passed through the competitive stage but workers' 
associations were not involved in political issues - "politics" in 
America at this time was "the affair of strictly local groups organized 
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on ethnic or racial lines by machine politicians" [Skocpol, 1985, p. 26]. 
The U. S. A. political system had a different history from that of European 
nations, with universal suffrage for white men occurring with the 
inception of capitalist industrialisation. As Skocpol has aptly explained 
[ibid, p. 26]: "In contrast to what happened in many European nations, 
unions and workers in the United States did not have to ally themselves 
with political associations or parties fighting for the suffrage in 
opposition to politically privileged dominant classes and an autonomous 
administrative state'-'. That history explains to some extent the general 
state of industrial relations in the U. S. A. - showing, incidentally, 
that the formation of a national system of industrial relations may be 
affected by political factors as much as by economic ones. The later 
emergence of industrial unions in the monopoly sector firms became involved 
much more with issues of collective bargaining and the settlement of 
disputes at enterprise level. Any militancy was blunted by welfare 
capitalism. These are some of the factors explaining the semi-corporatist 
nature of trade unionism in the U. S. and the dominance of management 
in industrial relations. 
That economic and political processes have an impact on industrial 
relations has been aptly argued in a slightly different context by Poole 
[1978]. Discussing participation he advances the view that "the main activity of 
governments in the field of industrial democracy has lain not in legal 
enactments pertaining to workers' participation itself but in their 
effect on the balance of power between the main social classes of any 
society and in the creation therein of a constellation of general values 
which bear on the issue in question". [p. 133]. 
This dimension comes out in the literature on industrial relations 
in Eastern Europe. In his studies of the Polish and Yugoslav experiences, 
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Kolaja [1960 and 1965] reveals amongst other things that industrial 
relations and the workings of workers' councils and self-management 
schemes are shaped not only by the character, position and role of workers' 
organisations in the management of enterprises but also by the processes 
of national decision-making. Given the state's preponderant role in 
the different sectors of the economy and in employment in those countries, 
the exercise and distribution of power and concomitantly the position 
of labour in the wider society is crucial in the operation of those 
councils. The direct and explicit involvement of the state in economic 
affairs means that the resolution of factory issues such as wages, prices 
and working conditions very much depends on the relative strength and 
resources management or workers have or can have recourse to in the public 
domain. It also means that the relations between management and workers 
become explicitly political. Trade unions play a mobilising, social 
and welfare role. On the other hand, management's power depends on 
those who have control of state power through the Party. 
Discussing the Yugoslav reforms through their system of self- 
management, Pasic [in Broekmeyer, 1970] argues that the system of workers' 
councils in that country is part of the direct democracy introduced in 
1950 in that society. Workers' councils are one of the ways by which 
"working people" would exercise their right to decision-making in running 
their affairs, with management accountable to an elected workers' council. 
However, the economic situation, both internal and international, such 
as the level of technology, the market situation and reliance on external 
financing placed real "constraints on the processes of decision-making 
at local level" [Poole, 1975, p. 155]. 
Bettelheim's study of the Chinese experience during the 1966 to 
1967 period [Bettelheim, 1974] highlights the intrinsically political 
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nature of workers' participation programmes and the historical 
specificity of each experience. Bettelheim demonstrates how the 
Chinese socio-political revolution took root initially in the country- 
side. The dispossession of the landlords and the passing of state power 
into the hands of the Red Army shaped the specific forms of workers' 
control that were adopted. These attempted to combine socialist 
economic planning at national, regional and local levels with mass 
participation at enterprise level. Enterprises were expected to take 
into account the national plan to cater for societal needs. The 'one- 
man' type of management was rejected in favour of a collective form of 
management based on revolutionary committees. Shop-floor participation 
involved the workforce, organised into teams or groups, dealing with 
grassroots issues such as improving productivity and maintenance of 
machinery. In an attempt to bridge the gap between manual and mental 
work, the occasional participation of administrative and managerial 
cadres in direct production work was encouraged. 
In summary, the two broad approaches in the literature on labour 
and industrial relations differ in at least two ways: first, on the 
interpretation of those relations either as elements of broader socio- 
political processes, or as essentially concerned with issues between 
managers and employees; and second over theoretical perspectives on 
industrialisation. In both of these respects, this thesis will follow 
the "radical" approach. 
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2 LABOUR STUDIES IN AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW 
The literature on labour in Africa has been influenced in one way 
or the other by the two perspectives outlined in the last section. The 
advent of colonialism in Africa and the subsequent transformation of 
African societies led to a variety of studies relating to labour and 
industrial relations by historians, economists and social anthropologists. 
The interest manifested in this subject during the colonial period has 
continued into the post-colonial period. The resulting literature 
on industrial work and industrial workers in Africa encompasses three 
main interrelated themes: (a) the penetration of capitalism during the 
colonial period and the process of proletarianization; (b) the develop- 
ment and character of trade unionism; (c) wage-labour and its condition, 
including adjustment to urban conditions. _. 
There have been relatively 
few work-place studies. 
a) Labour Migration Studies 
The penetration of capitalism leading to the creation of a wage-labour 
force, particularly via the phenomenon of labour migration, has been 
one of the constant themes on the literature on labour in Africa. Among 
the more important works on this issue are the study by Schapera [1947] 
on labour migration in the former Bechuanaland; Arrighi's study [1973] 
of proletarianization in the former Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe); 
Sandbrook's [1975] work on the case of Kenya; van Onselen's [1976] study 
on mine labour in what is now Zimbabwe; and Gutkind and Wallerstein 
[1976] on the broad lines of change that have occurred. These studies 
are concerned with the changes in the political economy of Africa with 
the advent of colonialism, a process of transformation of African 
societies which include the creation in some places of "reserves" of 
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migrant labour while in others there emerged an increasingly permanent 
wage-labour force. In an interesting recent addition to this line of 
enquiry, the edited work by Munslow and Finch [1984] offers an analysis 
which places the colonial state at the centre of the'process of 
proletarianisation in Third World countries. Cases from Africa are 
given. 
b) Trade Unions 
Some of the above studies naturally deal with the growth of workers' 
organisations, and descriptive histories of the development of trade 
unionism have continued to be a major theme in labour studies and industrial 
relations in Africa. This is witnessed by the considerable volume-of 
works ranging from studies of a more general nature covering the whole 
continent to more narrowly focused studies of particular countries. 
The former are exemplified by the early studies by Davies [1966], Woddis 
[1961] or Berg and Butler [1964] - the last-mentioned echoing the 
conventional approach of so-called non-political unions as compared with 
the radical approach represented by Woddis. Pioneering country-level 
studies of this type include Friedland [1969] on unionism in Tanganyika, 
Yesufu [1962] on Nigerian unionism, and Bates [1971] on mine workers 
in Zambia. Friedland [1972] and Kraus [1979] contain further references 
to some of the better known research on trade unionism in Africa. In 
these works the history of trade unionism or the growth and development 
of workers' organisations is related to labour struggles from the 
difficult beginnings during the colonial period to the chequered experiences 
during the post-colonial period. Particularly important in this regard 
are the compilations by Sandbrook and Cohen [1975] and Gutkind, Cohen 
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and Copans [1978], which are collections of studies on workers struggles, 
including strikes, in various parts of Africa during and after the 
colonial period. 
One key issue in writings on trade unionism in Africa has been the 
question of its "character", particularly in the light of its relationship 
to the state. In this regard, the literature has given different 
interpretations and analyses with the general theme that unions in Africa 
are instruments of control rather than of workers' struggle. Firstly, 
however, as Waterman [1970] correctly points out, such analyses are often 
based on idealised models of either 'free' trade union practice in 
advanced capitalist countries or 'revolutionary' trade unionism in 
socialist countries. The presence of unions corresponding to these 
norms is far from reality in those countries, let alone in Third World 
countries during or after the colonial period. Secondly, the enactment 
of a variety of legislative measures in African countries regulating 
the structure, organisation, and leadership of trade unions, or limiting 
strike action, should not deflect attention from the fact that in practice 
trade unions remain sites of contention. As Bates' [1971] study suggests, 
state control may not be complete or actually effective. The Zambian 
copper miners have effectively resisted control by the state. Structural 
or legal enactments, while placing constraints on workers' groupings 
does not automatically determine the content of their activities. A 
close examination of union activities is necessary to reveal the conditions 
under which workers' and their unions' activities correspond to the 
states' demands or get coopted or controlled. While there is little 
disagreement over the generalisation that governments have attempted 
to control both union activity, through the structural reorganisation 
of unions, and the direction of the leadership, especially at the national 
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level, there are grounds for thinking that more systematic knowledge 
is needed of how unions and other forms of employee organisations 
actually operate in work-places. 
c) Labour and Urban Conditions 
A considerable quantity of African research on labour takes the form 
of what have been termed urban studies. These deal with the worker's 
condition and his adaptation to the urban context. The works of 
Epstein [1958], Mitchell [1961], Mayer [1961], Pons [1969] and Gluckman 
[1940] are some of those which cover the colonial period mainly for 
Southern and Central Africa. Those of Peace [1979], Jeffries [1978], 
Sandbrook [1981], Peil [1972], and Waterman [1981] describe the 
conditions in the post-colonial period and the position of the employed 
and other poor in African urban centres. The focus of a study such 
as that of Sandbrook [1981] is on the urban community of which African 
labour is a part rather than the work-place or enterprise level. 
Sandbrook considers residence or housing conditions, low incomes and 
issues of ethnicity in an attempt to assess the kind of consciousness 
African urban workers have. The ideology of populism which they share 
with the other urban poor reflects, in his view, the conditions of 
dependent capitalism and early industry; it is below workers' conscious- 
ness which he presumes to exist among workers in developed central 
capitalist countries. His exposition of the poor material conditions 
of workers in African urban centres also contradicts the "labour arist- 
ocracy thesis" concerning the alleged privileged position of employed 
labour [Arrighi and Saul, 1973]. Adrian Peace's study is a good example 
of studies carried out in the post-colonial period which deal with migrant 
labour and the relations they develop in town. The author throws some 
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light on some aspects of shop floor life and in the work estate of Ikeja 
in Nigeria. The focus however, is on how this has ramifications on 
their life in the urban community and the wider political context. 
d) Work-place Studies 
Writings on workers in the work context and on enterprise level 
dynamics are relatively few when compared to those on migration, trade 
unions, or urban adaptation. We have referred above to the work of 
Peace which, in addition to urban residential aspects, covers some 
aspects of skilled and unskilled workers' relations with management 
(Chapter 4). and the labour movement over the industrial estate (Chapter 
IST-and how this was utilised in the urban community. Kapferer's [1972] 
study deals closely with the relations between the African workers and 
the Indian management in a Zambian clothing factory, including the 
various strategies the two parties deploy in that situation. Kapferer 
focuses revealingly on the social interaction between the two parties. 
However, in my view, his neglect of the structural or material constraints, 
both financial and technical, results in an over-emphasis on the 
behavioural aspects of the parties involved in the interaction. While 
Bates' [1971] work deals with the relationship between unionism and the 
state as its main theme, it also gives some insights into processes in 
the copper mines between employers, the then newly-independent state 
of Zambia and the miners' unions. The relationship between employers 
and employees at work-place level can be discerned also from studies 
which deal with industrial conflicts in several work situations such 
as those treated in the edited work by Gutkind, Cohen and Copans [1978]. 
The collection of essays on Industrial Relations in Africa edited by 
Damachi et. al. [1979] is rather typical in that it gives an up-to-date 
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summary of the industrial relations legislation or formal machinery in 
several African countries including histories of trade unionism, but 
leaves the issue of actual processes in factories or enterprises open 
and generally neglected. 
3 PERSPECTIVES ON THE STATE AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN TANZANIA 
With particular reference to Tanzania, the literature on wage-labour 
by historians, sociologists and economists is quite varied in theme and 
scope. Three broad concerns can be distinguished in these writings. 
The first theme is the emergence, growth and development of wage labour 
in Tanzania. These are mainly historical studies dealing with the 
changes which have occurred in the country from the last quarter of the 
19th century with the advent of colonisation. In dealing with the 
socio-economic changes, the studies give varying accounts on the develop- 
ment of wage labour. In Rodney's article [1979] on the socio-economic 
impact of colonisation and the emergence and creation of a body of wage 
employees the colonial state plays a central role. Iliffe's [1979] 
history of Tanganyika, which is based mainly on written documents, devotes 
considerable space to wage-labour conditions and deals with some of the 
post-Second World War industrial conflicts. 
The phenomenon of labour migration is an important sub-theme in 
the question of the development of wäge labour, especially in the cases 
of the sisal plantations and mines [Rodney et. al., 1983; Sabot, 1979; 
Shivji, 1986]. These works reveal some of the ways wage labour was 
constituted-as well as some of the characteristics of this labour force. 
The NUMEIST study [1977] was prepared by economists and has information 
on the characteristics of the urban wage-labour force, its distribution, 
and income and demographic characteristics. The issue of wage and 
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employment trends has been pursued by Valentine [1981] for the period 
after independence. 
A second major theme, the study of trade unionism, has often 
attracted the attention of the literature on the development of wage- 
labour. For this, the case of Tanzania is not very different from that 
of other African countries. Friedland's Vuta Kamba [1969] is a book- 
length study of the emergence and development of the trade union movement 
in Tanganyika up to 1964. Friedland discusses some of the early forms 
of workers' associations and the creation'of the Labour Department to 
guide them. He discusses the organisation of trade unions during the 
colonial period and shows how they were modelled on British trade unionism 
adapted to colonial Tanganyika. His institutional or, in terms of 
our earlier discussion, conventional approach leads him to argue 
unconvincingly "that Tanganyikan unions did not engage in political 
unionism or, indeed in politics at all to any significant degree ... 
The Tanganyikan unions were economic in their approach and in the success 
of their appeal" [p. 116]. 
Friedland's conclusion, I would argue, arises from a rather narrow 
definition of "political" linked to perceiving institutions as actors, 
rather than from a consideration of the activities of workers or union 
leaders. The insistence by officials of the Labour Department on 
registering and monitoring unions and on ensuring that they should not 
be political is significant. Further, the approach employed by 
Friedland leads him to distinguish economic and political struggle in a 
way which takes no . account of the history of : natiönalist ügg es. iü Africa, 
Workers' demands on employers, who were mostly expatriates, may have 
been initially economic but they could slide (and they did) into opposition 
to colonial rule. Wage-workers were an important section of the 
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nationalist movement; lack of organisational unity between T. F. L. (the 
Tanganyika Federation of Labour) and TANU should not blind analysts to 
this reality. 
Friedland also goes wrong on the significance of independence for 
the labour movement. He underestimates the real control the state had 
over union organisation and activities during the colonial period - union 
autonomy is lost only in 1964 according to him. This, I think, confuses 
form and content of state control. The former changed, while the latter 
remained in the post colonial period. Moreover structural control 
of unions does not guarantee actual control of workers' activities. 
This leaves the issue of actual control open to empirical investigation. 
Attempts to control workers' activities in sisal plantations did not 
always succeed, as for instance the work of Bolton [1978] demonstrates 
The independence period especially the post-Arusha Declaration phase 
awakened renewed interest in labour studies in Tanzania. Initiating 
a third major theme, wage-workers and trade unionism came to be examined 
more and more in the broad context of Tanzania's political economy. 
The position of labour was a central topic in the wide-ranging debate 
on class relations and the post colonial state which took place in 
Tanzania from the late 1960's, and the most influential analyses of the 
political economy of Tanzania have influenced studies on workers and 
industrial relations. Shivji's original contribution has been especially 
important in the literature. The main lines of his thesis can be 
discerned in Shivji [1975; 1985; 1986], of which the main works are 
the first and the last references; the 1985 article is an introduction 
to a collection with other contributors. 
Shivji has aptly summarised his central thesis as follows: 
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The transition from colonialism to neo-colonialism 
was marked by a change in the class character of the 
state; .... During colonialism the commercial and 
merchant bourgeoisie composed mainly of the immigrant 
nationality (Asians) provided the compradorial base 
to the ruling metropolitan bourgeoisie ... On 
independence, the petty bourgeoisie which led the 
independence movement, inherited reins of the state. 
Between 1961 and 1967 this petty bourgeoisie under- 
went significant differentiation in which its state 
based section emerged as a state bourgeoisie. 
[1985, p. 3) 
According to Shivji, in other words, independence in 1961 marked the 
political ascendancy of the petty bourgeoisie, which used the political 
movement TANU in its subsequent struggles with the mainly Asian commercial 
bourgeoisie. The Arusha Declaration and subsequent measures marked 
a decisive turning point in these struggles, leading a faction within 
the petty bourgeoisie to consolidate and carve out for itself an economic 
base, thus developing into a bureaucratic bourgeoisie. 
As Shivji puts it, "The transformation of the state has taken place 
both on the level of state power - its class character - as well as in 
the reorganisation of the state apparatuses. Indeed in life the two 
are inseparable" [p. 5]. Thus, TANU, dominated by traders and the 
salariat without any working class component was a key tool in the 
struggles of the rising petty bourgeoisie. Subsequently, its organ- 
isational hegemony was maintained through the nationalisations and the 
ideology of u_lamaa. 
Shivji's state bourgeoisie is relatively autonomous from imperialism, 
and is seen as exploiting the peasantry and the working class. The 
working class, he maintains, fell victim to the intra-petty bourgeois 
struggles of the early 1960's, which led to the banning of autonomous 
trade unions and the introduction of a state sponsored and controlled 
national union in 1964. The workers' councils introduced in the after- 
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math of the Arusha Declaration were established to serve the interests 
of the bureaucrats, and the hierarchy of institutions set up with token 
workers' representation has the ideological function of appeasing the 
workers and robbing the working class of its best elements. The workers' 
councils represent the 'ideology' - the false consciousness that the 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie would have the workers internalise. 
The aim in this section is not to carry out a comprehensive critique 
of Shivji's work (a number of articles have done so - for example Gibbon 
and Neocosmos [1985] and Stein [1985]). Instead the argument focuses 
on two specific features of the analysis which tend to hamper investigation 
of social processes such as those of work situations, the role of the 
party or trade unionism. These aspects will again be the focus of 
attention in our discussion of the Tanzanian political system in Chapter 
2. 
First, Shivji's formulation is influenced by the instrumentalist 
perspective on the state. The Tanzanian state is viewed as the 
instrument of a class, the petty bourgeoisie, later bureaucratic bourgeoisie, 
or as representing the interests of that class rather than as shaped 
by a number of factors. The inadequacies of the instrumentalist view 
have been pointed out in general terms by several authors; for example, 
Gold et. al. [1975] and Mouzelis [1986]. Among the inadequacies to 
which these writers draw attention are 1) a unidimensional approach 
to social phenomena, and 2) economic reductionism. - Thus (1) the 
approach tends to view state policies and social processes in voluntarist 
terms - neglecting the structural factors which constrain social processes 
and policies. State policies are too complex to be reduced to a reflection 
of the interests of one class or an alliance of classes. Some activities 
of the state, moreover, (2) are not to any degree concerned with promoting 
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the economic interests of a class but relate to more particular concerns 
of the state such as defending its territorial integrity in relation 
to other States or issues of national integration. The activities 
of the state cannot be reduced to only economic functions. Shivji's 
account of Tanzanian politics and society as a whole reflects these 
shortcomings. 
Furthermore, Shivji's perspective has a second, related inadequacy. 
This lies in the fact that in his perception of legal enactments and 
measures taken by the ruling class seem to determine social processes. 
Legal structures, however, do not determine social processes but are 
elements in power struggles. That approach neglects the react. tons and 
activities of the dominated groups and their influences on state activities 
and policies. It also underestimates the degree to which state activities 
may be more the result of the hand of particular members of the state 
bureaucracy who are crucial in the operation of the state machinery and 
who by virtue of their know-how and implementation ability are usually 
close to the formulation of policy. 
Shivji's instrumentalist conception of the state and his formalist 
or structuralist view of political and social processes leads him to 
conclusions which are difficult to defend. The problems begin with 
his treatment of colonial labour policies. Shivji [1986] has a detailed 
history of labour legislation in relation to the character of labour 
during the colonial period and the early independence period. The author 
demonstrates how the colonial labour legislation was utilised to regulate 
and control wage labour. One flaw in his account is the playing down 
of the various forms of workers' collective action and resistance in 
the period of semi-proletarianisation, which he incorrectly considers 
to be individualized [p. 98], thus incorrectly dating the labour movement 
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to the 1930's. The point one would particularly like to make is that 
despite the legislation to regulate and control wage labour, this did 
not stop workers' collective activities in their own defence during the 
1940's and 1950's. 
The 1964 legislation creating NUTA certainly marked a further 
attempt by the state to control workers' activities but, as Bienefeld 
[1979] has argued, this does not determine the role which the unions 
actually played [p. 553]. In other words, the 1964 NUTA Act did not 
mark the death of the trade union movement as Shivji seems to imply 
unless trade unions or workers' activities are reduced to the legal, 
institutional structures. Similarly, the thesis that the Arusha 
Declaration and all the ensuing legislation on workers' organisation 
served the interests of the dominant or ruling class is not only 
problematic from a theoretical point of view: it begs some of the most 
important questions. One of the main areas in which there are gaps 
in our knowledge is the extent to which the designs on the part of the 
dominant groups have actually been realised as regards unions and workers' 
councils, and under what conditions. this has taken place. Shivji's 
analysis merely obscures the need for research into these kinds of 
questions. 
Shivji's work is only the most s3&nificant. of the attemptsto analyse 
the position of labour within the political economy of post-Arusha 
Tanzania. However, several other well-known contributions pose similar 
problems. For example, M. von Freyhold's [1977] employment of 
Poulantzas' structuralist categories tends to suffer from some of the 
inadequacies associated with the instrumentalist view of the state. 
The structural functionalism implied in her approach sees state policies 
and the organisation of the state as being determined by the economic 
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functions they perform. The main function of the state is taken as 
fulfilling the accumulation needs of the society's dominant classes. 
Employing the distinction between "governing class" and "ruling class", 
von Freyhold considers that the state fulfils the interests of the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie (the ruling class), who are in cohesion with 
a (local) governing class. This economic reductionism neglects the 
non-economic aspects of the state and of some state policies referred 
to above in the critique on the instrumentalist notions. The 
structuralist perspective also neglects the influence struggles of the 
dominated classes and groups may have on state organisation and state 
policies. 
Saul's reading of Tanzania's political economy [1979] is more 
optimistic. In his view the class that came to'state power at independence 
was an unformed class which could have initiated either socialist or 
capitalist policies. This arose according to him out of the relatively 
autonomous character of the state and its yet unformed class character. 
It was still composed of a progressive faction and a less progressive 
one. For those reasons the nationalisations of 1967 were "not merely 
a charade" but marked an incomplete break with western capitalism. 
The workers' councils were a bold move to eliminate the obvious alientation 
of labour in the parastatal sector. Indeed the increasing role of the 
Party in economic affairs was a step in the right direction, for this 
is what socialist planning entails. The Party guidelines of 1971 are 
viewed by Saul as a "crucial document in crystalizing popular pressures 
against oligarchic tendencies on the part of the wielders of state power". 
However, there were a number of weaknesses and problems which needed 
to be resolved in order for the industrial relations scene to progress 
forward towards socialism. These weaknesses-according to Saul, included 
Urzýýec, uy 
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the presence of non-radical party functionaries, unclear ideological 
formulations which left room for the cooption of workers' participation 
at enterprise level, and the low level of political consciousness on 
the part of the workers as well as their low cultural level and poor 
technical education. Similar views are expressed in Loxley and Saul 
[1975] on the position of workers in parastatals. 
Plausible as much of it sounds, Saul's discussion is limited by 
lack of information of what actually happens - gaps which tend to be 
filled by prescription. Another inadequacy is the economic functional- 
ism which in the final analysis is present in his conception of the 
state. The state is not, according to him, autonomous from fulfilling 
the functions of capital accumulation. The "relative autonomy" he 
employs is in terms of not being an instrument of one specific class 
- which is as yet an "unformed" one. The functionalism implied in the 
perspective does not explain how and why the state performs the function 
of maintaining the mode of production. 
Cranford Pratt's various writings [e. g. 1976; 1979] give a very 
different view of the post-colonial political economy of Tanzania. In 
Pratt it is the ideas and visionary qualities of the political leadership 
which are held responsible for the positive moves towards socialism, 
as exemplified in the egalitarian measures of the Leadership Code and 
the democratisation of industrial relations through the workers' councils. 
However, this vision of the moral qualities of the leadership as the 
essential determinants of state policies and political institutions 
overstresses the subjective, voluntaristic factors at the expense of 
the objective structural conditions, both internal and external, which 
shape state policies. Pratt also neglects the struggles of other sectors 
of the population and the influence they may have on the emergence of 
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the state policies. 
The literature just reviewed deals with labour and industrial 
relations indirectly, for the main focus of discussion is the nature 
of the socio-political system which emerged in Tanzania after 
independence and especially after the Arusha Declaration. Contributors 
were engaged in one or other debate: was Tanzania on the road to 
socialism? what was the character of the post-colonial state in 
Tanzania? and so on. There is, however, another reason why the organ- 
isation of industrial relations is dealt with in a rather perfunctory 
way. In these discussions, one of the themes that was neglected, as 
Goulbourne [1977] points out, was the political party and its position 
in the political system. This stems from perspectives which neglect 
to account for how political power is organised and exercised. The 
state is perceived as the instrument of dominant class or classes or 
as functional for accumulation, but there is no discussion of how the 
state is organised or how control and domination are effected and 
legitimised. Yet answers to such questions can throw important light 
on societal processes as well as those taking place in work-places. 
An important issue here is: what are the specific and different modes 
of domination and legitimation at the micro-level? 
In the above mentioned seminal article, later published, Goulbourne[1979] 
attempts to redress the balance in the debate on the post-colonial state 
in Tanzania by focusing on the Party. Inspired by Fanon's 
insight concerning the way the independence party transforms itself into 
"an administration", Coulbourne advances the argument that the political 
party in Tanzania, "(unlike parties in developed capitalist formations) 
certainly ... ceases to be an instrument solely 
for mobilising support 
around broadly defined demands, but [is organised in such a way that] 
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it becomes, in addition, an instrument of coercion" [p. 2]. Functionally 
the Party plays a coercive and supervisory role over, for example, the 
educational system and in the field of industrial conflict. - The 
Party acquires this role due to the "need for the dominant petite- 
bourgeoisie to establish firm control over all possible sources of power" 
[p. 2]-in order to strengthen its weak socio-economic base. "This 
preponderance of the state over socio-economic life leads to a pre-emption 
of the activities of politics and forces the state to provide institutions 
whereby the rituals and the forms, if not the substance of political 
life areýseen to be intact" [p. 3]. The form of political organisation 
is centred in the political party. Decisions, (if one extends Goulbourne's 
pre-emption argument) are imposed centrally by the political leadership 
while maintaining some mix of popular participation which is controlled 
to the point of popular depolitization.. 
Goulbourne's stress on the need to. continue investigation on the 
political party due to its importance in the debate on the post-colonial 
state is timely. In broad terms it coincides with the general demands 
voiced recently for approaches which overcome the inadequacies of the 
instrumentalist and structuralist perspectives. In the already-mentioned 
book Mouzelis [1986] for example argues for a new perspective which avoids 
economic reductionism by developing "conceptual tools specific to the 
sphere of politics" [p. 201]. He argues that political structures 
and contradictions can be studied in their own terms without abandoning 
the "political economy" approach and "without falling into the type of 
compartmentalisation of the political and economic spheres which is to 
be found in non-Marxist political science" [p. 204]. Mouzelis thus 
suggests an approach which takes into account the way political power 
is organised and legitimized and the effects of that type of organisation 
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on state policies. Such a perspective promises to throw more light 
than some of the approaches reviewed here on work-place processes such 
as those of a public sector factory. 
Of the labour literature which has dealt directly with industrial 
relations in Tanzania, most was written after 1970 in the wake of 
the introduction of the workers' participation programmes. Much of 
this is rather generalised. Mihyo's contribution on Tanzania in the 
volume on Industrial Relations in Africa [Damachi et. al., 1979], for 
example, deals with the history of trade unionism, outlines joint 
consultation, dispute settlement procedures and the structure of workers' 
participation in Tanzania. This, however, is the industrial relations 
machinery beyond which one needs to go if one is to comprehend the actual 
processes, taking place between management and workers. Earlier Mihyo 
[1975] made an investigation on three cases of industrial disputes in 
which workers were struggling with management in the early 1970's. This 
study gives an insight into the industrial disputes and how they were 
resolved, but the broad setting of the work situation, the work organisation 
and aspects of the enterprise life and distribution of power are not 
treated to any significant extent. The essay deals with workers' unrest 
in the early 1970's occasioned by the 1971 Party Guidelines (Mwongozo), 
which gave the workers the excuse to demand improved wages and conditions 
of service. Mihyo states that "workers' committees were used to oppress 
and exploit the worker with his own consent and acquiescence in the name 
of discipline and efficiency" and that "the workers' councils were a 
mockery of industrial democracy" [p. 66]. Both statements are difficult 
to sustain in the absence of further information on how the union was 
organised and perceived among the workforce. 
Mapolu's edited papers [1976] contain two essays on workers' 
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participation in several enterprises in the early 1970's. While 
providing several insights on the actual workings of the workers' 
councils, the study's analysis is distracted from a consistent and 
positive approach by a pre-established abstract model which serves to 
gauge developments in Tanzanian enterprises. Various moves are 
discredited as ineffective for promoting workers' participation let 
alone workers' control. The a priori model, which has elements of the 
instrumentalist conception of the state, weakens the account of how 
(through the structures of the workers' council or the party branch) 
power is exercised and legitimized. Thus while both Mihyo and Mapolu 
have made significant contributions to Tanzanian labour studies, neither 
really gets to grips with enterprise-level dynamics, and both studies 
serve to highlight the need for research which looks in a more sustained 
way at the relation between workers and managers in particular work-places. 
4 ORIENTATION, ORGANISATION AND METHODS OF THE STUDY 
a) Orientation and Organisation 
From the last section it should be clear that what has been relatively 
lacking in Tanzania is not so much literature on labour and industrial 
relations linked to the evolving economic and political scene, but rather 
empirical studies of what actually happens in factories and other work- 
places. Such studies are not only very few and far between, but have 
an especially important contribution to make in view of the influence 
exercised in Tanzanian social science of economic reductionist conceptions 
of politics and formalist/structuralist approaches to social processes. 
To gain insight into enterprise-level processes and the impact of the 
Arusha Declaration and u'amaa (Tanzanian socialism) on labour relations, 
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we need both more empirical studies of processes in particular work 
situations, and, at a "macro" level, an adjustment of perspectives on 
the political processes as a whole. 
This study is designed to contribute to the literature on Tanzania's 
labour relations in these two ways. It attempts to overcome: 1) the 
limitations imposed by unidimensional and reductionist approaches to 
the study of the post-colonial state in Tanzania - approaches which are 
quite unhelpful in grasping the real context of labour relations and 
the politics employees are involved in at work-places in Tanzania; 
and 2) the lack of empirical studies and especially studies of the 
internal dynamics of work-places and labour organisations (as distinct 
from national-level studies) which take into account the objective situation 
in which employees are involved as well as the way they perceive and 
articulate their interests. In pursuing the above-mentioned objectives, 
the thesis presents case studies of industrial relations in Tanzanian 
public sector factories, which are first set in the wider context of 
the political and economic processes which have historically shaped the 
character of industry and wage-labour in Tanzania. 
Among the factors which have shaped industrial relations are the 
nature of the economy, the character of industry and the level of tech- 
nological development. We therefore need to highlight a number of 
characteristics of industry and industrial work-places, as well as other 
salient characteristics of wage-labour in Tanzania, spanning the colonial 
and post-colonial periods. This is done in Chapter 1. 
Chapter 2 is an examination of the political system in Tanzania. 
The chapter attempts to interpret political processes as shaped by the 
corporatist objectives of the political leadership in search of national 
integration and harmony. These corporatist principles are specifically 
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examined in so far as they relate to labour policies and institutional 
structures in Chapter 3. 
The second part of the thesis - Chapters 4 to 6- presents the case 
study material which is concerned in the main with three broad areas 
of interest to the thesis: a) the work and organisational context; 
b) the factory agencies (union and party branches) and its employees; 
and c) factory issues: decision-making and implementation. The number 
and nature of the case studies, and other details of the methods of the 
study, are explained below. 
A Conclusion draws together the major findings of the research. 
b) Methods of Data Gathering 
This research began and developed against the background of the political 
and ideological changes and labour legislation reforms which occurred 
in Tanzania over the decade or so after 1967. In the beginning I had 
only vague ideas about what I wanted to investigate. There were a 
number of issues I was interested in. These included the ujamaa 
(socialist) experience in Tanzania; the political party and its place 
in Tanzanian society; and industrial democracy or ujamaa in factories 
and how this affected employees' position and conditions. Discussions 
among social scientists tended to focus on the ujamaa experience in the 
countryside with the creation of ulamaa villages and the villagisation 
policy. However, interest in the Party and the political system was 
renewed with the creation of CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi) in 1977. 
Exploratory Research 
In collaboration with a member of staff at the University of Dar 
es Salaam, Dr. H. Goulbourne, I participated in a research project on 
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the political party, its organisation and relation with other institutions 
in socialist construction in Tanzania. The preliminary step was a 
reading of Tanzanian newspapers (Uhuru and The Daily News) for the years 
from 1967 to 1980, focusing on reports on the Party, Labour and Ideology. 
We carried out a number of in-depth interviews with national political 
personalities and Party bureaucrats at the Party headquarters. Information 
sought related to Party organisation and Party activities in economic 
planning and the role of the Party in regard to different political 
instances and organisations. The Party's history and orientation was 
discussed. 
We carried out a reading of minutes of meetings of the National 
Executive Committee and the Central Committee at the Party Headquarters, 
noting their membership and the issues discussed. These meetings are 
confidential and so are the minutes. One of the aims was to evaluate 
the role of these national Party bodies and hence the meaning of the 
recently declared "Party supremacy". 
Our third step was to discuss the relationship between Party officials 
and managers in enterprises outside Dar es Salaam. In-depth interviews 
were carried out with Party branch leaders and union leaders. This 
served for me as very useful experience in clarifying the organisation 
of the Party and some aspects of Party "supremacy". It also helped 
me in identifying more closely and focusing on aspects on which to 
concentrate my research. Finally, these preliminary explorations gave 
me some further useful experience in fieldwork. 
Gradually, in discussion with a number of members of staff at the 
University of Dar es Salaam and the University of Hull, I decided to 
focus on factory studies against the background of industry and politics 
in Tanzania. The preliminary investigations became resource material 
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for my chapters on industry and politics. My exploratory readings 
and research also suggested leads as to what to concentrate on; and 
what documents and other likely sources of information to look for. 
I also gained familiarity with the practice of in-depth interviews with 
management and Party leaders: what could and could not be found out 
by this means; what key issues to concentrate my attention on; how 
to formulate the questions related to issues found in reading of minutes; 
and what to keep my eyes and ears open for during conversations and 
interviews. I also gained some knowledge of factory situations and 
acquaintance with Party and union activities - very crucial in interpreting 
situations and responses from interviewees and the meanings and the 
"culture" of factories. 
As an employee of an educational establishment, I am acquainted 
with many aspects of work-place organisation in Tanzania. Party and 
union meetings are a general feature of Tanzanian society and work 
situations: rare is the month when there are no such meetings. It 
should therefore be added that gaining some information on factory 
situations was for me another, but not completely, different experience. 
The Factory Studies 
The second phase of my collection of information for the case studies 
was carried out for a period of six months during 1983-4. From January 
to April 1983 I carried out research on what I shall call Factory A. 
Another enterprise, Factory B, was investigated from May to the beginning 
of August 1984. During the intervening period I was on an assignment 
to write a report on a rural project. 
Research Sites 
The choice of the research setting was influenced in the first place 
by accessibility. If I wanted to carry out the investigation for some 
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continuous length of time, I needed to choose sites within easy reach 
of my domicile, which is in Dar es Salaam. Research outside Dar es 
Salaam would be costly and therefore impractical given my financial 
limitations. Secondly, Dar es Salaam is the de facto industrial and 
political centre of Tanzania. Thus public enterprises in Dar es Salaam 
were likely to reveal the workings of the industrial organisation and 
political reforms much more quickly than enterprises in other towns. 
Thirdly, I personally knew one or two persons working in the personnel 
offices of factories in the city, which was useful for gaining access 
even though I had ,a letter of introduction from the University of Dar 
es Salaam, the main prerequisite for obtaining the necessary cooperation. 
Choice of Factories 
Factory A- the subject of the main case study - is a wholly 
government-owned enterprise. With slightly over 650 employees, it 
is a medium-sized factory by Tanzanian standards. The factory manu- 
factures hand agricultural implements using imported materials. It 
was and remains one of the more important industrial enterprises for 
the Tanzanian agricultural economy. 
I went to study Factory B some months after my investigation in 
Factory A. Factory B is one of the biggest textile mills in the country. 
The information gathered in this case was particularly concerned with 
workers' councils and Party activities. The factory is larger and so 
I decided to restrict my interviews to 50 workers in the Weaving Section. 
The aim was to use the information from this and other establishments 
to throw extra light on my main case study. 
Techniques of Collecting Information 
Four techniques of collecting information were utilised: 
36 
i) Interviews with Factory Leadership 
a) In-depth interviews with members of management 
The interviews were in the form of a discussion. In Factory 
AI interviewed the Manpower and Administrative Manager, the Personnel 
Officer, Assistant Personnel Officer and the Training Officer on different 
occasions. The interviews dealt with general information on the factory: 
its history, organisational'set-up, production, the workforce, marketing 
and general problems related to the enterprise and various services. 
Interviews went on to cover the different factory agencies created to 
involve the workers and managers' assessment of those agencies. How 
did they view those agencies and their activities? What did management 
consider as positive or negative in the activities of those agencies? 
How did they relate to them? And so on. Information was gathered 
during the interviews and later in less formal discussions. The Personnel 
Officer and the Training Officer were very helpful in discussing some 
issues or events which took place before I went to do the research. 
b) In-depth interviews with Party and union leadership 
In Factory A Lcarried out discussions with the Party Branch 
Secretary, who introduced me to the Party Branch Chairman, the Chairman 
of the union, JUWATA, and the acting Secretary and two members of the 
Party Branch committee. He took me around the factory and introduced 
me to, the Production Manager before seeing a Shift Foreman and a super- 
visor in the Forging and Pressing sections. He took me through different 
departments and explained to me the work process. 
My interviews with the Party and union leaders dealt with the history, 
organisation and activities of the Party branch and the union. I also 
enquired as to what they considered the successes and failures of their 
agencies at the factory. How fervent were their members and what was 
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their relation with management? As I interacted with these represent- 
atives for several weeks, I added some of the information after the more 
"formal" interview-discussion was carried out in the Party office. These 
personalities were interviewed singly. The in-depth interview gave 
the flexibility to discuss issues or stumble on events, as for example 
when one respondent mentioned how managers misuse company property. 
ii) In-depth Interviews with Employees 
I interviewed 60 employees in Factory A. These were from the Materials 
Preparation Section, the Heat Treatment Section, and the Forging and 
Pressing Sections. I concentrated more on workers from the plant sections, 
although I had interviews with two security guards, two secretaries and 
one purchasing officer and accounts clerk. The machine operators were 
all from the shift, which in one week would be the morning shift and 
the following week the afternoon shift (from 3, p. m. ). The interviews 
were carried out in the factory, in the office of the supervisor. I 
asked the foreman to allow the workers to come if they wanted and if' 
possible to get a mix from the older employees and newer ones. My 
evaluation of responses to my invitation is that those who came came 
willingly, were not worried about talking to me (some thought, before 
I introduced myself, that I was an insurance promotions agent), and in 
general responded frankly to my questions. 
For these interviews I used a guide questionnaire to steer the 
discussion-cum-conversation. This helped me to cover the main issues 
I wanted to collect information on and avoid wandering off too far. 
Whatever manner in which the interview developed, I tried to cover items 
like job, education, wage level and membership of the Party and union, 
not always in the same order. The guide questionnaire helped me to 
note the information under the appropriate heading or to fill it in in 
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the appropriate space after the interview. The information sought 
concerned, in addition to the employee's job, education, wages and 
memberships, his or her participation in union and Party activities, 
the meanings attached to these activities and the role seen to be played 
by these organisations. Similar procedures were used for the 50 
interviews in Factory B. 
iii) Documents 
These consisted of copies of the minutes of Workers' Council meetings 
for 1979 to 1982; the minutes of Party meetings, especially the cell 
meetings in the Forging and Pressing Sections from 1975 to 1982; and 
the minutes of JUWATA (union) meetings for the whole factory. The 
documents varied in length and quality. The Workers' Councils minutes 
were long and included reports of departmental activities and figures 
on production, sales and purchases. Some of the JUWATA meeting minutes 
on the other hand, were three-to-four page summaries. Minutes of Party 
meetings were of mixed length; some were as short as four pages, others 
longer. The recording was sometimes a summary; at other times minutes 
recorded what one or other participant said. This proved valuable in 
gauging the participants' contribution in the discussions. 
I was not allowed to make copies of the documents, some of which 
were confidential. However, Ln the course of the first days of reading 
and taking notes I devised a thematic format of recording my notes on 
the minutes and documents. The headings included: recruitment; sanctions; 
promotions; further training; wages; social services; investment 
and marketing decisions. How did the workers' representatives and 
management react to them? What issues were discussed in the different 
sessions and how were they dealt with by the different representatives 
from the agencies in the factory and by management? The Secretary 
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and Chairmen had been working for some years in the factory and their 
recollections of some of the more recent events (e. g. the "compulsory 
leave" episode; the loss of overtime issue; the problems about transport 
or the canteen; thefts; and the matter of "shady deals") complemented 
and could be used to check what I read in the minutes of meetings, and 
vice-versa. 
iv) General Observation and Noting 
In the course of my presence at the factory, in the Plant Section, 
the canteen, the Party office or the administrative block, and in the 
course of interviews or reading of documents, I came across situations, 
some of which were directly relevant for my research. For example, 
I was present when the Chairman of the Party branch was meeting members 
of the branch political committee; or when the Chairman of JUWATA came 
to the Personnel Office with several machine operators who had been warned 
for coming late to work. I was also a witness to numerous relevant 
exchanges in the factory canteen. 
These methods of investigation and gathering information were not 
employed in a sequential manner but were used simultaneously and combined 
in the course of the field work. The combination of different methods 
was especially important in the course of my first days in the factory 
and in my preliminary analyses, serving to further guide me in the investi- 
gation. The use of complementary methods helped to clarify and reinforce 
some of the information which might otherwise have been less than 
completely reliable from the documents or interviews. One advantage 
of the in-depth method is to be able to clarify responses and cross-check 
them if need be. As the interviews were carried out in a form of a 
conversation or discussion, any question I felt was misunderstood I was 
able to reformulate. Sometimes I noted down the information immediately, 
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but other points were noted after the interviews. 
In the course of my investigation I came across two episodes which 
I did not witness but which were significant in illustrating some of 
the issues discussed. One was the compulsory leave given to employees 
of Factory A for two months in 1982. The other was the allegation of 
malpractice in the company. The first event took place before I went 
for the research and I had to reconstruct what happened before, during 
and after the "leave". This was done through documents and interviews. 
The second "event" began before I went for the research and continued 
after. I relied on documents and interviews as well as newspaper 
reports for a picture of what happened. 
A Final Note on Factory B 
The study in Factory B was, as has already been explained, to supplement 
my main study. Here I concentrated on documents and reports of Workers' 
Councils. Records of Workers' Councils in this factory were often 
very long, with the names of who said what and what was suggested and 
agreed in the meetings. This proved particularly valuable in helping 
to assess how agreement or dissent was reached, as distinct from the 
content of decisions. As the main research was concerned chiefly with 
workers in the directly productive sections of Factory A, I chose machine 
operators from the Weaving Section as my interviewees in Factory B, as 
well as interviewing the officials from factory agencies from this large 
enterprise. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF WAGE LABOUR IN TANZANIA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The object of this chapter is to highlight key background information 
on the emergence, development and character of wage labour in Tanzania. 
In doing this, the aim is to gain some understanding of the kind of 
processes which have contributed to the creation of a working class in 
Tanzania. The scope will necessarily be selective, but we will touch 
on aspects of the economic processes which were implanted, the nature 
of the labour policies and the various forms of workers' activities 
during the colonial and the post-independence periods. This selective 
review will form a broad framework which will be useful in later apprec- 
iating labour policies and the position of workers in manufacturing 
public enterprises in the contemporary era. 
In examining the record of the colonial period, three interrelated 
points are stressed. Firstly, wage labour emerged simultaneously with 
the introduction of a new economic system as a result of colonisation. 
The new economic processes did not emerge from the spontaneous internal 
dynamism of the pre-colonial societies of Tanzania, but were the result 
of a dynamism which originated from outside. This has important rami- 
fications. Secondly, the state was directly involved in the creation 
of this new economic system and the emergence and growth of a wage-labour 
force. In other words, it emerges that the colonial state was not only 
the guarantor of societal peace within the given territorial space, but 
was actively and effectively engaged in the process-of creating wage 
labour not only for private enterprises but also for the state. Thirdly, 
the economic system which gradually took root was oriented towards import/ 
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export activities as the key structures of the economy. The wage 
labour force linked with these activities - in export agriculture and 
mining, construction and building, commerce and trading activities, 
and the administrative sectors - represented a small part indeed of the 
total labour force, a tiny minority of permanently wage-employed in the 
midst of semi-employed or those working on the land. 
In other words, the emergence of categories of people who work in 
exchange for a wage or salary, as distinct from the various forms of 
slavery or serfdom, was in Tanzania as in other parts-of Africa generally 
the product of western colonialism-[see Amin, 1976, Ch. 5 for a broad 
picture of the African continent]. Prior to formal colonisation of 
mainland Tanzania, forms of wage labour were found among porters on the 
caravan trade, and their numbers increased with added activities of trade 
companies in the mid-19th century [Iliffe, 1979]. The main focus 
of the discussion in the early part of this chapter, therefore, is the 
pattern of socio-economic development resulting from the impact of the 
colonisation which followed the rise of industrial capitalism in Western 
Europe. The implantation of capitalism in Third World countries and 
the simultaneous development of wage labour manifested itself in different 
forms in each country or region depending on how capitalism was introduced 
in the country, the nature of the societies with which it came into contact 
and the responses of the populations involved. These issues have a 
bearing on the character of wage labour which emerged and how it developed. 
The character of wage labour in Tanzania thus depended on the mode of 
implantation of capitalist relations through colonisation and the responses 
by the precapitalist societies during and after colonisation. 
The "mature" colonial situation in Tanzania was characterised by 
efforts to create and run the above-mentioned extractive (export-oriented 
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agriculture and some mining) and import-export economy. Agriculture 
took two main forms: a plantation wage-labour employing sector and a 
household-based agriculture. The role of the state in this extractive/ 
import economy was to create the conditions and infrastructure for 
servicing such an economy. This consisted of: the constitution of a 
transport and communication network to facilitate the expansion of export 
agriculture and the distribution of imported manufactured goods; 
assistance to employers to procure a labour supply in the face of chronic 
shortages; and the creation of the necessary administration and services 
within the territory in order to maintain some order. This pattern 
of activities shaped both the distribution and the character of colonial 
wage labour. Colonial wage labour was concentrated in plantation agri- 
culture; transport (dockers, railwaymen, transporters); mining; 
government administration; social services and domestic service. 
Manufacturing was negligible. As the new production system did not 
emerge through the natural evolution of the concerned societies, employers 
had considerable difficulties in drawing labour from the pre-capitalist 
social formations. - As in many other Third World regions, resort was 
had to "extra-economic" measures to recruit and procure labour [cf. 
Munslow and Finch, 1984]. The colonial state was active both in using 
forced labour or taxation to force labour out of peasant-household-based 
activities, and in laying down regulations for the treatment and organisa- 
tion of that labour. 
As we shall see, the recruited workmen reacted in a variety of ways, 
either individually or in combination, when faced with this new work 
situation. This was the beginning of trade unionism in Tanzania. 
State legislation enacted in the 1920's and 1930's governing workmen's 
combination was the state's response - its strategy for monitoring, 
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organising and containing the emerging forms of collective action. It 
should not be seen as the origin of trade unionism, I shall argue. 
Faced with an employer who was more often than not a "foreigner", 
workers were susceptible to the nationalist movement as it developed 
in the 1950's. 
The discussion on the "post-colonial" period in the later sections 
of this chapter will identify some of the changes which emerged in the 
pattern of economic development, the role of the post-colonial state 
and its strategy as regards labour. That strategy as manifested in 
the labour policies of the new government was "rooted in the political 
economy which reveals its material basis" [Hyman, 1979, p. 329]. With 
independence in 1961, state power passed into the hands of the leader- 
ship of TANU, the popular nationalist movement. The leadership of the 
independent state was faced primarily with the task of ensuring societal 
unity and cohesion (given the country's many social divisions) while 
supervising an economy whose structures had been erected during the 
colonial period. The experience of the first years of independence 
was to prove that reliance on foreign private investment to meet the 
demand for growth, especially in manufacturing, was misplaced. To meet 
popular needs within the context of national sovereignty, the state 
increasingly became involved in the economy through the extension of 
the public sector, either by new direct investments or, especially after 
1967, by nationalisation. As we shall see, these developments formed 
the material basis for the corporatist labour policies which were a feature 
of the post-independence scene. 
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2 THE GERMAN PERIOD 1885-1920 
Before becoming the German colony of East Africa in 1885 following 
the general "scramble for Africa" among West European powers, Tanzania 
consisted of a multiplicity of societies-and communities with varied 
economic foundations and forms of social organisation, depending in part 
on ecology and history. [Kjekshus, 1977]. On the eve of formal German 
colonisation following the Conference of Berlin, the socio-economic 
situation can be summarised as follows. Along the coast were societies 
dominated by a landed aristocracy headed by the Sultanate in Zanzibar 
and composed of groups of Arab descent. This aristocracy employed 
slave labour on clove plantations and lived on the proceeds of the slave 
and ivory trades with the interior. The southern areas, the north- 
eastern zones around the Usambara Mountains and Mount Kilimanjaro as 
well as the areas near the lakes Victoria and Tanganyika in the north- 
west, were peopled by cultivators relying on household labour or that 
of kin or neighbours. In the north-west there existed a form of socio- 
economic organisation known as nyaruban_ja (a patron and client relation- 
ship based on land and loosely resembling feudalism). In the-more 
widespread form of socio-political organisation, found in the west, 
south-west and southern parts and the nbist parts of the centre of the 
country, cultivators belonged to small or big communities led by a chief, 
in some places known as the ntemi. Members of different households 
had to pay tribute to him in the form of grain or livestock or by 
cultivating his fields during certain days of the rainy season. In 
the dry central parts, clusters of hunters could be found, while in the 
north-central areas the picture was completed by the presence of past- 
oralists organised around households and age-sets [see Sheriff, 1979, 
p. 11 for a short version]. The only forms of wage labour before the 
46 
1880's were found in the caravan trade - porterage and other supporting 
services such as domestic servants and guards. These increased as new 
activities were undertaken by trading companies and missionary societies 
from the 1840's onwards [Iliffe, 1979, p. 279]. 
The establishment of German domination over the communities in this 
territory marked the beginning of a process in which these societies 
were gradually reshaped. The structure's new socio-economic patterns 
were built around two basic processes: (a) creating the conditions for 
the extraction or production and export of raw materials from the 
territory; and (b) the proliferation of imported manufactured products 
from abroad within the country. To advance these processes while at 
the same time protecting Germany's sphere of influence, the colonial 
state was established, with Dar es Salaam becoming the capital in 1891. 
Soon after the turn of the century plans were put into place for 
the construction of the central railway line, which was intended not 
only to open up the interior but to bea strategic line of communication 
for quick movement of troops to quell any uprisings. From 1906 Dar 
es Salaam gradually became the main port and railhead for the interior. 
Further north, another railway was built from Tanga towards the fertile 
areas around Mount Kilimanjaro in 1905. The creation ofa communication 
infrastructure went simultaneously with the creation of an administrative 
structure led by the governor with the local jumbes and akidas occupying 
the lowest ranks. These were locally recruited agents of the German 
colonial state who were used to put pressure on the population to produce 
agricultural commodities such as cotton and oilseeds or to collect 
bee wax and ivory. 
Two main forms of agricultural production developed during-the 
German period: (a) plantation agriculture in rubber and sisal in the 
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north-east and along the central railway between Dar es Salaam and 
Morogoro (this, as Rodney [1979] has noted, was the more important 
system of production with European settler farms mainly restricted to 
the Usambara Mountains being of lesser importance); and (b) peasant 
production of cash crops, mainly relying on household labour, which 
was developing in different parts of the country (e. g. coffee, copra). 
The creation of one territorial entity under a central colonial admini- 
stration and the orientation of agricultural production towards export 
was paralleled by the importation of manufactured goods from abroad, 
mainly Germany. 
These developments had a number of consequences for the economies 
and social structure of the societies within this territorial space. 
First, the country became divided into several discernible and unevenly 
endowed economic zones: (a) the areas where plantation agriculture 
was dominant, mainly sisal around the general area between Morogoro; 
Tanga and Dar es Salaam; (b) the labour-exporting zones - with the 
difficulties of getting labour in the areas near the plantations, labour 
was procured from the relatively poor central-west, west (Kigoma), south- 
west and southern areas; (c) peasant-based production where due to 
favourable ecology and state policy peasant cultivators produced crops 
like coffee (around Mount Kilimanjaro, Bukoba and Rungwe); cotton (in 
the Lake Victoria area); and (d) areas where a mixture of those 
activities could be found. 
Second, the importation of manufactured goods in significant numbers 
led to negative effects on, and the demise of, "traditional" crafts, 
especially those related to iron works and the clothing industry 
[Phillips, 1976, p. 5]. Third, the gradual proliferation of the use 
of money and the need to use money accelerated the transformation of 
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the societies. In order to meet their requirements for such items as 
clothing, hoes and cash for paying taxes, individuals and households 
were induced into money-acquiring activities, either as cash-crop 
cultivators or as wage labourers. Outside merchants, traders and 
employers were the only ones who could provide the needed money. The 
relative self-sufficiency of households and communities was thus 
shattered and with it the basis for the social stratification based on 
age or sex in several parts of the territory. In those areas where 
in the precolonial period social differentiation was noticeable, that 
differentiation was now based on access to and control of cash cropping 
land; control of livestock; access to money through education and 
service in the colonial state; or trading and commercial activities. 
Wage labour developed during the German period within colonial 
administration, transport and construction work (especially railway and 
harbours), agricultural work (forming the bulk of the workforce in non- 
native agriculture), trade and domestic service, with some mining. One 
study [Leubuscher, 1944] estimates that in 1912 there were a total of 
139,515 wage earners in the service of Europeans or a total of 172,000 
wage employees, if police and soldiers (6,000) and others employed by 
coloured employers are included [cited by Stephens, 1968, p. 211. This 
was about 14% of the adult male population. As we have already noticed 
in general terms, the new system of production had not emerged from the 
internal processes of expansion, so that labour procurement initially, 
and indeed for a great part of the colonial period, was difficult. 
Several mechanisms were utilised, at the centre of which was the colonial 
state. Forced labour was utilised for construction and building work. 
Agents of the colonial administration used coercion for various projects 
such as the construction of the railway lines and roads as well as 
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buildings for local administrative centres, known as bomas. Force 
was utilised for procuring labour in agricultural plantations 
or communal projects for the production of cash crops such as cotton 
in south-eastern Tanzania. Another well-known form of labour 
procurement was the imposition of various taxes usually in money. 
In order to fulfil that requirement the population as a whole had two 
main options: engage in cash crop production or search for wage 
employment. Engaging in cash crop production depended on several 
factors: the ecology of the area for cash-cropping, transport possib- 
ilities and the proximity of markets to the area, and the state policy 
on cash crop production in the region. In the less favoured areas 
labour migration was the only available option. The overall result 
led to different regions occupying different positions in the colonial 
economy as mentioned above. 
The changes brought about by the spread of money were reinforced 
by the introduction of a system of formal education. To man the junior 
ranks in the colonial administration, to be employed in education or 
social services or to occupy the position of assistant in commerce or 
the growing import-export trade, one had to pass through the school system 
which was introduced at this time. "About 9% of estimated eligibles 
were receiving some instruction in 1913". [Stephens, 1968, p. 22]. Apart 
from the different sectors of the colonial administration, export- 
agriculture and the import houses, the products of the schools were 
employed by the army as messengers and by religious organisations, 
with increased Christian religious conversions after 1908. 
Wage labour was still in its great part agricultural wage labour 
in the plantations and a few mines and therefore rural. Nevertheless, 
towns like Dar es Salaam and Tanga were growing in importance as harbours, 
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railheads and centres of administration. The growing status of 
Dar es Salaam as the centre of administration for the whole territory, 
as the railhead and harbour for the hinterland and overseas trade 
gradually attracted a growing population from upcountry, with its 
population expanding from a modest few dozens of cultivators and fisher- 
men before 1865 to 5,000 in 1886 and 19,000 in 1913 [Leslie, 1963, p. 21]. 
Sabot [1979, p. 17] gives estimates of 20,000 in 1900 and 22,500-in 1913. 
The story is similar for the growing small centres which emerged 
in many parts of the territory, forming the nucleus of an expanding urban 
population. Many of them began as trading posts and/or centres of 
administration, growing as these two activities and other supporting 
services for the core of the colonial economy expanded. Tanga developed 
as a railhead and harbour for the northern railway and an entreport for 
the interior and the export harbour for the growing sisal production 
in this zone. Moshi developed as a trading post from the railway 
station at the foot of Mount Kilimanjaro. Kigoma/Ujiji, originally 
a centre for the caravan trail and a slave trading post, grew as the 
railway reached the shores of Lake Tanganyika. Tabora, as the railway 
junction to Lake Victoria and towards Lake Tanganyika, developed into 
an important trading, communication and administrative post. Mwanza, 
a fishing village, became the administrative centre for the rich and 
densely populated Lake Victoria districts, and with the railway reaching 
there after the First World War, it expanded in population. Stephens 
[1968, p. 21] provides a useful table which shows populations of principal 
towns of German East Africa in 1896 and 1913. 
The spatial residential division of the towns followed a pattern 
also observed in Dar es Salaam - the racial segregation of the town 
[Leslie, 1963]. The administrative centre manned by Germans contained 
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offices around which residential houses were built. In the commercial 
quarter one found Asiatic people whose place of work and residence was 
usually located in the same house. The African quarters were in the 
outer parts of the town, usually merging into the surrounding villages. 
As Dar es Salaam grew later, this pattern was repeated, each race being 
allocated its residential areas, with the familiar differences in housing 
quality, population density and facilities. 
Labour conditions were similar to those in other colonial situations. 
Though slavery had been officially abolished by the German administration, 
the use of forced labour was normal in the construction industry, with 
flogging and regimentation in work camps and imprisonment of recalcitrant 
labourers. It was perhaps in the sisal plantations that regimentation 
was most pronounced, with the worst conditions among estates run by smaller 
employers with little capital. opting for quick returns on their investments 
[Orde-Browne, 1946; Rodney et. al., 1983]. Poor housing in the form 
of grass huts and poor sanitation has been documented [Rodney et. al., 
1983, pp. 34-35] as well as poor nutrition and a high incidence of disease. 
Wage workers in construction, quarrying and sisal estates were mainly 
unskilled with consequent low pay per assigned task. 
The wage paid in such situations was a "bachelor's wage": the 
reproduction costs of the workers' labour-power and retirement benefits 
were not considered in fixing wage levels. The generally low wages 
meant that wage labour relied for its reproduction on the rural areas 
from which it had been extracted. This had a double disadvantage for 
the household and the rural area from which the labourer had emigrated: 
the loss of able-bodied manpower from the household sector to the wage 
sector; and the necessity to provide support to returning migrants in 
the absence of old-age pension or retirement benefits. 
52 
Workmen's responses to the incorporation into this colonial wage 
labour market took various forms. We have already implied that there 
was resistance to forced labour. Several authors have documented the 
most notable example of such resistance, known as the Maji Maji Uprising 
of 1905 [Iliffe, 1978; Rodney, 1980 1. Sabot [1979] 
notes that "the Gotzen cotton scheme employed large numbers of men against 
their will at extremely low levels of compensation; its existence has 
been put forward as an explanation of the Maji Maji Rebellion" [p. 39]. 
The difficulty of securing sufficient labourers during this period was 
a manifestation of the reticence of large numbers of rural dwellers in 
taking up wage employment. For those, however, who did get engaged 
in, for example, sisal plantations, the presence of hard labour with 
low pay led to many deserting and fleeing to other countries like Kenya. 
This is what happened following the resettlement of labourers from west- 
central Tanzania in areas around sisal plantations between 1900 and 1902. 
Many of them deserted and sought better paid jobs in Kenya or Zanzibar. 
Other labourers deserted even before the termination of their contracts, 
giving up their pay to return to their home areas. One response on 
the part of employers was to attempt to dispense with indigenous labour. 
To meet the chronic shortages in supply, the construction of railways 
had to rely on a significant proportion of imported Indian industrial 
workers. Sisal estates also recruited workers from outside the territory 
[Sabot, 1979, p. 32]. 
Wage labour during these initial stages was not stabilised but 
migrant [Orde-Browne, 1946]. The search for wage employment to meet 
needs for taxation or the buying of imported manufactured goods would 
be carried out during the dry seasons until the "targeted" amount of 
money had been acquired through porterage, domestic work, building or 
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construction. This form of circular migration did tend to weaken the 
development of workers' unity, since they would remain at work-places 
only for limited periods before returning to their home areas. 
However, the early stirrings of workers' collective actions can 
be discerned in the German period. There were workers' mutual aid 
schemes, especially in times of sickness or death. These were based 
on workers from the same district or speaking the same language and 
having similar cultural practices, helping one another, receiving new 
arrivals, arranging taking care of them and introducing them to the 
employer. These same groupings usually led by elders or long-timers 
were utilised to present petitions to the employers for the redress of 
grievances. Desertions and boycotts of harsh employers were also 
organised. 
This point needs to be stressed, for a number of studies trace the 
rise of trade unionism to the passing of-legislation on trade unions 
in 1928, or else to the rise of the unions as a phenomenon of after the 
Second World War. The passing of trade union legislation which came 
somewhat later, during the British colonial period, was an expression 
of attempts by the colonial state to direct and channel already existing 
workers' collective actions into forms which the state could supervise 
and monitor through the Department of Labour. The legislation did not 
create the unions. These emerged spontaneously through efforts of wage 
employees who found themselves in new conditions of wage employment. 
To be sure, these early expressions of workers' unity took 
traditional forms. Leadership of such informal mutual-aid associations 
tended to be in the hands of older migrants, as in many pre-colonial 
situations. Furthermore, the process of creating workers' unity was 
not without its contradictions and breaks - contradictions, which were 
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used by employers. Employers picked some labourers to act as gang 
leaders known as nyamparas (foremen) and utilised language and cultural 
differences to limit the cohesion of their labour force. Weak and 
lacking the recognised forms of a modern labour movement, these early 
efforts of self-organisation were in their substance the early 
development of trade union action. 
3 THE BRITISH PERIOD 
After the First World War, in 1920, mainland Tanzania became a mandate 
territory under a British colonial government. Most of the processes 
of socio-economic transformation which had been initiated during the 
German period were continued. On the other hand, the uncertain 
political future of the territory in the international political situation 
following the First World War was not very conducive to increased foreign 
investments [Leubuscher, 1944]. This relative lack of metropolitan 
interest in the development of the territory was aggravated by the 
economic crisis of the 1930's. 
Among the economic innovations which did occur in the inter-war 
years and which have a direct bearing on wage employment were the extensions 
to infrastructure for communications and transport. The rail link between 
Tabora and Mwanza was completed in 1928; road construction continued, 
a telegraph service was introduced. Mining expanded, with gold mining 
in Musoma, Geita, Lupa and Sekenke; diamond mining; salt, tin ores 
and mica [Leubuscher, 1944, pp. 54-56]. The great labour-employing 
sector remained the sisal plantations, which recovered following the 
War. Sisal growing was extended along the central line. The Tanganyika 
Sisal Growers' Association was formed in 1923 to coordinate activities 
of plantation employers from many nationalities who had bought the estates 
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after the War. Wage employment in this sector continued to grow 
[Leubuscher, 1944, pp. 62-63;. Rodney et. al., 1983, p. 31]. Other 
notable sectors of wage-employment were in transport, domestic service 
and government administration, and there was now saielocal industry, including 
small bakeries and repair workshops, as well as a growing number of 
ginneries for cotton [Stephens, 1968, p. 48, Table 10]. The growing 
of agricultural export crops, other than sisal, such as coffee and cotton 
was mainly by smallholder peasant households. Coffee production on 
this basis had expanded, for instance, around Kilimanjaro and in Bukoba. 
By the 1930's, the Kilimanjaro Native Coffee Union (a cooperative) had 
been formed to deal with peasant-grown coffee. Cotton production, which 
had been introduced in the Lake Victoria zone, was linked to a number 
of Asian-owned ginneries. 
As the mandate authority, the British colonial government became 
involved from the 1920's in regulations governing labour. In 1922 
through the Involuntary Service (Abolition) Ordinance, forced labour was 
abolished. The main legislation, which dates from 1923 and was amended 
in 1926, was the Master and Native Servant Ordinance, which regulated 
terms of contract for recruiting and employing African wage---labour. 
This was complemented by the relaxation of forced labour except for 
public works; the provision of housing, food and health services for 
employees; and the recourse to court in case of a breach of a work 
contract, rather than resort to the employer's summary powers for 
sanctioning his employees. 
In order to oversee implementation of and adherence to these laws, 
the Labour Department was formed in 1926 as a special branch of the 
colonial government. In 1938 a Labour Inspectorate was formed to 
supervise labour and safety conditions in work places. Through the 
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Labour Department, the state took charge of labour recruitment, which 
remained difficult, given the shortages of labour supplies chronic 
during this period. The Department was in charge of setting up 
transit camps and running them for labour from upcountry passing through 
the labour routes especially in Kilosa, Kimamba and Muheza. Safety 
conditions especially in the mines came under the Department's brief. 
Other important activities included supervision of modes of wage payment 
and medical care for labour migrants. Administrative officers in the 
districts became key figures in regulating labour recruitment [Friedland, 
1969, p. 32f]. 
Legislation on trade unionism was also passed during this period. 
Prior to 1932, the year the Ordinance was passed, ,a number of unions 
had been formed: among civil servants - and teachers - the Tanganyika 
Teachers and African Civil Servants Association (1922); the Tanganyika 
Railways Asiatic Union (1925); and the Railway African Association (1929). 
These had existed often as "staff associations" for mutual welfare and 
social and cultural activities. The presence of anonymous and spontaneous 
African associations with political undertones in an urban context such 
as Dar es Salaam, with which many employees were undoubtedly in contact 
[Iliffe, 1979, p. 392] was regarded as potentially disruptive. The 
registration of Trade Unions with the government was made compulsory 
as a means of supervising their activities with the view that they should 
not be political and deal only with collective bargaining. Later, after 
the Second World War, various models were experimented with in further 
efforts to regulate labour relations in the wake of increasing wage 
employment. 
The foresight shown by the experienced colonial administrators who 
initiated the recognition and supervision of trade unions in Tanganyika 
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was acquired through examples from other territories, through conferences 
of Labour Commissioners in East and Central Africa [Friedland, 1969, 
p. 35]. Experience was to prove them correct despite objections by 
some local employers particularly in the sisal estates. The seeds of 
state control over unions and workmen's collective activities were sown 
-a legacy which was to be developed and enhanced during the subsequent 
decades. 
The last two decades of colonial rule represent a discernible phase, 
with marked changes in the development and condition of wage labour in 
the territory. Following the Second World War and during the 1950's 
a number of factors emerged which bore on labour. Reading the historio- 
graphy of this period a number of crucial issues are discernible. Firstly, 
it was during this period that the British colonial state, now the 
trusteeship authority, began to be directly involved in economic activities 
within the territory. Apart from creating the administrative structures 
and laying down the necessary infrastrucutre, especially transport, for 
the functioning of the economy and facilitating the recruitment and 
organisation of labour, the colonial state took'on a more actively 
promotional and even entrepreneurial role. Secondly, wage labour 
increased now not only in the agricultural sector but also as a conse- 
quence of the emergence of manufacturing industry, financed mainly by 
foreign private owners. 
A third development was that the deterioration of economic 
opportunities in some rural areas without cash crops, and the recurrence 
of droughts, increased the availability of potential wage labourers and 
led to the presence of numbers of unemployed especially in Dar es Salaam. 
Fourthly, the increased registration of trade unions and the stirrings 
among workers led to the state's experimenting with different ways of 
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organising the work-force. Fifthly, the emergence of an organised 
nationalist movement, spearheaded by TANU raised mixed reactions among 
the trade union leadership in terms of the relationship between the two 
organisations. However, during the 1955-58 period, most wage-earners 
supported TANU [Iliffe, 1979, p. 542], as one of the ways of advancing 
their interests in their struggle with mostly foreign employers and 
against discriminatory, often racist, employer practices. Learning 
from the example of the nationalist movement which was working towards 
a unified organisation, trade unionists formed the T. F. L. (The 
Tanganyika Federation of Labour) in 1955 as the central organisation 
for trade union activities. The remainder of this section examines 
the record of the two decades before independence with special reference 
to the above factors. 
State intervention in the agricultural sector started with government 
regulation of the manner and quantities in which peasant-based crops 
such as cotton and coffee were grown. With the War the growing of such 
crops as cotton and foodstuffs was enforced by administrative fiat under 
the Emergency Defence Regulations of 1940 and The Native Authority Ordinance 
of 1942 [Bowles, 1980, p. 168]. State Marketing Boards with a monopoly 
of marketing major crops were instituted: for tea in 1950, coffee in 
1957 (changing the Native Coffee Ordinance of 1940), cotton in 1952 and 
other crops in 1949. The state's direct involvement in agricultural 
production occured with the ill-fated state-sponsored Groundnut Scheme, 
administered by the Overseas Food Corporation funded by the British 
government. By 1949 the Scheme employed about 27,000 Africans at Kongwa, 
Nachingwea, and Urambo before it collapsed despite heavy investments 
to the tune of £36.5 million [Stephens, 1968, pp. 82-83]. 
Demand for sisal cordage during the Second World War and after 
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(especially during the Korean War) increased, boosting sisal growing 
and raising sisal employment, as documented by Rodney et al. [1983]. 
Ten years later the demand for sisal cordage was to collapse, resulting 
in a fall in wage employment in this sector in the early 1960's. The 
sector which did begin to generate at least relatively an increase in 
employment was manufacturing. 
Manufacturing before this time had been restricted to agricultural 
processing of cotton, rice, maize and coffe; sisal decortication; small 
soap factories; bakeries; and some printers. A brewery, a subsidiary 
of East African Breweries, and a shoe factory (Bata Shoe Company) were 
the only sizeable factories, with Unga Ltd. (millers). Shortages of 
consumer products from overseas in the conditions of war had led to 
the growth of import substitution industries in several colonies. 
However, the satellite position of Tanzania in relation to Kenya (with 
whom there had been a customs union since 1927) meant that relatively 
few such industries were set up. Those that were established included 
a metal box factory, a paints factory, a meat packaging plant, 
a bottling plant, and a car and general retreading company for vehicle 
repair. These were properties of multinational companies. In the meat 
plant, Tanganyika Packers Ltd., the colonial government had a 51% share. 
In Williamson Diamonds opened at this time, the state had 50% of the 
shares and it had 81% in the Nyanza salt mines at Uvinza. In 1960 the 
first textile mill was set up. A number of small establishments were 
also set up by Asian businessmen. As Coulson [1982, p. 61, Table 3.1] 
has remarked, however, all the above were small establishments (the 
textile factory after expansion employing 687 workers, a blanket factory 
190, a garment manufacturer 350). 
Folowing post-Second World War development in attitudes towards 
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the colonies expressed in the 1945 Colonial Development and Welfare 
Act, a plan was drawn up for Tanzania which would encompass a 10 year 
period with government capital funding for social services such as town 
planning, the re-establishment of a Labour Department, the building 
of infrastructure and public works as well as social services, especially 
education and health, [Stephens, 1968, pp. 80-89]. This heralded an 
increase in employment in the government sector both in public works 
and in the social services [Stephens, 1968, p. 100, Table 26]. Earlier 
neglect of African education was followed by increased efforts in education 
but the structure created was highly elitist, with extremely small 
numbers entering secondary and university levels. "Only 14 per cent 
of those who attained the final standard of primary school went on to 
middle school and the size of enrollment in the first standard of 
secondary school was only 13% as large as the final year of middle 
school" [Stephens, 1968, p. 88]. 
Sabot [1979, p. 22] gives a summary of the balance sheet for wage 
employment in 1952. He estimates that over 50% of employees were in 
the agricultural sector, the bulk of them in sisal plantations owned 
by private foreign capital. About 4.6% were employed in private house- 
holds. Another 22.7% were employed in non-agricultural private industry, 
which encompassed mining, construction, transport and commerce; about 
22.4% of this employment in non-agricultural private industry was in 
manufacturing. Government administration and government-related 
services employed 20.2% of total wage employment, which for that year 
is estimated to have been 443,597. 
The proportion of those more or less permanently employed still 
constituted a small proportion of the total labour force. Sabot [1979, 
p. 64] has calculated that the proportion of the male labour force in 
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wage employment was 19% in 1948 and 17% in 1957. One has to bear in 
mind, however, the under-numeration of those engaged by "African small- 
holders" and the casual or temporary employees in urban centres. 
The increasing numbers in wage-employment coupled with growing 
stabilisation in urban areas combined to create conditions for increased 
workers' collective action to demand better wages and improvement of 
working conditions. It remained the employers' practice to offer low 
wages during the later colonial period. Strenuous work, especially 
in the sisal estates, coupled with labour practices such as the use of 
the kipande (card) system and the harsh forms of supervision prevalent 
in many work places could lead to discontent, and this manifested itself 
increasingly at this time. After the Second World War, wages received 
by "87% of government employees in Dar es Salam [were of a level] on 
which they cannot possibly subsist without getting into debt" [quoted 
in Iliffe, 1979, p. 354]. "Workers in the private sectors, such as 
dock workers, probably fell behind inflation", and this low rate of pay 
was the pattern for all sectors due to the rising cost of living [Iliffe, 
1979, pp. 352-354]. Several writers have remarked on the growth of 
trade union organisation at this time culminating in the creation of 
T. F. L. in1955 as an umbrella organisation uniting different groups of 
African employees. The increase in union activity was a reflection 
of the growing collective forms of action by workers in their work in 
relation to the employers. It was in this period that widespread 
strikes began to take place. 
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Recruitment for wage employment was from various sources but mainly 
tapped the rural areas. Labour migration continued to be chiefly from 
those areas without a viable cash crop or livestock economy, either due 
to ecological conditions (such as in central and some southern areas 
of Tanzania), but more often, as in the case of western and south-western 
Tanzania, due to distances from the main export exits- and routes. In 
this regard famine and drought in 1943 and 1950 were a great catalyst. 
With the deterioration of economic conditions in the peasant economy, 
labour was thus pushed to search for paid employment in cash cropping 
areas (e. g. Sukumaland) and towards the sisal zones. A recruitment 
bureau known as SILABU began to operate. This has been documented with 
respect to the increase in numbers of peasants in search of work in the 
process of rural-rural and rural-urban migration [Sabot, 1979, I and 
II]. 
It was at this time that, for example, Dar es Salaam witnessed an 
increase in unemployed people. Not only had rural-urban migration 
accelerated, but Dar es Salaam was attracting a greater proportion of 
rural-urban migrants. Of the employed labour outside the agricultural 
sector, an increasingly large proportion was to be found in Dar es Salaam 
as the commercial, transport and administrative capital, soon to house 
the little manufacturing industry to be found in the country. 
Another contributory source of labour employment and unemployment 
was the growing numbers emerging from the school system, which had limited 
places for secondary and higher education. Primary school leavers with 
four years of formal education would tend to move to urban centres in 
search of employment. For those with higher education paid employment 
was the goal of going to school in the first place. 
Wage labour began at this time to be more stabilised and less 
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cyclically migrant. Earlier migration for work was undertaken as a 
means of earning money to fulfil needs which could not be catered for 
in the rural economies. It was a form of subsidy or complement to 
a basically agricultural, rurally-based, household economy. Now, 
increasingly wage employment was taking a more central role in a house- 
hold's budget, particularly for those who were now being accompanied 
by their wives. The nature of work-in government administration and 
services, manufacturing industry and processing or transport and communi- 
cations, necessitated a more stable workforce which after the initial 
instruction to attain the basic skills for the jobs, had to be retained 
by the employer if work was to be done with the minimum of interruptions. 
This contrasts with the nature of work in sisal estates. There the 
bulk of activities which employed large quantities of labour consisted 
in activities which utilised "skills" which had been learnt in the peasant 
agricultural economy and needed strength. These included clearing 
the bush, hoeing, weeding, cutting of sisal leaves and carrying sisal 
bundles. This increasing stabilisation of labour and the increase of 
numbers of people looking for jobs meant an increase in job competition 
among urban dwellers. 
Labour employment in the late colonial period showed a variety of 
conditions from the basically rural-based agricultural labourers in sisal 
estates to the urban-based dockers, railworkers and junior civil servants. 
Skills differed according to work. Most jobs in sisal estates needed 
only experience with agricultural work, with the more skilled jobs such 
as clerks or machine technicians falling to Asian or European employees. 
A similar hierarchy based on race could be discerned in the railways, 
with manual jobs going to African employees and the more responsible, 
trained jobs (white collar or engineering) falling into the hands of 
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Europeans or Asians. In construction and administration the pattern 
was similar. European employees received 20 to 30 times more than 
African manual workers. Businesses were usually owned by foreign 
private entrepreneurs or local Asian businessmen, who logically had the 
final say in such matters. 
Despite the Masters and Native Servants Ordinance governing terms 
of contract, the lack of personnel to supervise the implementation of 
labour legislation, and the collusion between Labour Department officials 
and employers, meant that employers had a free hand as regards employment 
conditions and contract terms, maintaining monopsonic power over employ- 
ment, and wages, and the right to impose summary dismissals. There 
was no legally enforced minimum wage despite legislation in 1939 giving 
a mandate to government to fix wages. The first minimum wage took effect 
in 1957 for workers in Dar es Salaam and only after independence in 1963 
for the whole country [Sabot, 1979, p. 207]. 
As already noted, workers' restlessness grew with the rising cost 
of living in Dar es Salaam during the war and after. This manifested 
itself first among the dockworkers of Dar es Salaam, one of the more 
organised sections of the employed, who conducted four strikes between 
1939 and 1950. It is remarkable that the 1947 strike was supported 
by other workmen including railwaymen, agricultural workers, miners and 
teachers in different parts of the country [Iliffe, 1970, pp. 119-148]. 
This was both a protest effort to improve their lot, and an attack on 
the colonial employment system. The importance of the work at the 
harbour and the potential for civil disturbances made the colonial state 
intervene in all four strikes, and the 1950 strike led to the dissolution 
of the Dockworkers Union by order of the High Court. For the next five 
years employers and state sought other means of labour control. This 
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was through the creation of staff councils among dockers and sisal 
estate workers; the adoption of the Employment Ordinance, which was 
being drafted from 1953; and the reguldtions governing unionism in 
the wake of the creation of the T. F. L. in 1955. 
The increase in the numbers of registered trade unions during the 
1940's showed the workers' increased militancy [Friedland, 1969]. 
Unionism had been encouraged by the Labour Department despite the 
reticence of many employers. However, after the experience of the 
dockers' militancy and the spate of strikes mounted by this stable 
labour force, unions were less favourably looked upon, by the government. 
There was increased interest in Joint Staff Councils, which would bring 
together representatives of workers to air and express their grievances 
with management over social problems affecting workers and iron out day- 
to-day frictions that might arise. The Staff Councils would discuss 
work conditions, serve as a channel of communication between management 
and the workforce and promote a spirit of cooperation [Friedland, 1969, 
p. 37]. This form of direct relationship between workers and employers 
was of course liable to be controlled by the more organised and know- 
ledgeable employers, rather than the employees who were less experienced 
in "bureaucratic instrumentalities". They served as a means of 
excluding unions, which, not being tied to one work place or employer, 
had the potential of being more militant. 
The Employment Ordinance of 1953 sought to alleviate some of the 
malpractices and gaps as regards work and employment contracts. It 
had sections dealing with the necessity of a registered written contract 
for employees and employers, with consequent sanctions for any breaches. 
Settlement of disputes was to be through the Labour Commissioner, thus 
limiting the employer's powers for summary dismissal. Other sections 
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governed child employment, medical examination, housing and food provision 
- though most of these were not usually adhered to. The key section 
was the payment of wages in legal tender and the abolition of the truck 
system or the payment of wages in kind. The legislation reflected 
the perceived necessity to stabilise labour in paid employment. Many 
other rights of employees were to be recognised in law only after inde- 
pendence. Colonial labour legislation still favoured the employer, 
leaving wide areas to his discretion. 
One other means utilised by the colonial state to reduce the efficacy 
of trade union struggles was the insistence that unions should not be 
tied to political parties. The rise of the nationalist movement TANU 
gave a strong impetus to the creation of the T. F. L. in 1955 as the central 
federation of trade unions, grouping several industrial unions with 
national scope into one general union of workers in transport, construction 
and light manufacturing. Structurally they were autonomous unions 
federated to the T. F. L. The T. F. L. was registered by the state on 
condition that the unions would not involve themselves in politics. 
Though many leaders and members of several unions affiliated to T. F. L. 
were members of TAND, there was no organisational link between the two 
structures. 
It is, in other words, a myth that there were in the colonial period 
no laws limiting the independence of trade unionism. On the contrary, 
state regulations curbed the free activity of unionism in various ways, 
including the prevention a link-up with TANU. Paradoxically, with 
independence unionism came to be regulated through affiliation to the 
Party and incorporation into a new type of political system. The 
differences in the positions of labour and unionism during the colonial 
period and after independence does not lie in the presence or absence 
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of state control but in the forms state control takes, in the different 
strategies employed by the state and employers to organise, regulate 
and control labour. 
4 THE PERIOD OF INDEPENDENCE 
At independence agriculture was the main economic activity of mainland 
Tanzania, accounting for over 50 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product. 
Agricultural production was carried out by household-based peasants 
(partly for subsistence and partly for sale) and by large plantations 
mainly for export. Smallholder households produced the bulk of cotton, 
coffee, skins and hides for export, while export sisal and tea was by 
foreign-owned companies. The marketing of peasant produce had greatly 
increased, especially during the 1950's, but was controlled by export 
companies. Imports contrasted with exports in that they consisted largely 
of manufactured products: machinery, transport equipment, chemicals, 
textiles etc. [Smith, 1966, pp. 458-459, Tables]. The destination 
of exports and the source of net imports was mainly Western Europe. 
The banks were agencies of overseas banks, Barclays, D. C. O., The Standard 
Bank, The National and Grindlays [van de Laar, 1972, p. 84], as were 
the insurance companies. Industry was, as we have seen, limited. 
Independence in 1961 and the creation of a separate political entity 
led the government to try to reduce the relatively satellite position 
of the country with regard to imports of manufactured goods from industries 
based overseas or in Kenya. Despite this aim, however, the policies 
followed the basic industrial pattern of the colonial period: industrial 
development took place in primary and secondary processing of agricultural 
products, and in import substituting industries, especially textiles 
and other consumer items. The industries tended to be privately owned 
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(mainly as branches of foreign corporations), with a heavy dependence 
on imported machinery and other manufacturing inputs. 
The Three Year Plan for Tanganyika 1962/64 was built on the 
Development Plan for Tanganyika initiated by the colonial government. 
It envisaged industrial growth in the hands of private investors as had 
been recommended by a World Bank Mission which had been invited by the 
colonial government to make a study of development potential in 
Tanganyika. The government's main role consisted in running the 
supportive structures such as. water and electricity; the training of 
personnel through the educational system and maintenance of industrial 
peace. A number of incentives were offered to investors as well as 
protection through the Foreign Investment Protection Act of 1963, guarant- 
eeing compensation in the case of nationalisation. In some instances, 
though, the State was to have a share in some of the industrial enterprises. 
Following the Kampala Agreement of 1964, which tried to redress the trade 
and industrial imbalance between the three East African countries of 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, Tanzania was allocated certain industries 
including aluminium, radio assembly and tyie manufacture which would serve 
the whole of the East African market and the encouragement of increased 
production for consumer industries in footwear, cement, cigarettes 
amongst others. 
The first years of independence saw the establishment of Tasini 
Textiles, jointly owned by a Netherlands textile corporation, Smith 
Mackenzie and Co., Dalgety (E. A. ), the Victoria Federation of Co-operative 
Unions and The Tanganyika Development Finance, partly owned by the 
Netherlands government (1961). The Mwanza Textile Mill (owned by 
NDC, VFCU and Amenital Holding Registered Trust) began operating under 
management by Maurer Textiles S. A. of Geneva and Textil Consult of Vaduz. 
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Other textile mills were set up by local Indian entrepreneurs. Other 
types of new import substitution activities included a paint plant 
owned by Leyland Paints (1963), an aluminium factory established by 
Aluminium African Ltd. in 1964 and a radio assembly plant by Philips 
Electronics of Holland - all of which were given tariff protection to 
varying degrees. The Matsushita Electric Company of Japan had a 
battery factory start production in Dar es Salaam. In agricultural 
processing the main development was the construction of a cashew nut 
decortication plant (Tanita) in 1963, with the Tanzania government having 
40% of shares and the rest owned by a varietyäprivate foreign financiers. 
A number of sisal cordage rope and twine factories were set up by foreign 
corporations or local Asian businessmen. 
Rweyemamu [1973] has documented the case of the capital goods sector, 
or rather the lack of it at independence, and the need to import a wide 
range of intermediate inputs and raw materials: iron, steel, chemicals, 
petroleum products and fertilisers. In 1966, for example, the small 
Sapa Chemical Industries began operations, and an increasing number of 
garages and repair workshops appeared during this phase. Industrial 
location at this time tended to be restricted to Dar es Salaam. During 
the later period, after 1967, this tendency was reduced by deliberate policy, wirh other 
towns like Arusts, M, anza, Tanga and Morogoro appearing in the picture. 
The First Five Year Plan (1964-1969) reflected much the same 
priorities with 53% of planned investments to be contributed by government 
(central, local and E. A. common services) and 47% by the private sector. 
Of public sector investment 28.4% would be for social development 
(housing, town development and education), 24% for industry; 13.5% for 
commerce; 15% in agriculture and 16% in economic infrastructure. 
Private investment would be dominant in industry and commerce. It is 
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important to note further that of government's investments 78% would 
be from external financing, 14% from domestic borrowing and 8% from 
taxes [Rweyemamu, 1973, pp. 49-51]. Further, the private sector was 
mainly owned by foreign nationals or nationals of "Asian" descent. 
Such an economy, dominated by "non-Africans" could have been 
expected to prove difficult for a TANU government - for a government 
which had come to power through African nationalism; a government which 
wanted to maintain its authority and legitimacy in the society as well as to 
make national independence more meaningful over and above the fact of 
having a national flag and a national anthem. In response to political 
pressure the government gradually got more involved in productive 
activities. , 
While in the colonial period state involvement had arisen 
from the need to increase sources of agricultural products either for 
food or as dollar earners in the aftermath of the War, it was the 
independent government's strategy for societal integration, peace and 
legitimacy that prompted the state's increased involvement in economic 
activities. 
Against this background, even before the Arusha Declaration, the 
state took several measures to get involved directly in the economy. 
In 1964 the National Development Corporation was formed as the industrial 
arm of government. It took over former Tanganyika Development Corp- 
oration's holdings (Tanganyika Packers, Mwadui Mine, Uvinza Salt Mines 
as well as mining, hotels and ranches belonging to the Tanganyika 
Agricultural Corporation). NDC was charged with developing the 
country's industries. In the import and export trade the government 
took 90% in Intrata and a monopoly in the export of major agricultural 
crops, namely cotton, coffee, sisal, cashew nuts and major food grains. 
In the financial sector, the Central Bank was created in 1966, along 
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with a government Insurance Company, and a Tanganyika Bank of Commerce, 
as well as the Cooperative Bank to facilitate loans mainly for 
agricultural producer cooperatives. Though private industry and 
commerce was still the prime mover of the economy during these early 
1960's, the state acquired an increasing share in economic activities 
with assets distributed among several sectors [Clark, 1978, p. 102, 
Table 25]. In the manufacturing industry, for example, parastatals 
accounted for 24 per cent of total manufacturing investment [Clark, 1978, 
p. 127]. 
The proportion of wage-employment attributable to government was 
similarly enhanced. This was mainly due to the growth of the civil 
service, public services, infrastructure and public utilities after 
independence. Overall wage employment was in decline during the last 
two years of colonial rule and continued to do so after independence. 
This decline was pronounced in the private sector especially in sisal 
plantations. In contrast, over the 1962-67 period government employment 
rose by nearly 5 per cent per annum [Valentine, 1981, p. 17]. Para- 
statals accounted for 1.4 per cent of wage employment in 1964, but by 
1967 that had risen to 7.5 per cent. "The proportion of total wage- 
earners employed in the public sector increased from 27% in 1962 to 
36% in 1967; the proportion reached a high of 43% in 1974" [Valentine, 
1981, p. 18]. 
The state was therefore directly concerned about the question of 
wages and conditions of workers, being the main employer.. It 
was also concerned about the organisation and control of the labour and 
the maintenance of industrial peace, not only in its own establishments 
but also in those owned and run by private capital - in order to 
encourage and maintain investment climate especially from abroad. This 
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had to be balanced against the pressures to improve the general economic 
welfare of the general population. The labour policies adopted at 
this time were the political leadership's responses to maintaining the 
balance between improving the workmen's conditions and the constraints 
created by the dominance of private foreign capital. These policies 
will be discussed further in Chapter 3. 
At the same time as the balance between private and public employment 
was shifting for the reasons given, so too was the rural urban balance. 
The 1960's like the '50s were years of accelerated growth in urban 
population, especially in Dar es Salaam and Mwanza. A number of circum- 
stances combined to create the conditions for rural-urban migration 
which was the main factor for this urban growth. One of these was the 
deterioration of living conditions among rural dwellers in different 
parts of the country. In the early colonial period the search for wage 
employment had been sparked by state action. Under the new circumstances, 
peasants' search for money and the failure in some areas to meet the 
demands for money through agricultural work (compounded often by droughts) 
led some rural dwellers to seek employment in the towns. Another was 
related to the first. Wage employment opportunities were mainly in 
urban centres, which consequently drew not only rural cultivators but 
also many of the growing number of primary school-leavers in search of 
wage employment. A greater part of the-rural-urban migrants came from 
relatively poor rural areas or from areas where they felt they could 
not make ends meet. 
Sabot [1972] and the NUMEIST [1972, pp. 11-12] have documented this 
process as regards the population of six major towns in mainland 
Tanzania which totalled 62,500 in 1948: "... from 1948 to 1971, the 
population nearly quadrupled, implying an average annual growth rate of 6. )% 
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of which "... threequarters, or nearly 130,000 were made up of people 
born elsewhere who left their birth-place to come to one of the six 
towns". The dramatic population increases for Dar es Salaam are shown 
in the fact that in 1971,82% of its population were not born in Dar 
es Salaam [Sabot, 1972, p. 49]. Its population rose from 69,200 in 
1948 to 280,603 in 1967, and further to 769,445 by 1978. If the figures 
for the whole Tanzanian population are examined, the percentage of urban 
population has risen from 2.6% in 1948, to 6% in 1967 and 13.3% 
in 1978 (total population figures from the 1978 Population Census, Vol. 
IV, p. 1, Table 1, are 7,500,000 in 1948; 11,958,654 in 1967 and 
17,036,497 in 1978). 
Administration and commerce were the major activities of many towns 
such as Dar es Salaam. These gave the initial employment to those 
with formal training for work in administration, or manual work in 
commerce. Employment expanded in the services (education, medical) 
for those with some formal education. Many schools (higher) and 
hospitals were in urban areas. Industries, according to Sabot [1979] 
were placed by their owners in urban areas (mainly Dar es Salaam) where 
an existing infrastructure was ready at hand to get raw materials from 
abroad and a sizeable market was available. Sabot [1974, p. 71] estimated 
that in 1961 Dar es Salaam had 9.4% of the country's total wage employm t and that 
by 1970 it was 21.1%. For non-agricultural wage employment it was 
19.3% in 1961 and 29.6% in 1970. Offers for work remained limited to 
the construction industry for those who had not gone further in formal 
education, as the manufacturing industry remained limited. 
The urban population consisted of the following main categories: 
(a) The "permanent" employed. These were those in regular employment, 
their conditions and pay generally regulated by labour legislation and 
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trade union laws. A section were technically trained in one field or 
another, while another section consisted of the less skilled employees. 
(b) The second broad category were the casual employed: urban dwellers 
who had no permanent jobs but depended on casual and temporary work. 
Some of them often engaged in small-scale activities as self employed 
but more often they were "employed" without adherence to the statutory 
regulations on pay, hours of work, sick pay, etc. Lastly there were 
(c)"the self-employed. " [Sabot, 1979, passim]. 
The combination of rapid urban growth with limited employment 
opportunities not only placed a heavy burden on social services such 
as housing, transport and education. In a situation where there were 
no unemployment benefits, it also affected workers' budgets, since those 
regularly and permanently employed needed to support those irregularly 
working. The presence of many potential job takers also created 
bargaining conditions favourable to the employer over the permanent 
employee and affected his margin of militancy. Especially the less 
skilled, less technically trained, groups among the permanently employed 
tended to be vulnerable in their jobs. 
Wage-employment furthermore still extended to only a small section 
of the Tanzanian labour force. By 1980, only 6.9% of the Tanzanian 
labour force were in wage employment [ILO, 1982, p. 66, Table 6.4]. 
Manufacturing industry by 1980 accounted for about 16.1% of wage 
employment, with agriculture taking about one third [ILO, 1982, p. 67, 
Table 6.5]. 
As we have seen, the industry created was the import substitution 
type of industry. It was thus dependent on imported machinery, spare 
parts, chemicals and other inputs, especially oil, all of which required 
foreign exchange earnings. The design and production of the machinery 
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used took place outside the country. Employees' role in the plants 
therefore consisted either in manning, operating and servicing or in 
repair work. The absence of a capital goods sector limited them as 
it does now tothedevelopment of industry. Dependence on the outside world 
for engineering and scientific processes had repercussions on the skills 
of the workforce employed and the stability of their employment. 
Industry was faced with fluctuating supplies, not only of raw materials 
but of spares, energy and other inputs. 
These issues were to emerge much more clearly in the wake of the 
Arusha Declaration and in the Second Five Year Plan (1969-74), which 
was reformulated in the aftermath of Arusha. The measures which followed 
the Declaration deepened both the state's involvement in the economy 
and the development of wage labour. They also defined the charact- 
eristic political and industrial relations systems of present-day 
Tanzania, which are the focus of attention in Chapters 2-3. For the 
moment we will limit ourselves to the major changes in the ownership 
of the economy and the role of public-sector employment. 
The historical circumstances in which the Arusha Declaration emerged 
have been discussed by several authors [e. g. Pratt, 1976;. Rweyemamu, 1973]. 
In the first place, foreign investments had not been forthcoming in the 
amounts expected in the First Five Year Plan. Growing disillusionment 
with the foreign-investment-led model of development was swelled by the 
discontinuation of aid from West Germany over the Hallenstein Doctrine 
and the problems with Britain over Rhodesia. The newly independent 
government faced in any case the dilemma of increasing economic growth 
through foreign investment within the parameters of a strongly nationalist 
independence movement, TANU. As Mwalimu Nyerere declared, private 
economic development meant either relying on unreliable foreign investments 
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or else local Asian dominance. In the Arusha Declaration speech, 
Nyerere explicitly noted that Tanzania's independence was jeopardised 
so long as the President was a mere figurehead, responding to foreign 
investors seeking assurances should workers be restless in their demands. 
Back in December 1966, NUTA, the workers' organisation, had called for 
more government control of the economy. State control and national- 
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isations would be the solution. [NUTA, 1966]. 
Worries about national independence coincided with a concern to 
preserve national unity in the face of divisive socio-economic trends. 
There was increasing concern about social differentiation following the 
taking of top government posts under the Africanisation programmes. 
In Nyerere's thinking such problems were interpreted through intellectual 
and ideological influences from a variety of sources: the experience 
of Mao's China with rural cooperation and self-reliance; ideas of 
equality and equity from the Fabians, religious ideas of social organic 
harmony and cultural practices among many Tanzanian communities3 Post- 
colonial conditions of low level economic growth, the slow rate of foreign 
investment, the absence of a sizeable African entrepreneurial class and 
the twin ideas of independence and organic harmony (unity) all combined 
to create the context in which the political leadership opted for the 
Arusha Declaration. 
Regarding the state's role in development, what was new was the 
extent of state control and government involvement in the economy rather 
than the fact of government involvement which, as we have seen, started 
in the immediate post-independence days and indeed during the colonial 
period, especially in the 1950's. Major steps were taken over the 
period commencing in 1967, with some modifications and adjustments as 
the years passed. The earliest measures involved state control of 
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commercial and trading activities as well as nationalisation of some of 
the large-scale industrial activities. Thus in February 1967, all 
private banks were nationalised to form the National Bank of Commerce. 
Insurance activities now fell completely under the National Insurance 
Corporation. Eight large-scale import and export firms were national- 
ised to form the State Trading Corporation. Eight large milling firms 
were nationalised to form the National Milling Corporation (1968). On 
the industrial scene, the government took a 60% share in seven major 
industries dealing with beer, cigarettes, shoes, cement and pyrethrum, 
as well as the Tanzania Metal Box Company. These were to be part of 
the enlarged National Development Corporation (N. D. C. ). 
The government had had control over land and mineral resources since 
1962, but in October 1967 it took a majority share (60%) in the sisal 
estates. By 1969 full ownership was extended to 31 estates and 80% 
in only 10 estates [Rweyemamu, 1973, p. 59; Clark, 1978, p. 45 ff. ]. 
The take-over of the sisal industry gave the government control of a 
section of the export agriculture directly, as owner and producer. 
In other sectors of agriculture, it will be recalled that from 1962 
the state had set up Marketing Boards which directed the marketing of 
major crops such as maize, rice, cashew nuts, simsim, tobacco, 
coffee, wheat, tea, dairy products and sisal [see Wagao, 1982, mimeo, 
for the details]. In this set-up the Cooperative unions were 
procurement agents for the Boards. With the policy of u_jamaa rvi_jijini 
(rural socialism) encouraging the formation of u'amaa villages as the 
basis on which at the grassroots cooperatives would be formed, a period 
of uneasiness followed between the Marketing Boards and cooperative 
societies. In 1972 a new set-up for the marketing of agricultural 
produce was created, with new holding companies known as Authorities 
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for the major export crops: cotton, cashew nut, coffee, tea, tobacco, 
sial and pyrethrum. The marketing and processing of other crops 
would be under Corporations such as the National Milling Corporation, 
SUDECO for sugar and L. D. A. for livestock. With the creation of 
u'amaa villages, the villagisation operations of 1971 and 1974-75, and 
the Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975, villages were to evolve into a form 
of producer cooperative. Other trading activities, including the sale 
of goods to cooperative members, which had been done by some cooperatives, 
now passed to the Regional Trading Corporations. There were state 
corporations under the Ministry of Trade. Thus the road was open for 
the abolition of cooperatives in 1976. Henceforth crop marketing would 
be under Crop Authorities, with villages as agents of those Authorities. 
The Arusha Declaration, then, marked a substantial increase in the 
state and parastatal sector. This meant among other things a notable 
increase in numbers of those employed in the public sector. 
Following nationalization, most parastatal industries naturally 
remained located in the towns where they had been built originally: 
Dar es Salaam, Arusha and Tanga. Later investments have tried to redress 
the balance with new parastatal industries in, for example, Arusha, 
Mwanza and Morogoro-towns. In other respects, though, the character 
of Tanzanian industry was little altered by nationalization. In economic 
and technological terms it continued to be characterised by a heavy 
dependency on imports and thus on the health of the foreign trade balance. 
Employment in industry continued to be a modest part of the total wage- 
employment picture, involving a minute proportion of the national labour 
force in largely unskilled and poorly remunerated occupations. These 
facts are an essential part of the back-drop to our study of the politics 
of labour relations in public sector factories. 
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Footnotes 
1. These categories have been deemed more analytical than the 
"formal-informal sectors" divisions which tend to blur the 
relations to the property among those engaged in the sectors. 
2. Meeting of NUTA General Council 27th December 1966 to 3rd 
January 1967 and memorandum to N. E. C. Arusha Meeting of 26th to 
28th January 1967 calling the President to appoint a commission 
on the implementation of Ujamaa. 
3. While Mwalimu Nyerere's writings articulate the meaning of 
Ujamaa, the thinking is shared by many and has a variety of 
sources which have been influential. 
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CHAPTER 2 
POLITICS IN TANZANIA: THE NATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter sets out to examine the political processes and the 
socio-political forces at work in the country since independence and 
especially after 1967 in order to provide some insight into the range 
of labour policies and structures which regulate work relations and 
shape activities by employees at enterprise level. Power relations 
at enterprise level can hardly be divorced from those at societal 
level. An examination of the political system in relation to labour 
policies and the industrial relations system is also appropriate because 
since independence in 1961, and after 1967 particularly, a lively 
debate has emerged on the post-colonial state in Tanzania in relation 
to which it is necessary to take a position. The chapter does not 
aim at presenting an exhaustive critique of the debate or to contribute 
to it beyond outlining a perspective which arises from a dissatis- 
faction with approaches one finds generally in the literature. 
The first section of the chapter explains this alternative approach 
in general terms. Sections 2 and 3 explore aspects of the political 
system of Tanzania before and since the Arusha Declaration. The 
final section contains some illustrations of the process of decision 
making under the post-Arusha arrangements. 
1 NEW ORIENTATIONS IN THE STUDY OF THE POLITICAL 
Literature on the post-colonial state in Tanzania has been strongly 
influenced by formulations which seem to me to be inadequate. As we 
saw in the Introduction, much of this work has rested on either an 
instrumentalist or a structural-functionalist, and hence an economic 
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reductionist, view of the state. That type of analysis assumes 
complete identity in many instances between class power and state 
power or a total fusion between class power and state power. This 
perspective has been questioned by several writers. Shaw [1986, 
p. 248] convincingly argues against the tendency to over-politicize 
the power of social classes. The state "is not seen as identical 
with or a simple reflection of, the economically dominant class". 
Furthermore "the interests of states are normally embedded in complexes 
of class-economic relations, but they are also defined by the inter- 
national relations of states". State power is also concerned with 
power in a given territorial area. 
Mouzelis [1986] on his part suggests an approach which would over- 
come the limitations and the inadequacies of both instrumentalist and 
structural-functionalist approaches to the study of the state. In 
his view, instrumentalist and class reductionist orientations to the 
state neglect "to give due consideration to the complex organisational 
and institutional realities which lie between classes and the state 
(such phenomena as political parties, pressure groups, clientelistic 
networks, and so on)" [p. 200]. He argues: 
"More generally, the attempt to analyse political 
developments in the semi-periphery/periphery in 
exclusively economic categories (class, requirements 
of capital) is especially absurd in view of the 
saliency of political structures and the role 
the state has played in generating capitalist 
industrialisation in such societies". [p. 2001 
Mouzelis advocates an analysis which deals specifically with 
the "sphere of politics" [p. 201]. This can be achieved, he suggests, 
through making a distinction between a mode of production (and its 
relations of production) and a mode of political domination (and its 
relations of domination). According to Mouzelis, the state can be 
viewed as relatively independent of class or other civil society interests. 
Holders of the mans of domination (state power) "have an enhanced capacity for 
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defending and, within certain limits of further promoting their own 
primarily political interests"[p. 215]. State activities may basically 
be geared towards political ends - an aspect which is neglected when 
one conflates economic and political power or reduces political power 
to economic power. 
Applying some of these principles to the case of Tanzania, those 
who came to political power at independence were clearly not economically 
dominant, but since 1961 and most glaringly so in 1967 have been none- 
theless able to make decisions and take measures dramatically affecting 
Tanzanian society. 
My approach does not see state policies and activities as the 
mere expression of the class interests of those in power or that of 
the economically dominant class(es). The state is not a tool of 
the economically dominant classes; nor are state policies always 
oriented towards the structural maintenance of existing economic relations. 
Secondly, political independence in 1961 has to be taken seriously 
as the establishment of a separate nation-state in which political 
processes, the competition for public (state) office and the struggle 
for domination and control, took place within the confines of a given 
territory with defined boundaries separating it from other states. 
In post-colonial countries such as Tanzania, the construction of a 
national community is a key factor in many state policies - national 
independence and national unity (uhuru na umoia) took. centre stage 
particularly in the years immediately after political independence. 
Issues of national consensus, political legitimacy as well as economic 
development play an important role in shaping state policies. 
Thirdly, however, these political processes take place within 
the context of a given economy and given social forces, both internal 
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and international, from which the state actors draw their resources 
and by which they are constrained. The state of the economy and the 
social aspects are the conditions in which political actors operate, 
shaping and constraining their actions and their capacity to implement 
those decisions and maintain their dominance and control. Lastly, 
as organisations state structures are not homogeneous entities, 
instruments of a group, nor are they actors, but forums or arenas within 
which actors with differential powers and perspectives contend for 
domination and control. I believe that analysis of the major features 
of the development of the Tanzanian political system amply confirms 
each of these general points. 
2 INDEPENDENCE AND AFTER 
a) The Nationalist Movement: Membership, Leadership, Organisation 
In 1961, Tanzania achieved territorial independence and identity 
and with it control of the state machinery passed into the hands of 
the leadership of TANU - the nationalist movement which coalesced into 
a political organisation in 1954 and thence virtually dominated the 
struggle for political independence. During the 1950's various 
categories of the African population united under the banner of TANU 
in their opposition to colonial rule. In the rural areas TANU 
recruited its membership, leadership and support from African cultivators 
and traders from different parts of the country alienated by the 
colonial government's policies concerning - land, agriculture 
or livestock. In Arusha and Meru, the colonial policy of land 
alienation from African peasants to white settlers was a grievance 
brought within the nationalist orbit and highlighted by the TANU 
leadership. In Sukumaland, rural improvement programmes which 
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included tie-ridging and destocking were unpopular among cultivators 
and herders. This issue was taken up by TANU, making the movement 
very popular in those areas despite the banning of the organisation 
in those areas for some time in the 1950's. In Morogoro the enforce- 
ment of terracing became an issue generating support-for TANU. In 
many places African traders in competition with Asian traders joined 
ranks in the movement, as did members of African cooperative societies. 
[see Iliffe, 1979, p. 523; Maguire, 1969, passim; for details]. 
The support for TANU leadership increased with the colonial government's 
attempts to impose local government on a racial basis and to set-up 
the settler-dominated United Tanganyika Party (U. T. P. ). In the 
countryside, TANU leadership had popular support. 
In urban areas the basis of the movement was among African traders, 
labourers and the urban poor. The underprivileged dwellers of the 
African quarters suffered the effects of the racialist 
differential services in housing, health and 
education [Stephens, 1968, p. 129], so that by 1957 Dar es Salaam was 
almost 100% a TANU town as far as the African population was concerned. 
The only African group who were not TAND members or supporters were 
the civil servants who by law were not allowed to-. be members. Members 
of the then small educated African elite who joined the movement had 
to resign from their posts or were members secretly. TANU support 
encompassed the main religious and regional groupings without exception. 
The variety of the membership was reflected in the variety of 
social categories from which the movement recruited its leadership. 
These, included educated African nationalists who had resigned from 
their posts of employment (Mwalimu J. K. Nyerere the president of TANU 
was from this small category), leaders of African cooperatives, African 
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traders and rural notables disenchanted by colonial rule, and trade 
unionists for whom the struggle with mainly foreign or Asian employers 
for better conditions was linked to the cause of national independence. 
Iliffe [1979, p. 523] notes that among TANU activists were traders; 
teachers; mission employees or catechists; former government clerks; 
police officers and medical aides "educated men excluded from local 
power". But this differed from place to place depending on who were 
the underprivileged in the colonial situation. In some places it 
would appear that some teachers opposed TANU, e. g. in Masasi, while 
in other places, e. g. Mbulu, they used TANU membership to promote their 
own ends. Even among the non-TANU members, however, the popular 
antipathy to colonial rule which was voiced by TANU, was shared by 
the population including chiefs. 
TANU as a movement, then, became the vehicle articulating shared 
opposition to colonial rule among a variety of social categories and 
classes. It should be noted here that the political organisation of 
showed characteristics which distinguish it both from "Continental 
European" parties, which tend to be the political organisation of social 
strata. or classes, and from "Anglo-Saxon" parties which are professional 
aggregating institutions for a variety of specialised interest groups 
(D. A. Chalmers [1972] makes this useful distinction in discussing the 
distinctive features of political parties in Latin America). In other 
words, TANU on the eve of independence was composed of several strata 
and social categories and was the forum for articulating the general 
opposition to colonial rule. The objective or goal was political 
independence and unity of all the people of the country. This was 
clearly stated in the Party's motto and objectives. 
Authors, among them Bienen [1967, Chapter 2], have remarked on 
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on the "favourable conditions" for TANU being accepted as the 
nationalist movement and achieving national unity and consensus. 
They note the presence and widespread use of one language, Kiswahili, 
as a factor favouring national unity and integration and helping to 
counteract the alleged organisational weakness of the movement stemming 
from the plurality of ethnic, cultural and religious environments. 
However, I would argue that the credit for the achievement of a high 
level of national integration in the independence struggle must go 
to the political leadership and the line taken, rather than to the absence 
of a disruptive potential based on region, religion or status. Such 
strains did exist and could have had serious consequences, as in several 
instances they threatened to do before independence. In other words, 
it was the political conceptions and strategy utilised by the leadership 
which was the primary factor conditioning the political system of post- 
colonial Tanzania. 
b) Independence: Political Centralisation, Mobilisation and Incorporation 
At independence in 1961 the leadership of TANU took control of state 
power over the identifiable geographical space known as Tanganyika 
-a country with a diversity of social groupings, religions and cultures 
- diversities which could be a source of tensions and social conflicts, 
as experience in the 1960's in many formerly colonised countries was 
to show, if divisive tensions were encouraged or nursed. The political 
leadership of independent Tanganyika was guided by one fundamental 
objective: the creation of a stable socio-political order, independent 
and nationally integrated. From this stemmed a number of related 
tasks or intermediate objectives, including on the one hand the 
construction of an appropriate system of political institutions, and 
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on the other the promotion of socio-economic development. 
Orientation of the Political Leadership 
To achieve those objectives, the strategy employed by the leader- 
ship centred upon the nationalist party TANU, from whose ranks the 
government was formed. Through the Party, the different interests 
of all citizens were to be articulated and aggregated. Leadership 
conceptions of the Party at this time indicate that it was seen as 
a "two-way all weather road", passing on information from the government 
to the people and from the people to government. In 1962, Nyerere 
stated: 
It is necessary to have an elected government which 
has full support and cooperation. It is also 
necessary to have a strong political organisation 
active in every village, which acts like a two-way 
all-weather road along which the proposals and plans 
of the government can travel to the people at the 
same time as the ideas, desires and misunderstandings 
of the people can travel direct to the government. 
This is the job of the new TANU. 
[Nyerere, 1966, p. 158] 
In a pamphlet published in April 1962 entitled TANU na Raia 
(TAND and Citizens) similar views were expressed: TANU was to deal 
with the problems of people of all types, not of one religion or tribe. 
Uhuru (independence) was for all citizens of Tanganyika. TANU was 
enhancing the unity of all the people of the country through justly 
elected leaders, a committed leadership of TANU which worked to help 
people in adversity. The work of TANU was to get rid of poverty and 
work towards the reduction of income differentials [Nyerere, 1962]. 
It followed that the Party would not be a medium for the 
articulation or aggregation of particularist interests, but a mechanism 
for popular mobilisation and communication between citizens and 
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decision-makers or wielders of political power. Party activities 
would therefore consist in facilitating that cooperation and channelling 
support for the government. The Party's structural organisation 
reflected on the whole that preoccupation. From 1962 membership 
was open to all citizens who adhered to the Party's beliefs, aims 
and objects as well as making the pledges. Membership of TANU as 
conceived created an ambiguity as to the difference between a TANU 
member and a loyal citizen of the country when for example the pledges 
of good citizenship and loyalty to the President of the United 
Republic are considered [TANU, 1962, E, IX, X]. In the early 
independence years public policy was to be in the hands of government 
officials and top party leaders. Party leaders were to be participants 
in decision-making supported by ranks of committed followers, but not 
spokesmen for specific programmes. 
The TANU leadership's objective of creating a stable and 
harmonious socio-political order informs, in the main, the trajectory 
of political developments after independence. It would, however, 
be difficult to characterise them as a well laid out, coherent scheme 
or design from the beginning or as the work of a prophetic visionary 
[cf. Pratt, 19761 - political processes being more complex in the realm 
of reality than in the realm of mythology. The trajectory is 
characterised more by what Stephens [1977, p. 961 writing about an 
analogous process in Peru, has called "an action-reaction sequence 
rather than a pursuit of a clearcut strategy". The main element 
of coherence was that the options and measures taken were imbued with 
a conception of the state working towards the ideal human, democratic 
society without exploitation - Ujamaa. 
To promote societal stablity, national integration and harmony, 
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the leadership of TANU pursued two main options. Firstly, 
it aimed at a centralised political structure uniting 
the whole country under a central leadership. This entailed the 
creation of one popular organisation to which all citizens could belong 
and within which they could voice their ideas and desires as well as 
be informed by their rulers who would be elected. Another important 
element in societal stability would be the reduction of the potential 
power of particularistic groups by the creation of corporatist 
organisations linked to the state (cooperatives, unions, and youth 
and women organisations) as well as the regulation of conflict and 
tension between employers and employees by humanising aspects of work 
relations and workers' conditions. Secondly, societal harmony would 
come through the promotion of national economic independence and growth. 
This would entail increased investments especially by the state directly 
and drawing on other domestic resources. 
This, then, was the dominant conception held by the mainstream 
political leadership, notably by Mwalimu Nyerere who as President 
of the Republic and head of the Party held a crucial position in the 
political system. Bienen [1967] in his work on the pre-1967 Party, 
[. Chapter VI] has identified other conceptions, but these were 
then peripheral, with limited impact on the political structure at 
the centre of which was the Presidency and the Party, TANU. 
Political Organisation 
An examination of the 1962 Constitution and the Interim 
Constitution of 1965 reveals the centralised and integrative aspects 
of the decision-making process and the organisation of political power. 
Central authority and decision-making power were ultimately vested in 
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the President. He was both Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of 
the armed forces. As Chief Executive he had power to appoint 
ministers, regional commissioners and heads of institutions including 
the Chief Justice, judges, the Governor of the central bank and 
ambassadors. Presidential appointees were answerable to the 
President, and through the Preventive Detention Act of 1962, No. 60, 
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he had sweeping powers that could not be challenged in any court. 
Another salient feature of the political system was the centralised- 
cum-popular aspects of the one-Party system which was made legal in 
1965. Political activity could only be legally carried out within 
the context of the different Party echelons and sittings, structured 
from the cell at the grassroots to the national level (see Bienen 
[1967] for details of Party organisation before 1967). Membership 
of the Party, however, was open to all who accepted the principles 
of the Party in a general way, as we have seen. 
Structures of government administration and TANU organisation 
ran parallel from the local level to the national level. Along the 
different structures there was a dovetailing or overlapping of roles. 
As heads of government administration in their respective spheres, 
area and regional commissioners were appointed. They were also 
district and regional secretaries of the Party, while ministers were 
deemed to be political commissars in their respective ministries. 
At the national level the President of the Party, its Vice-President, 
Secretary General and National Treasurer, held the respective posts 
of President, Vice-President, Minister and Minister of Finance in the 
government. 
As well as this appointed leadership there was an elected leader- 
ship of district and regional Party chairmen. They headed their 
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respective Party sittings, where discussions were held and views 
expressed concerning government officials' activities, and where 
government officials explained actions taken in their respective 
spheres. During the sittings at District and Regional levels, 
the Area and Regional Commissioners respectively were the secretaries 
of the meetings, noting down what had been discussed and expressed. 
This would be taken into account in the execution of their duties as 
heads of government administration in their areas or regions. 
One notable element, however, was that the party sittings at 
District or Regional levels did not in practice have any authority 
to give directives to the regional or district administrations. Nor 
could they remove officials. The latter were accountable to the 
appointing authority. In other words, political power, the capacity 
to enforce decisions and allocate resources at District and Regional 
levels rested solely with the Commissioners, who were the President's 
representatives and appointees. Party meetings thus served chiefly 
as a forum for the expression of the population's demands as well as 
one in which decision makers and implementors could inform the general 
public. The open membership of the party also enabled the meetings 
to serve as a basis for popular mobilisation in support of government 
decisions and measures. 
Another important function of the Party organisation and sittings 
at District and Regional levels was that they served as a channel for 
the recruitment of new elites into the decision-making processes and 
leadership roles at higher levels. Given the one-party system, access 
to political leadership was through membership and activity in the 
Party; the Party structures were thus a ladder or sieve through which 
political leadership was recruited. 
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At the national level the parallel political structures of 
government and Party were linked by key political actors holding key 
positions in both organisations. In governmental terms, the highest 
organ was the Cabinet of Ministers chaired by the President of the 
Republic. In the Party's organisational structure, the central 
committee could be considered the corresponding body. However, at 
this pre-Arusha stage, it was a relatively small group consisting of 
the national leadership of the Party and some Dar es Salaam elders 
close to the President, who served as his personal counsellors and 
advisors. 
The Party organ which could raise and which discussed policy 
issues was the National Executive Committee or Council (N. E. C. ) which 
consisted of, over and above the national leaders of the Party, one 
elected member from each Region and, as ex-officio members, the 
Regional Commissioners and Regional Party Chairmen. P. Msekwa, a 
one-time National Executive Secretary of TANU, has argued in a study 
entitled Towards Party Supremacy [1976] that the N. E. C. exercised 
decision-making power in several instances, such as the selection of 
candidates for Bunge (National Assembly) elections, the decision to 
have a republican constitution and the Arusha Declaration. These 
were and are within the brief of N. E. C., which was to give general 
orientations. 
On the other hand the political structure with the mandate to 
make laws was the National Assembly or parliament. The National 
Assembly was conceived as the popularly elected legislative arm of 
the state. According to the Interim Constitution of 1965, the Bunge 
was to consist of elected constituency members as well as ex-officio 
and presidential by appointed members [see Pratt, 1976, p. 205 and 
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Cliffe, 1967, for details]. But access to membership in the Bunge 
was through the Party machinery. Candidates for the Bunge had to 
be members of TANU and the two candidates to stand in constituency 
elections were nominated by the N. E. C. following suggestions and 
indications about their preferences from District and Regional levels. 
Election campaigns were organised and directed by Party committees. 
Use of tribe, race or religion as a basis for electoral appeals 
disqualified a candidate. National Assembly members were expected 
to discuss affairs as they affected the whole country: chosen from 
constituencies they were not to speak for constituency interests as 
such, and so did not represent in that sense the constituency. 
Similarly, those members who came through nomination by the trade 
union, -N. 
U. T. A., or the cooperatives were not in Bunge to represent 
those organisations. 
2 
According to Pratt, one result of this system was that the Assembly 
tended to deal with government bills with superficial scrutiny [1976, 
p. 208]. And according to Hopkins [1971, p. 28], despite the honest 
and open criticism sometimes voiced, "the Assembly has been concerned 
with ratifying decisions made by some other group". In his assessment 
"the Assembly has been more often a sounding board and a forum for 
extracting approbation and applause for new government policies than 
a deliberative body that formulates policies or actually writes 
legislation". 
Given the many structures and the crisscrossing of discussions 
and actors both in governmental structures and Party structures, it 
is difficult and unrealistic to try to say whether a particular decision 
was a government or Party decision. Underlying all the political 
structures and sittings was the basic reality that the decisions were 
those of the dominant political actors in a centralised decision-making 
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system. The many structures did play an important role in eliciting 
popular consent and consensus as well as acting as a basis for popular 
mobilisation in support of decisions and measures by the political 
leaders. Thus measures which needed legal backing were passed by 
Bunge, but only after N. E. C. discussed in a confidential forum the 
principles of a more general kind to be concretised in legal acts by 
Parliament. Thus for example the Arusha Declaration was approved 
by N. E. C. as a general policy document for uiamaa and self-reliance, 
while Bunge passed the specific and concrete acts of nationalisation 
and creation of the public sector, -taking into consideration the 
Declaration. 
Attempts to institutionalise a unitary and corporatist system 
revealed themselves als in the affiliation to the Party of already 
organised sectional interests - the youth and women's organisations, 
the cooperative movement, the Parents' Association and the trade union 
movement. These organisations were affiliated to the political Party 
and their Executive Secretaries and Secretaries appointed by the 
President. 
Implicit in this political set-up was a rejection of the liberal 
pluralist conception of a political system in which individuals or 
groups of individuals pursue their particularistic goals in competition 
with one another. Similarly, the concept of social conflict and the 
irreconcilability of the interests of different social classes or 
groups as the basis of political structures was not the dominant 
perspective. Solidarity and the quest for the common good was the 
guiding concept. The leadership's implicitly corporatist ideas 
envisioned a harmonious development in which a centralised state 
regulates and organises groups, promotes the participation of all 
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groups and social strata under one roof and discourages particularistic 
representations based on social strata or territorial divisions. The 
key to this organic unity as the basis for national and social cohesion 
was the Party - TANU. 
While membership of the Party became open to all races in 1962 
and open to civil servants in 1964, the occupants of leadership 
positions prior to 1967 tended to retain their pre-independence ý. 
characteristics. Apart from the topmost posts of President, Vice- 
President, Secretary General and National Treasurer, Party leaders 
in the Central Committee or the elected members of N. E. C. were mainly 
from the more popular elements of the membership - peasant activists 
in cooperative societies, teachers, traders, trade unionists or 
prominent elders [see Bienen, 1967, p. 186. for composition of Central 
Committee 1965; and Pratt, 1976, p. 211-212, on N. E. C. characteristics]. 
This reflected the social categories which had contributed to the 
independence movement and whose consent and support remained important 
for the leadership of the post-independence state. For this leader- 
ship and its supporters, the government's mission was to fight against 
ignorance, poverty and disease. This entailed improved educational 
opportunities, economic growth and the provision of health services 
among a population who felt that they had been neglected during the 
colonial period by the colonial state. 
Decision Making and Implementation 
In order to run a modern state and to organise an increasing state 
sector, the political leadership controlling the state had to have 
recourse to the social strata with the necessary "skills", especially 
as regards financial control and national budgeting, foreign exchange 
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control and planning. Initially these experts or technicians were 
drawn from the colonial civil service or from abroad, given the 
scarcity of local high-level manpower. These "experts" deployed in 
the ministries especially the Treasury, Central Bank, Ministry of 
Planning, Ministry of Commerce and Industries and N. D. C. had an 
important part in decision-making by virtue of their proximity to the 
political leadership, especially Ministers and the President. Their 
information, the resources (physical, human and financial)-of their 
ministries, state institutions or related organisations placed them 
in important positions in decision-making as well as in the actual 
translation of those decisions into actual activities. With the 
Arusha Declaration, those charged with running and organising the 
state sector not only increased in number with the proliferation of 
parastatals in different sectors of the economy but their importance 
also grew, with the increased role of the state sector as an element 
of the political leadership's programme. 
The socio-political system was thus characterised by a centralised 
state headed by the President, Ministers, and an administrative layer 
of principal secretaries and heads of parastatal institutions assisted 
by technicians and advisors. This was one aspect of the system. 
The other aspect was that the President and Ministers emerged from 
the leadership of the sole political Party. Its membership consisted 
of all elements in society. Its structural organisation from the 
grass roots (the cell) to the national level was also centralised and 
unified, with sectional or factional interests considered harmful for 
social harmony. Activities and interests of specific groups were 
brought under one roof in party-supervised organisations affiliated 
to the Party. These features were carried over into the 1970's and 
after. 
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3 POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES AFTER 1967 
This section highlights the key characteristics of Tanzania's 
political system and political processes after 1967. We focus on 
the organisation and the structures of the Party (TAND, and from 1977, 
CCM) as the central political institution constructed by the political 
leadership. Those structures of domination and legitimation defined 
the conditions and framework through which public issues and goals 
were to be determined and implemented during the period of our study. 
The final section of the chapter will single out some decisions made 
between 1967 and 1977 to illustrate the general character of national- 
level decision-making and the maintenance of political control in 
Tanzania following the Arusha document. 
a) Orientation Following the Arusha Declaration 
As we have seen, the Arusha Declaration and the subsequent measures 
gave rise to an increased state sector. This was the main economic 
aspect of the event. However, the Arusha Declaration also had its 
political side, defining along with other documents of the period the 
public goals and objectives of Tanzanian society and the ways people 
were in future to accede to political power. In the wake of the 
internal and external crises facing the country during the early 1960's 
(see Chapter 1), the Arusha Declaration expressed the political leader- 
ship's preferred method of realising its fundamental objective of 
securing national independence integrity and national harmony. 
A number of related measures were to be undertaken. First, the 
country was to embark on the construction of a socialist and self- 
reliant society. The country would be socialist understood under 
three dimensions: there would be no exploitation of man by man; the 
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major means of production and exchange would be under state control; 
and that state would be a democratically elected state. The society 
would also be self-reliant, that is not dependent on foreign loans 
which could endanger the country's political independence, but reliant 
on its own resources and especially on agriculture (Arusha Declaration, 
Parts Two and Three [Nyerere, 1968]). These objectives of national 
independence and harmony would be achieved through the policy of social 
justice carried out by a morally committed and upright leadership and 
membership (Arusha Declaration, Parts Three and Four). 
The main orientations of the political leadership's ideology as can 
be gleaned from this basic policy statement and from the other writings 
and speeches of the President of TANU, Mwalimu Nyerere [Nyerere, 1968] 
were characterised by what in analogous situations have been called 
"organic-statist" ideas [Stepan, 1978]. These entailed a commitment 
to a number of values: first, to a human community and human equality, 
the living in social harmony of people in a community with a 
commonality of interests; second, a commitment to social justice and 
an equitable distribution of resources and services; and third, the 
value of group or communal ownership, in which the state would control 
the major means of production and exchange. 
Public control of major resources would ensure the realisation 
of the fundamental goals in the following ways. Firstly, increased 
economic development was crucial for maintaining national independence 
and national security. Secondly, state ownership would open up the 
way for a planned economy enabling the state as the expression of the 
general community's will to effect harmonious development and to cater 
for all citizens regardless of race, religion or tribe in the struggle 
to provide the basic services and to fight the main enemies (ignorance, 
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poverty and disease). Fourthly, a commitment to democracy and 
popular participation, Ujamaa (socialism) and self-reliance meant 
rejecting "liberal capitalism" and "doctrinaire socialism" in favour 
of the creation of a society free from conflict -a society in which 
members in state enterprises, cooperatives or communal (ujamaa) 
villages would work for the benefit of all. 
While the Arusha Declaration spelt out the country's objectives 
and the qualities required of the political leadership (Arusha 
Declaration, Leadership Code), the Mwongozo (Party Guidelines) [TANU, 
1971] spelt out the task of that leadership, namely to be the guide 
of the masses by setting objectives; monitoring performance and 
gauging results. The Party leadership would be the controller of 
major affairs in the public domain. This became enshrined de lure 
in the country's constitution of 1975, which gave effect to the 
principle of 'Party Supremacy'. To mobilise and organise the society, 
recourse would be had to the new state organisation Chama (the Party) 
which developed further the unitarist ideas enshrined in the one-party 
democracy of 1965, and the corporatist principles of centralisation and 
popular participation, and incorporation or cooptation of any would 
be sectional or particularist interests. 
b) Party Organisation: Membership, Leadership, Structures 
After the Arusha Declaration political power gradually tended to 
be organised and exercised around different echelons of the Party, 
touching with varying and uneven levels of intensity on local issues. 
through the grassroots structures (the cell) and on national and inter- 
national issues through the national organs. Political activities 
could be legitimately undertaken only within and through the structures 
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of Chama (= the Party). In its membership, organisation and 
structures this body attained unique characteristics which combined 
mobilisation, decision-making and administrative roles. The 
structures show features of inclusionary corporatism as sketched out 
by Stepan [1978, p. 73] with particular reference to Latin America, 
namely the cooptation and inclusion in a new state organisation of 
associations of workers, youth, women, parents, cooperatives, etc. 
combined with attempts to improve social welfare through the public 
provision of education and other services. Partly perhaps because 
it came to function in this way, the Party in Tanzania has not sunk 
into "an extra-ordinary lethargy" -a characterization used by Fanon 
[1965, p. 137] for many African nationalist movements in the immediate 
post-independence years. 
Party Membership 
After 1967 the political movement retained the open mass character 
[Mwansasu, 1981, p. 172] it inherited from the pre-independence and 
immediate post-independence years. Membership in TANU had been 
perceived then as a mark of one's commitment to national independence 
and patriotism, as TAND had successfully mobilised towards the gaining 
of national independence. As we have seen, the opening up of member- 
ship to all racial groups after independence and to the civil service 
in 1964 meant that TANU had membership from all social categories in 
all parts of the country. On the other hand, the Arusha Declaration 
stressed the need for members to adhere to "the beliefs and policies 
of socialism" of the Party, and it also asserted that the Party was 
that of "peasants and workers" (Arusha Declaration, Part Four, TANU 
membership). Following this development, a department of political 
education was created at the national headquarters of the Party, to deal 
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with inculcating the political ideology of socialism and self-reliance 
among members. This seems not to have transformed the character of 
membership. however. [Interview with Kyulule]. 
In 1970, for example, Msekwa [1976, p. 40] estimates that there 
were 3 million Party members from all social categories and from all 
regions of mainland Tanzania. In 1975, the TANU Central Committee 
reported that in that year there were 1,472,551 "active" members, 
representing about 20.1% of adult Tanzanians above the age of 18. 
The term "active" represents those who had paid their monthly contrib- 
utions and fees [TANU, 1975, pp. 7-9]. The difference between the 
two years does not necessarily mean therefore that there was a fall 
in membership over the five years, but reflects more the increasing 
organisation and structuring. While in the 1960's membership was 
loose and membership obligations were generally vague, in the 1970's 
members were called on to show more commitment by paying monthly fees 
and other contributions and attending Party meetings in their locality 
or place of work. The 1975 figure is for the more active members, 
and the number of those with TANU cards was probably higher than in 
1970.3 
Recruitment methods also changed. While earlier the procedure 
for joining the Party was rather informal with any adult agreeing 
generally with TANU's nationalist principles going to a TANU office 
and buying a card, after 1967 procedures were begun to be put in place 
for gaining membership. Formerly the initiative for membership 
recruitment was on local branches through their leadership, especially 
the Chairman or Secretary. Branch secretaries were not paid but were 
allowed to take roughly 10% in order to improve their livelihood 
[interviews with Mzee Msindai], including visiting market places and 
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soliciting for prospective membership. After 1967, a system of 
filling forms was introduced, with local branch committees approving 
new membership. This though was not always strictly adhered to. 
Also, members in arrears for payment of party subscriptions could pay 
their dues at the time when they wanted to seek election in leader- 
ship positions. 
An important new membership condition was introduced in 1974. 
At the Musoma N. E. C. meeting it was decided that ordinary members were 
from then on required to abide by the Arusha Declaration regulations 
on leadership and to be exemplary. These included being of good 
behaviour and not being involved in capitalist or feudal practices 
or having a house to let. In practice this was difficult to monitor 
or implement, even for cell leaders, who as the leaders at grassroots 
had been among those required to abide by these regulations from the 
start. The national leadership preferred to cast a "blind-eye" on 
the issue and considered, for example, the practice of letting a room 
or two as practically innocuous. 
In 1977, with the creation of the CCM, adherence to these regulations 
became more stringent. To gain membership one had to fill in forms 
detailing one's family, education, career, occupation and political 
or criminal record. This was followed by a3 month course in political 
education on the objectives and the ideology of the Party. At the 
end one had to pass an (oral) test. Regular attendance of Party 
meetings was stressed and one could lose one's membership either by 
not paying fees for 6 months or for not attending three consecutive 
meetings without valid reasons. In 1977, the total number of active 
members in CCM was 1,524,939 from 9,217 branches [CCM, 1978, p. 54]. 
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Leadership 
While more stringent regulations were being applied to membership, 
more ideological commitment was being expected of the Party leadership. 
For the lower ranks of the leadership such as cell-leaders, this was, 
as mentioned, not strictly implemented. There was also a marked 
ambiguity in the case of businessmen and traders over whether they 
could be members and especially whether they were eligible for leader- 
ship positions. In practice, the term worker or peasant was so 
loosely applied as to include quite varied categories of people 
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Structures 
In structural organisation TANU also retained its hierarchical 
character. At each level from the national leadership to the cell, 
there were committees consisting of a combination of elected and ex 
officio members. Candidates for the elected posts (usually two) 
had to be approved by higher bodies. Control by the national leader- 
ship was thus maintained. 
The National Conference 
Constitutionally, the highest authority in TANU and later 
CCM was the National Conference, whose membership apart from the 
national leadership included all members of Parliament; all district 
chairmen and secretaries of the Party; the members of the Central 
Committee and the National Executive Committee; and delegates from 
affiliated bodies of the Party - amounting to over one thousand 
delegates. The N. C. elected the national leadership of the Party; 
chose the members of the CC (Central Committee) and the N. E. C. 
(National Executive Council or Committee); and approved the candidate 
for Presidential elections. 
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Scheduled to meet every two years from 1971 and every five years 
after 1975, the National Conference had a limited influence on Party 
policy. Attended by a large number of delegates from different 
parts of the country assembled, usually in the Diamond Jubilee Hall, 
for at the most one week, the Conference could not carry out a serious 
deliberation of the issues presented. The Conference was usually 
addressed by the Party Chairman and other national leaders and 
culminated with the passing of resolutions based on these speeches. 
For example, in 1982, the Chairman of the CCM gave a lengthy 
report on the five years of CCM government. This was followed by 
addresses from the Party Vice Chairman and other Party leaders 
exhorting the delegates to be committed and continue the work of CCM. 
A number of delegates got the chance to speak on problems and raise 
questions with the Party leadership and to point to some malpractices 
in the regions. A Conference Committee was then selected to draft 
resolutions based on the Chairman's speech. These were passed at 
5 
the end of the Conference. 
Another activity at the 1982 Conference was amendments to sections 
of the Party Constitution which on recommendation by N. E. C. the 
Conference was called upon to endorse. The third item of business 
was the election of the national leadership and members of the National 
Executive Committee. Delegates had copies of a curricultm vitae for 
each candidate. Each candidate was allowed three mintues to introduce 
himself to the Conference before delegates proceeded to make their 
choices by secret ballot. Candidates had been shortlisted by the 
CC and N. E. C. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the National Conference had 
great symbolic value as the visible expression of national unity with 
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delegates from different parts of the country and from all walks of 
life among the delegates united in the approval of programmes and 
resolutions which had been prepared by the national leadership. 
The participation of the Conference in the choice of the national 
leadership meant that this leadership was approved and endorsed by 
a nation-wide gathering. The National Conference also was a useful 
popular forum in which the leadership could explain and get approval 
of its policies from the wider membership. 
Central Committee 
The agency in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the Party 
was the Central Committee. Before 1969, the Central Committee was 
an informal group consisting of the elected TANU national leadership 
and TANU elders appointed by the President of TANU. These were usually 
resident in Dar es Salaam [Bienen, 1967, pp. 186-87]. In the 
reorganisation of Party structures from 1969, positions in the Central 
Committee became partly elective and partly appointees of the President 
of the Party. The elected members were one from each region and held 
office for five years. 
Members of the CC in 1969 and those of 1974 showed similar 
characteristics. Of the elected members from the regions in 1974, 
17 were notable elders, TANU stalwarts elected for their long standing 
in the Nationalist Movement and as old men respected for their wisdom 
and advice. Their formal training in the majority of cases was 
limited to primary education. Four were religious notables. In 
a sense they represented the more popular elements in the Party from 
the regions where they lived, being engaged in self-employment in 
agriculture. Of the three other elected members, one was an army 
captain (the Director of Political Education), another was a former 
Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Information and the third a 
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former medical assistant. Of the five Presidential appointees, four 
were long standing TANU elders while one was the Minister of State 
in the President's Office-[see TANU, 1974, pp. 8-9; TANU, 1974(a) 
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passim for some brief biographies]. 
Members of the Central Committee were constituted into four sub- 
committees in 1969. These were Economy and Finances; Political, 
dealing with Party matters and political education; Social Affairs, 
including health and education, and Defence and Security. In 1974 
the number of subcommittees was increased to seven to facilitate the 
work of the Central Committee in the wake of the push to make the Party 
supreme. This went hand in hand with improved organisation and 
expansion of the Secretariat of the Party Headquarters with the creation 
of departments to service the Party leadership under the direction 
of the National Executive Secretary. The subcommittees had permanent 
chairmen resident in the new capital, Dodoma. 
The Central Committee had the task of formulating Party policies, 
which would then be debated and decided upon in a wider body, the 
National Executive Council/Committee. The Central Committee through 
its subcommittees also had the task of supervising the implementation 
of government policies and the performance of parastatals. The Political 
Affairs and Defence and Security subcommittees dealt with Party 
membership and leadership issues. Aspirants to various leadership 
positions would be scrutinised and recommendations made to the Central 
Committee to be passed to the National Executive Council for decisions 
as to who would stand in elections - for example, those for the National 
Assembly, or for district or regional chairman of the Party. 
On economic issues, the Economic Affairs subcommittee had the 
general task of supervising the implementation of Party policy on 
107 
economic programmes, including agricultural and industrial production 
and the use of natural resources. This covered the whole range of 
economic activities; the work of cooperatives, the transport sector, 
use of energy resources, and the performance of financial institutions 
[information on the work of the Economic Affairs subcommittee mainly 
from interview with Mzee J. Mbutu - Secretary]. The subcommittee 
was composed of members from the Central Committee plus coopted members 
from the relevant economic ministries such as Agriculture, Industries, 
Land and Housing, Commerce, Water and Communications. The latter 
would be called on at sittings of the subcommittee to explain the 
situation of the sectors they were in charge of and to report on the 
work of the government agencies and parastatals under their responsi- 
bility. 
In this way the Central Committee would supervise economic affairs 
as well as be a source of new ideas which later could be discussed 
and become Party policy. For example, the Committee dealt with the 
Second Five Year Plan, 1969-1974, and readjusted it to give stress 
on rural development. In 1976, the subcommittee probed the unsatis- 
factory performance of UMITA (a freight parastatal) where there were 
losses and alleged misappropriation of funds. The probe led to a 
number of dismissals. The subcommittee also dealt with The National 
Housing Corporation scandal, which centred upon some building projects 
by this parastatal that had remained unfulfilled and the poor quality 
of several of the built houses. This led to the management's being 
dismissed. Another case considered was the unsatisfactory distribution 
of textiles by TEXCO (the textiles products parastatal), leading to 
warnings and the organisation of a seminar on the approved procedures 
in the distribution of textile products. The subcommittee probed 
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the Tanga Fertiliser Company where fertilisers had been piling up and 
a conflict had developed between the management and employees. The 
subcommittee also dealt with problems facing the National Milling 
Corporation and the losses it was making. 
Another common procedure utilised by the Central Committee was 
the commissioning of a study. This task would usually be given to 
the National Executive Secretary. This is what happened in the case 
of the resolution on Universal Primary Education which was passed in 
1974 at Musoma. The task was given to the National Executive 
Secretary to make recommendations on extending primary education to 
all primary age children. Technical advice was sought from the 
Ministry of Education and the University of Dar es Salaam (the then 
Vice-Chancellor of the University Nd. P. Msekwa was a member of the 
team). Recommendations were made to the CC and to the N. E. C., which 
after deliberations issued the famous Musoma Declaration. 
With the exception of the President and the Vice-President and 
the Minister of State in the President's Office, the 1975 Central 
Committee was composed of people who did not hold ministerial posts. 
This being the case, the summoning of Ministers and Principal 
Secretaries or heads of parastatals before the CC did not always go 
well with some ministries. Some Ministers and Principal Secretaries 
saw the system of CC subcommittees as an intrusion into their sphere 
of authority, since they had been taught and had come to accept the 
myth of the unpolitical nature of government administration and the 
civil service. This involvement of members of the CC in the decision- 
making processes of government ministries was an important element 
in ujamaa political practices. 
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The National Executive Council 
While the CC formulated policies and was in charge of the 
day-to-day affairs of the Party, Party decisions were finalised in 
the wider body of the N. E. C. - often referred to as National Executive 
Committee, but the Swahili name is better rendered by the English 
Council. Its composition was revised during the 1970's several times. 
In the early 1970's, the N. E. C. 's members consisted of: 
- 20 members elected (one from each region) by the National Conference 
to compose the Party Central Committee; 
- all 20 Regional Party Chairmen elected in the regions; 
- 20 Regional Party Secretaries, appointees of the Party's National 
Chairman; 
- Five other members appointed by the Party Chairman; 
- the National Secretaries of all affiliated organisations (i. e. the 
trade union; the cooperatives, the Parents' Association, the women's 
organisation and the youth league), all of whom were appointees; 
- the Attorney General; 
- and the Principal Secretary to the President. 
The Council was designated to meet every three months. 
In 1977 the N. E. C. was enlarged to about 160 members to include members 
from both parts of Tanzania on an equal basis, but the principle of 
appointed and elected members was kept. The chairmen of the Party 
mass organisations also became members. In 1982 another innovation 
was introduced with the addition of five reserved seats for the youth 
organisation, women's organisation and the armed forces. The N. E. C. 
was to meet every six months. 
In 1974 the elected members, the elected Regional Chairmen of 
the Party and the twenty N. E. C. members from the regions elected by 
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the National Conference, tended to be drawn from the elder notables. 
These were personalities respected for their involvement in the Party 
since colonial times. They were drawn from the more popular sections 
and were people well known in their respective regions where they had 
influence and respect. This contrasted with the Regional Secretaries 
who were people with more formal education who had risen by being active 
in the Party's youth wing or in the Party administrative sections 
[CCM, 1977]. 
During the late 1960's and the 1970's the N. E. C. became the body 
from which several major pronouncements were made, leading commentators 
[Msekwa, 1976] to see it as the key decision-making body over a whole 
range of issues of national importance. The following examples of 
policy statements and directives that were deliberated upon and issued 
by N. E. C. can be cited from the Minutes of the N. E. C.: 
(1) The N. E. C. meeting of Ist June 1967 at Iringa deliberated on 
a 'report by the President on nationalisations and the payment of compen- 
sation to various companies -a follow-up to the Arusha Declaration 
meeting when the N. E. C. had urged further steps in the implementation 
of socialism. 
(2) The N. E. C. meeting of October 10,1967 deliberated on NUTA's 
suggestion that more say be given to workers in the management of 
factories. It was agreed in principle that workers in parastatals 
should have more say and that means be investigated to realise that 
objective (Minute No. 100). 
(3) The N. E. C. in March 1970 discussed government's efforts to 
create a state commercial sector on the basis of a report prepared by 
the Minister for Industries. The Principal Secretary in the Ministry 
of Agriculture reported on the state of food production in the country; 
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and there was a discussion of ways of stemming corruption - 
government officials would be required to explain how they got 
property when required to do so by the President. 
(4) The N. E. C. Extraordinary Meeting of February 1971 in Dar es 
Salaam deliberated on the country's security and decided on the creation 
of the People's Militia (military training for adult citizens). 
(5) The N. E. C. session of January 18,1972 agreed on the 
Decentralisation Programme setting up a new system of Regional Admini- 
stration and determined that 40% of government expenditure to be 
utilised on development projects. 
(6) The N. E. C. meeting of May 15,1972 decided on the need to raise the 
minimum wage in view of the rising cost of living, directing the 
government to deal with the issue. 
(7) The N. E. C. meeting of November 28,1972 discussed housing 
policy and the question of the Tanzania Hdusing Bank giving loans to 
workers to build their own houses; they also discussed rents in 
government houses, approving a report tabled by the Minister of Lands. 
(8) The N. E. C. meeting of April 1973 in Dar es Salaam approved 
the payment of bonuses to encourage productivity but decided these 
were not to be paid to those with high salaries; it agreed on the 
creation of an Anti-Corruption Squad to deal with corruption and 
bribery; and the TAPA (Tanganyika Parents Association) and religious 
organisations were allowed to run schools, since government was unable 
to offer primary and technical education to all children. 
(9) The N. E. C. meeting of November 22,1974 at Musoma approved: 
(a) the principle of Party supremacy, to be enshrined 
de jure in the constitution; 
(b) the implementation of steps leading to the goal of 
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Universal Primary Education; 
(c) a procedure for University entrance, including vetting 
by Party branches and two years' work experience before 
joining institutions of higher learning; 
(10) The N. E. C. meeting of March 10,1975 in Shinyanga was informed 
of an imminent law on villages and ulamaa villages and the structures 
envisaged. N. E. C. gave its approval. 
Other measures decided upon during N. E. C. meetings included the 
transfer of the capital from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma (1973) and the 
move of rural population into nucleated villages, placing control of 
land in many areas into the hands of newly constituted village councils 
under the Villages and Ujamaa Village's Act (1974). 
The structures of the Party at the national level were linked 
with those of central government through the various holders of office 
in the two organisations. Thus the President of the Republic and 
the Vice-President were Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Party. 
Ministers had to be members of the Party and some of them were in the 
Central Committee. In the late 1960's and early 1970's members of 
the Central Committee tended to be drawn from the more popular elements, 
with few of them in the Cabinet, but by 1977 this situation had changed, 
with several Ministers now being members of the N. E. C. or of the Central 
Committee. In 1982, the President, Vice-President, Prime Minister, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Finance were members of 
the Central Committee of the Party! 
Regional and District Administration 
The decentralisation programme which was introduced in 
January 1972 changed the structures of regional and district 
administration which had been created after independence. The 
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ostensible purpose of the new administrative set-up was to give people 
in their Region or District greater democratic control over matters 
which directly concerned them by bringing them closer to the imple- 
mentors of those decisions. The new administrative structure would 
also speed up decision-making and implementation at the Regional and 
District levels, freeing them from the need to wait for central 
government approval. 
The new system of regional administration introduced at the 
Regional and District levels a hierarchy of administrative officials 
and technical personnel in the fields of agriculture, education and 
health. These administrative officials and personnel were to be 
headed by and answerable to a Regional Development Director. The 
post of Regional Commissioner remained as the regional head, (as well 
as being Secretary of the Party Regional Structures) but the new post 
of Regional Development Director was to combine several responsibilities. 
He became Secretary of the Regional Development Committee which 
coordinated all regional plans before they were tabled to the Regional 
Party Committee for approval. He was the chief advisor to this Party 
Committee on proposed plans, indicating sources of funds and the state 
of material and human resources in the region. Regional plans were 
submitted by the Regional Development Director to the Prime Minister's 
Office where all regional plans were amalgamated before submission 
to the Economic Committee of the Cabinet. 
In regional planning the Regional Director thus held an important 
position. In matters of implementation, the Director was the 
practical head of administration; as chief accounting officer he 
approved use of regional funds; and he monitored the implementation 
of projects as head of all the technical personnel who were answerable 
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to him in the region. At the District level, the District Development 
Director was in a similar position. 
The Regional administration was linked to the structures of the 
Party through the Regional Commissioner, who as we have seen retained 
also the post of Regional Secretary of the Party. The Regional 
Commissioner chaired the Regional Development Committee which drafted 
plans for the region in the light of suggestions from Ward and District 
levels. This committee consisted of District Party Chairmen and 
Secretaries and District Directors. The draft plans would be submitted 
to the Regional TANU Committee chaired by the Regional Chairman of 
the Party and attended by delegates from Districts for deliberation 
and approval. In this way the regional administration and party 
political structures combined appointed officials and Party elected 
delegates and representatives. 
At the village level, the village government was composed of a 
popularly elected, Party-based Council headed by the Party Village 
Chairman but managed by the centrally-appointed Village Manager. At 
the Ward level, the appointed Ward Secretary (katibu kata) combined 
the administrative post of Ward head as well as that of Party Ward 
Secretary. The same situation prevailed at the District level, with 
the Area Commissioner combining the post of chief executive and 
District Party Secretary. His work was to liaise with party political 
structures which were forums for local expression of demands and 
desires at their respective levels on issues relating to agriculture, 
education and other local services. Several studies in rural 
administraiton have shown that effective decision-making and imple- 
mentation lies greatly in the hands of these appointed and technical 
personnel at the different levels [see, for example, Finucane, 1974]. 
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In June 1975, "Party Supremacy" became enshrined in the 
Constitution of Tanzania. Henceforth public affairs and public 
policies were to be carried out under the guidance, supervision 
and approval of Party leadership: "the functions of the organs of 
the United Republic of Tanzania shall be performed under the auspices 
of the Party"-(Chapter 1, pt. 1, Section 3(4) of the Interim 
Constitution). This was reiterated in the country's 1977 Constitution 
(Chapter 1, pt. 1, Section 3 (1-3)) with the creation of CCM, and in 
the 1984 Constitution. These provisions meant that the Head of 
State, state and government ministers would be summoned before 
sessions of the N. E. C. to account for government actions. But as 
the top posts in the government hierarchy and in Party 
were occupied by the same people, there was less prospect of dis- 
agreements than would otherwise have been the case. Such summons 
served in practice as an occasion for those N. E. C. members not in 
government to be involved in State decisions and for the President 
and the Cabinet to gain their approval and support. At the same 
time, as N. E. C. members were from different parts of the country, 
political leaders in government would be able to get feedback from 
the regions in a confidential and uninhibited atmosphere reminiscent 
of the palavers so common in the cultural practices of communities 
in many parts of Tanzania known as baraza (meetings or assembly of 
men, usually elderly, deliberating and coming to a consensus decision). 
With the separation of the posts of national Chairman of the Party 
and President of the Republic as a result of the 1985 elections, it 
remains to be seen how the provisions of Party Supremacy will affect 
the functioning of the political system. 
116 
4 DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES AFTER 1967: SOME ILLUSTRATIONS AND 
OBSERVATIONS 
Some aspects of the analysis presented in the last section are best 
illustrated by the way the Tanzanian leadership handled a number of 
crucial episodes in the country's history since 1967. The following 
examples have been selected to highlight some of the more important 
issues. 
a) Illustrations 
Mwongozo 
The N. E. C. 's Extraordinary Meeting of February 1971 was called 
following the military coup d'etat in Uganda. The deliberations were 
attended both by N. E. C. members and by invited leaders in government: 
ministers, principal secretaries, and the heads of the armed forces, 
the University and the Party Ideological College. The Chairman explained 
the events in Uganda and the ramifications of that army revolt and how 
it would affect the East African community and the Liberation Struggle 
in Southern Africa. Discussions during the week centred on the 
strengthening of the country's defences, the role of the Party, 
Tanzania's foreign policy and the consolidation of the country's 
economy. A working committee was chosen to draft what were to be 
the resolutions of the meeting, giving rise to the 1971 Party Guidelines 
(= Mwongozo). The resolutions and the decisions taken were initiated 
by different participants, including the Chairman in his opening address 
and other contributors speaking on the role of the Party (for example, 
Ngombale Mwiru, a former Secretary-General of the Party youth wing as well as 
principal of the Party ideological college-who was considered to be 
on the Party's radical wing). Sokoine spoke in favour of 
the creation of a people's militia drawing examples from the way all 
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able bodied in his community(Masai)and in many parts of the country 
were usually trained and armed. This persuaded delegates to pass the 
motion for the creation of a People's Militia. Attention then n ved to the 
question of the guiding role of the Party and the need to get members 
more involved. In the face of threats of political instability, the 
Guidelines were passed. Moreover the style of arriving at the 
resolutions was based on the assembling of different views and arriving 
at a consensus. The objective sought is societal integration and 
leadership's legitimacy [interviews with Msekwa and Mwiru, N. E. C. 
minutes]. 
Decentralization 
The Decentralization Programme of 1972 followed a different course. 
In the first place the government commissioned a study to reform the 
regional administration to relate it to the development objectives set 
out in the Arusha Declaration. When the new structure was proposed, 
the Regional Development Director was to be chairman of the Regional 
Development Committee, which would have implied a relatively small role 
for elected Party personalities in regional economic affairs. When 
the N. E. C. met, at the suggestion of the Chairman, that proviso was 
removed from the final structure before it was approved by N. E. C. 
As we have seen, in the agreed decentralization arrangements, Regional 
Development Committees were chaired by the Regional Party Chairman 
[interview with Mzee J. Mbutu; Minutes of N. E. C., Minute 3]. Regional 
administration and programmes it was hoped would be more acceptable 
with an element of popular involvement. 
Foreign Affairs 
Kiwanuka [1979] has argued that N. E. C. as a body did not usually 
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discuss external relations except in terms of the general policy of 
the Party, which stood for support of liberation movements in southern 
Africa and the Non-Aligned Movement. N. E. C. was usually "briefed" 
by the President on what action the government took on different issues 
as they emerged. N. E. C. would then invariably support the government 
stand. In other words, the style was that initiatives were presented 
by the Presidency after initial discussion with the Ministry and 
advisors. These were presented to N. E. C. for discussion and decision. 
This forum was suited to this purpose, as its deliberations were 
confidential, thus avoiding publicity which could embarrass the government 
or generate conflict. That the Presidency felt the need to 
at least brief and justify the N. E. C. is a measure of the importance 
attached to gaining the acceptance and consent of the wider population 
for governmental activities. 
b) Observations 
In all of the above instances decisions were by assent rather than 
by strict voting. The emphasis was on integration and achieving 
consensus, not on "adversary politics" and the imposition of the will 
of the majority. Committee members participated not as representatives 
of a specific category of the population but as members of a party 
aiming to arrive at conclusions which would be for the common good. 
The lack of organised "factions", separate interest groups or pressure 
groups was typical of the N. E. C. as it was of the National Assembly, 
both institutions reflecting the unitarist character of the political 
system. The presence of members from various sections of the popu- 
lation (youth, women, armed forces) far from interferring with consensus, 
tended to defuse any potential mobilisation that could have arisen had 
119 
they been excluded. 
The Tanzanian political system, then, was a centralised system 
in which the expression of particularistic interests was discouraged. 
This lack of pluralism, which was partly conditioned at independence 
by the relatively low level of differentiation of the population, made 
a number of things possible which would not have been possible in 
adversary politics. For example, the state was able to intervene 
in the economy in a continuous but largely conflict-free way, and - 
as we shall see in the next chapter - it was able to regulate relations 
between employers and employees without the problems this typically 
involves. 
The power enjoyed by the central state actors in such a system 
is obviously not unlimited, however. It is circumscribed first of 
all by the resources available, the state of the economy, the inter- 
national political and economic context, and the weight of foreign 
capital and financial agencies from which the state is constrained to 
borrow funds for pressing projects. The centralization of the 
political system of Tanzania was also quite relative, given the limited 
organizational resources and manpower available to the central 
authorities for implementing and enforcing decisions. In practice, 
this kind of limitation led to Regional, District and Ward officials 
retaining in their jurisdictions real power to implement and enforce 
decisions as they understood them and to interpret the country's 
policies as they saw fit, or even to pursue their own goals [Vide 
Samoff, 1974; Finucane, 1974]. 
Another qualification on the relative centralism of the political 
system concerns the necessarily general character of Party pronounce- 
ments at the top. National Party decisions were usually expressed 
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in abstract terms, often as moral ideals which needed practical 
translation into identifiable objectives that could be implemented. 
Gaps on that level often created ambiguities in the strategy to be 
undertaken. For example, the role of private activities after the 
Arusha Declaration was not always spelt out clearly in distinction 
from what the public sector would be engaged in. That kind of 
ambiguity sometimes led to important decisions being taken in a more 
ad hoc way. For example, the ill-defined limits to the role of the 
public sector led in 1976 to public take-overs of small enterprises 
such as butcheries and shops. This "Operation Maduka" (maduka = 
shops) was later reversed. 
In the chapters which follow both the corporatist-type centralism 
of the post-Arusha political system and these important limits to its 
effectivenesss will be very much in evidence. 
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Footnotes 
1. See Tordoff [1967] for details of the Constitution. 
2. This point recurs in several minutes of N. E. C. when discussing 
the creation of constituency boundaries. 
3. TANU [1975, p. 9]. TAND fee-paying membership (hai) was 20.1% of adults. 
4. This ambiguity showed itself in the term workers in the workers' 
participation programme and would refer to all employees. 
5. Notes taken by author as observer to the Conference. 
6. TANU, 1974(a) was the report of the National Conference of TANU of 
June 1974, during which time the practice was that candidates would 
introduce themselves verbally to the Conference. In those self 
introductions one gets a glimpse of those who were later elected. 
TANU, 1974 is an annual report listing names of members of the C. C. 
Information on them was obtained through interviews with Mzee S. Ng'hwaya, a 
long-time journalist with the Party Newspaper Uhuru. 
7. There has been a change in the face of both the N. E. C. and the C. C. 
since the creation of CCM in 1977, and since the 1982 party elections. 
This was brought about by the union of the Afro-Shirazi Party and 
TANU and the need to include N. E. C. and C. C. members from both sides 
of the United Republic. Secondly, N. E. C. and the C. C. are more 
drawn from the ranks of government 
administration, parastatals or party administration and less from 
the more "popular elements" - the elders and notables of the 1970's. 
Thirdly, the simultaneous tenure of important posts in N. E. C.,. C. C. 
and government is another feature of the early 1980's. [Vide van Donge, 
K. and Liviga, A., 1985, for one surzary of the 1982 N. E. C. I. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SALIENT FEATURES OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM 
This chapter sets out to examine the industrial relations system 
in Tanzania after independence and especially since 1967. The 
objective is to review the general labour policies and the major items 
of legislation regulating work relations and shaping employees' 
activities at factory level. One central feature that is highlighted 
is the way the political system has articulated with or has informed 
the labour policies and the formal structures governing work relations. 
The chapter argues that three guiding principles expressed in the 
ideology of ujamaa - centralism, populism and humanism - have permeated 
the way workmen and industrial relations are organised, particularly 
in public enterprises. At a deeper level, the explanation for the 
range of corporatist measures introduced in 1964 and after 1967 lies 
in the socio-political system discussed in the preceding chapter - 
the labour policies and structures emanate from that system. 
The chapter, in other words, conceives the industrial relations 
system in Tanzania as an element in the political strategy of dominant 
political actors, for an industrial relations system and messes governing 
the relationship between workmen and employers cannot be divorced from 
the nature of the political system. One of the central roles of the 
state is the maintenance of jurisdiction over the population in a given 
area. This includes employers and employees. The issue then as 
regards the industrial relations system is not the existence or non- 
existence of state control but rather the form this control takes. 
The character and content of political power affects the character and 
content of the industrial relations system, the structures of 
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organisations of employees, the bargaining procedures between employers 
and employees and the content of policies relating to working conditions. 
Implicit in this perspective is the belief that the industrial relations 
system is not a mere or a direct expression of the interests of a class 
but is rather one of the strategies of political actors pursuing 
certain primarily political goals. 
The chapter discusses trade union organisation, the workers' 
participation programme (Workers' Councils), aspects of the organisational 
set-up of public corporations which affect labour relations and the 
regulation of industrial relations under the Permanent Labour Tribunal 
Act of 1967. 
1. TRADE UNION ORGANISATION 
At independence Tanzania inherited an industrial relations system 
in which the state through the Department of Labour was involved in 
direct regulation of working conditions and wages and as well as in 
the supervision of trade unionism. From this it was a short step 
towards the direct state control of unionism which was introduced in 
1964. The decisive influence, though, was the political leadership's 
basic strategy, which as we have seen was strongly oriented towards 
national integration and harmony. In order to further national 
stability, consensus and harmony, the option was pursued of demobilising 
potentially partisan socio-economic groups by placing them under the 
umbrella of one organisation, whose leadership was linked to and 
answerable to the political leadership. This structural arrangement 
tended to circumscribe the independent activities of trade unions. 
Cooptation of labour organisations was not the only instrument 
of the leadership's strategy. In order to promote societal peace 
and remove sources of industrial conflict, some of the first measures 
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of the independence government were designed to improve labour conditions 
especially in urban areas and remove those aspects of the work situation 
which were conspicuously unwelcome. It enacted a statutory minimum 
wage, established the right for paid leave and compensation in case 
of sickness, and set out procedures for dismissing workers, thus 
constraining the power employers had over their employees. As we saw 
in Chapter 2, such a combination of institutional incorporation and 
measures to provide material benefits to previously disadvantages groups 
is typical of what Stepan [1978] calls inclusionary corporatism. Other 
aspects of the labour regulating measures working towards harmony and 
consensus were the systematic regulation of wages and salaries, government 
arbitration of disputes and the creation of avenues for workers' 
involvement and consultation. The last mentioned was, as we shall 
see in a later section, a crucial aspect of the work setting as it 
emerged after 1967, although elements of it were present from an earlier 
date. 
At the same time as it was providing new social benefits to reward 
its supporters and consolidate its political base, the new government 
was intent on encouraging foreign investment and thus was concerned 
about curbing industrial unrest which could scare off prospective 
foreign investors. This double aspect of the labour legislation 
immediately after independence reveals itself in the series of Acts 
passed in the period 1962-67. 
The major items of legislation were as follows. 
- The Trade Unions Ordinance (Amendment) Act, 1962, which made 
it a condition for a union to remain legal that it should be affiliated 
to a designated Federation appointed by the Minister for Labour - in 
effect a measure for close supervision and control of unions by the 
government. 
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- The Trade Disputes (Settlement) Act No. 43 of 1962, which set up 
a longv -winded tortuous procedure before a legal strike or lockout could be 
carried out - restricting strike action by employees. A similar act, 
The Civil Service (Negotiating Machinery) Act, 1962, concerned junior 
civil servants who were to be forbidden to go on strike by the Trade 
Disputes (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1964. 
- The Severance Allowance Act No. 57 of 1962, granting some 
benefits to an employee or his dependents in case of loss of job or 
death. Such provisions had not existed before. 
- The National Provident Fund Act of 1964, which provided some 
measure of retirement benefits in the form of contributions made partly 
by the employee (5% of basic wage) and partly by the employer (10% of 
employee's basic wage). 
- The Security of Employment Act No. 62 of 1964 restricting the 
employer's arbitrary power to dismiss employees with the introduction 
of Workers' Committees in work places. Through the Act employee's 
Workers' Committees were to be consulted by the employer on issues 
relating to discipline and the sanctioning of workers. A Conciliation 
Board was to be set up consisting of representatives of the two parties 
under the chairmanship of a District Labour Officer to deal with 
disciplinary matters. 
The National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA) Act No. 4 of 1964 
was the law which affected workers' organisations most considerably 
and was the principal expression of the corporatist policies of the 
political leadership. In the wake of the army mutiny of 1964 and the 
threat to national integration and cohesion that event entailed, the 
Tanganyika Federation of Labour was disbanded and one central trade 
union (NUTA) was created to which all employees were to belong. 
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In its structures and procedures NUTA was to be closely linked 
to the political party. Unlike the hitherto "consumptionist" unions, 
the new union as an affiliate to the Party was to advance the policies 
as designated by the political leadership and promote increased 
production. Under the Act, the union was centrally organised at its 
national headquarters with several industrial departments. Its main 
executive officers, the Secretary General and his Deputy, were 
appointees of the President of the Republic. The union structures 
included elected committee-men at District, Regional and the National 
General Council levels. There were also appointed Secretaries at the 
head of each echelon. As an affiliate of the Party, the union sent 
delegates to the different sittings at District, Regional and National 
level as well as giving annual reports on union activities to the 
National organs of the Party. Positions of leadership, either elective 
or appointed, were restricted to those with membership in the political 
party. One point that needs noting particularly is that NUTA 
delegates at National sittings of the Party were not expected to 
participate in discussions as representing the particularistic interests 
of the employed. 
As the organisation of the employed, NUTA was replaced in 1977 
by JUWATA. This followed the restructuring of the Party set-up and 
the creation of C. C. M. Several changes affected the employer's 
organisation. JUWATA became designated as one of the Mass Organisations 
of the Party, to which all employees belong. While membership of NUTA 
had been through one's enrolment as a member or through the "closed- 
shop" system (whereby all employees were deemed members in a workplace 
consisting of more than fifty percent of membership), membership of 
JUWATA was by virtue of being employed, with the consequent monthly 
127 
payment of membership dues of 1% of one's basic salary or wage. Those 
seeking leadership positions in JUWATA either as chairmen or committee 
men at different levels were screened and approved by the Central 
Committee of C. C. M. before being submitted to a ballot of the workers 
(Paragraph 71 of Party Constitution [C. C. M., 1977]. JUWATA branch 
committee-men and elected Congress delegates were expected to attend 
meetings with Regional and National Secretaries who were appointees 
of the Central Committee of C. C. M. 
JUWATA is a centralised organisation and manifests in its structure 
the unitarist and organic-statist conceptions of the political leader- 
ship. At the lowest levels is the JUWATA branch is composed of-all 
employees with the obligation to pay their monthly subscriptions. The 
branch elects a Chairman and members of the branch committee, whose 
number depends on the size of the workforce with the proviso that there 
is one member from each department. The key role is played by the 
appointed Secretary of the branch who is in charge of all correspondence, 
finances and the holding of meetings. The C. C. M. Branch Secretary 
is also a member of the JUWATA branch committee. A similar structure 
is replicated at the District, Regional and National levels. The 
National Congress, which meets every three years, is composed of mixed 
delegates and elects the General Chairman of JUWATA. It also elects 
the smaller National Council (Baraza Kuu) whose members are partly 
elected (the Regional Chairman of JUWATA, twenty members elected by 
Congress, ten each from mainland and the Isles - and one member from 
each of nine categories of employees such as industrial workers, 
railwaymen, teachers, hotel workers, transporters, etc. ) and partly 
appointees (the JUWATA Secretary General, C. C. M. National Executive 
Secretary and the Regional Secretaries of JUWATA). 
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Baraza Kuu, which according to the union constitution must meet 
at least once a year, is the body which generally supervises the 
implementation of Congress decisions including procedures relating 
to industrial disputes. The further smaller body in the hierarchy 
of JUWATA, Kamati ya Usimamizi (Executive Council). , meeting at 
least once every six months, is with JUWATA Headquarters the imple- 
mentator of union decisions. The daily conduct of union-affairs 
at the National level is managed by the JUWATA National Secretariat. 
Under the union chief executive (the Secretary General) and one deputy 
each for mainland Tanzania and the Isles, the secretariat is composed 
of seven departments: Education and Culture; Publicity; Finances; 
Personnel; International Relations; Research and Planning; and 
Workers' Participation. 
The system of hierarchies and the working procedures of JUWATA 
defined the conditions for industrial action by the union to take 
place. Any such action must start from branch level and be approved 
by the District and Regional hierarchies before submission to the 
National organs which alone can endorse any intended action. On the 
other hand, the National echelons cannot initiate any move until all 
the legal procedures governing industrial disputes have been exhausted. 
JUWATA figures show that there was a steady growth in membership 
from 1977 to 1981, with total membership rising from 267,391 to 
349,681. At the end of 1981 the JUWATA membership was 58% of the 
estimated total labour force of 600,000 employees of all categories. 
Among those who were not registered as JUWATA members were workers in 
household employment. The limited coverage of JUWATA membership was 
also the result of a lark of strict applications of the "closed shop" measures to 
employees who had been non-NUTA members. This usually involved 
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middle-level categories or white-collar employees -a legacy of the 
historical concentration of union membership among low-wage blue-collar 
workers. Despite these limitations, the increase in membership was 
reflected in a growth in the number of JUWATA branches from 1,383 in 
1978 to 2,263 in 1981 [JUWATA, 1982]. 
When JUWATA formally took over from NUTA in February 1978, the 
NUTA leadership was passed over to JUWATA, with the Secretary General 
continuing as the chief executive of the organisation, a position he 
had held since 1969 as an appointee of the President of the Republic. 
The same happened to his two deputies. The Secretary General, a long- 
time trade unionist, also held the post of Minister of Labour. His 
deputies were longstanding active unionists. The National Chairman had formally 
held a government post as Area Commissioner before standing for election 
as the National Chairman of JUWATA. Departmental Heads at the National 
Secretariat had been active trade unionists. 
Since the 1984 JUWATA elections, reflecting a tendency discernible 
also in the Party leadership, the National leadership of JUWATA has 
tended to be drawn increasingly from among white-collar employees in 
government administration or Party bureaucracy. The Secretary General, 
another long-standing union leader in the late 1950's and 1960's, came 
back to the Secretariat of JUWATA after varied spells as General Manager, 
Regional Commissioner and Ambassador. The new National Chairman is 
a former labour officer, Regional Development Director and Principal 
Secretary in the Prime Minister's Office. Among the five elected 
members of the JUWATA Executive Council from mainland Tanzania, one 
was an incumbent Regional Commissioner, another a Director of Personnel 
and Management in the Ministry of Trade, another a Regional Development 
Director and the last a District Party Secretary. 
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Figure 3.1 
The Structures of NUTA/JUWATA 
NATIONAL CONGRESS 
GENERAL COUNCIL 
HEADQUARTERS EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 
Sec-General 
REGIONAL LEVEL REGIONAL COUNCIL 
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE 
REGIONAL OFFICE COMMITTEE 
Regional Secretary 
DISTRICT LEVEL DISTRICT COUNCIL 
DISTRICT EXECUTIVE 
DISTRICT OFFICE COMMITTEE 
District Secretary MEETING OF BRANCH 
COMMITTEES OF 
INDUSTRIAL AND 
SUB-INDUSTRIAL 
SECTIONS 
FACTORY LEVEL BRANCH MEETINGS 
BRANCH OFFICE BRANCH COMMITTEE 
Branch Secretary 
Source: Drawn by the Department of Research International Affairs, NUTA, 
Year 1975 September. 
Note: I have added the title JUWATA as structures are basically 
the same. 
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2. THE WORKERS' PARTICIPATION PROGRAMME: THE STRUCTURE OF WORKERS' 
COUNCILS 
Another of the key features of the industrial relations system 
relating to public enterprises is the workers' participation programme 
introduced in 1970. In its origin, purpose and structural design 
the programme reveals once again values and conceptions which tend 
towards industrial harmony and consensus. The apparent objectives 
included the demobilisation of any potential organisation of sections 
of the workforce to make concerted demands; the keeping of decision- 
making power and the right to manage in the hands of the managerial 
cadre; and the creation of avenues of popular involvement or 
industrial democracy based on the assumption that there is no antagonism 
between management and workers. In accordance with one of the central 
tenets of the u7amaa ideology, workers and managers were seen as being 
in organic unity and harmony as parts of a body working towards the 
common good. 
However, although in its purpose and design the programme aimed 
at the incorporation of the workforce and the maintenance of industrial 
peace, the programme set in motion processes of a different kind as 
workers utilised situations and events to advance their own more limited 
objectives. In other words how the workers reacted to the structures 
was contingent on how the workers and management defined their work 
situations - the results of this complex interaction were not always 
those anticipated by the designers of the programme. 
The Workers' Council programme applicable to Tanzania's public 
enterprises was promulgated by the Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1970 
and stemmed from the changes which followed the Arusha Declaration - 
the increased size of the state sector and the search for new ways of 
running these enterprises. Following the Arusha Declaration, sections 
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of the trade union leadership advocated a variety of workers' 
participation schemes or profit sharing programmes. In the course 
of the parliamentary debate on the Permanent Labour Tribunal Act in 
October 1967, [Session No. 10 of Bunge 24-27 October 1967], several 
Members of Parliament, mostly from the trade union leadership, raised 
objections to sections of the intended legislation, arguing that it 
put restrictions on workers' capacity to bargain with employers on 
wages and conditions of service. Several members of the Assembly 
argued for the necessity of putting into practice the Party's policy 
on Socialism and Self-reliance as regards salary/wage differentials. 
They also argued for the introduction of forms of workers' partici- 
pation in planning and decision-making, giving examples from socialist 
factories in Eastern Europe and stressing the importance of industrial 
democracy on workers' control. 
The issue of workers' participation was not pursued during the 
following sessions of the Assembly but it continued to be discussed 
in the trade union leadership. In 1969, in a memorandum sent by NUTA 
to government, the issue of workers' participation was raised, proposing 
1, 
a scheme for workers' participation and for workers' consultation. ' 
The Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1970 initiating the Workers' 
Participation programme was a response to these proposals and demands. 
The purpose of the circular was to find ways of mobilising a new 
attitude among workers towards the enterprises they worked in, of 
spreading information to the workers as regards performance and targets, 
and of eliciting a sense of commitment towards increased productivity 
on the shop-floor (Para. 1 of the Circular [1970]). The creation of 
the Workers' Councils, it was hoped, would promote a sense of 
"common endeavour and common responsibility" (Para. 2) within the 
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workforce as well as creating a new form of industrial discipline 
based on workers being respected as partners in a common venture. 
This can be viewed as a strategy to elicit commitment without recourse 
to force. 
To distinguish the Workers' Councils from the union workers' 
committees the main function of the Workers' Council was to be to "give 
practical effect to workers' representation and participation in planning, 
productivity, quality and marketing matters" (Para. 5), while the 
Workers' Committees would be concerned with conditions of service and 
work discipline. In practice this distinction proved difficult to 
adhere to when dealing with planning for ' enterprises wages and the 
welfare of workers. Employees wages are a part of an enterprise plan. 
Another source of tension was the discrepancy between the condition 
of workers as co-partners with management (as envisaged by the programme) 
and their actual position as employees of state organisation. An 
amelioration of the condition of workers as co-partners with management 
when taken to its logical conclusions could be a source of conflict 
not only with management but with the government as the ultimate source 
of authority over the parastatal sector. 
The structural design of the Workers' Council as adopted by the 
Presidential Circular was basically informed by unitary, incorporationist 
principles of social (in this case work-place) harmony. The Workers' 
Council would consist of the Manager or General Manager and all depart- 
mental heads on the one hand, and members of the workers' committee 
and elected workers' representatives from different departments on the 
other (Para. 7 of the Circular), thus bringing together in partnership 
members of the workforce and management. Formally required to meet 
at least once in six months the main task of the Council was to advise 
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the Board of Directors on different aspects of the enterprise, from 
the current wages situation to aspects of the marketing of company 
products and matters of planning, including discussing the company's 
balance sheet. As an advisory body, the Council was designed to be 
a useful forum for the workforce to air their views and suggestions. 
Decision-making would remain, in principle, in the hands of the 
management and the Board of Directors, themselves operating under 
constraints instituted by higher authorities, to whom management and 
the Board of Directors remained accountable in their decisions. The 
Board of Directors was, however, to have at least one member nominated 
by the national authorities of NUTA. 
The Workers' Council programme included the creation of smaller 
bodies known as Executive Committees chaired by the General Manager 
and consisting of heads of departments and members elected by the Workers' 
Council. The elected members were to be up to a third of the total 
composition of the Executive Committee (Para. 15). Its main task 
was to advise the General Manager on the day-to-day running of the 
enterprise. 
Commentators have correctly remarked that the Executive Committee 
was "top heavy with bureaucrats" [Mapolu, 1976, p. 275] and that 
management was given a dominant role in the Workers' Councils. This 
dominant role given to state appointed management and the appointed 
Board of Directors in the formal structure of the workers' participation 
programme reflects, I would argue, the relative strength of the state elite 
which has come to exercise since 1967 not only political control but 
also increasingly economic control-via the state sector. This is what 
shapes the position of management vis-a-vis the workforce rather than 
their formal position or numerical preponderance in the organisational 
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structure of the Workers' Councils. In its turn, the power the state 
elite has politically and economically at the societal level reflected 
the relative weakness of the post-colonial civil society in Tanzania. 
Correspondingly, the impact of the Workers' Council programme 
depends on the responses of the employees, on their organisational 
activities, their level of coordination and the sum of resources they 
are able to muster both nationally and at the work place. The formal 
position they hold sets out the parameters under which they operate 
but hardly determines the actual operations of the Workers' Council 
in a work place to such an extent as to merit the blanket view that, 
like the union, it is a mere instrument of management. How the 
Workers' Council actually operates, and the workers' relation to it 
in any particular instance, merits investigation taking into account 
the economic and political conditions facing the workers in that 
particular time and place. Only after a consideration of contextual 
factors of this kind can one determine whether or not the Workers' 
Councils are mere instruments of management, as well as whether and 
in which way the workers' representatives may have used them as part 
of a strategy to promote their members' interests. 
3. SOME ASPECTS OF THE ORGANISATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR FIRMS 
The Workers' Participation programme involved attempts to modify 
the structural organisation of Public Enterprises. The Public 
Corporations Act of 1969 was the legislation which generally governed 
the organisation and management of public enterprises. Designed on 
the basis of the general set-up of public enterprises in Britain, 
the Act modified the previous legislation covering companies in both 
the public and private sectors. Through this 1969 Act, the President 
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was given the authority to move assets and personnel from one para- 
statal to another. This "erodes" as it were, the autonomy of the 
companies. 
Under the 1969 Act, the Chairman of the Board of a Public 
Corporation is appointed by the President, while other board members 
are appointed by the relevant or parent Ministry. The final decision 
to start a new project lies with the Cabinet. However, some 
ambiguity persists, as some Corporations have within their jurisdiction 
the power to make decisions through their Boards. Through the Written 
Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act of 1974, the President has the power 
to re-organise, dissolve etc. a wholly'owned subsidiary. The Government 
through the Central Bank has control of the financial resources of public 
enterprises especially regarding foreign exchange allocations, or loans 
for the purchase of spares, raw materials and wages. 
To control the conduct and conditions of public sector employees, 
the political leadership had created the Presidential Standing 
Committee on Parastatal Organisations (SCOPO). Established in 
September 1967 through Presidential Directive General Notice No. 1976, 
SCOPO periodically issued directives on wages and conditions of service 
to parastatals. SCOPO was chaired by the Principal Secretary to the 
President; other members were: four Principal Secretaries, from each 
of the Treasury, Central Establishments, Economic and Development 
Planning and Agriculture; the Managing Director of the National Bank 
of Commerce; and the General Manager of the National Development 
Corporation. The Committee had two joint Secretaries. In its terms 
of reference, it was granted the task of formulating training 
programmes for employees in parastatals, reviewing salaries and fringe 
benefits to be consistent with those in the public service and to 
approve transfers of staff between government and parastatals [Gazette 
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of the United Republic of Tanzania General Notice No. 1976 of 1967]. 
In September 1976, SCOPO was reconstituted with the new 
composition as follows: a Chairman and a Secretary (appointed by the 
President); three Principal Secretaries (from the Ministry of 
Manpower Development, the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, and 
the Prime Minister's Office); the Chairman and Manpower Director of 
N. D. C.; the Director-General of the Tanzania Audit Corporation; the 
Head of the Political Education Department of the Kivukoni Party 
Ideological College and the Director of Public Investment in the 
Ministry of Finance [SCOPO, 1976]. Its terms of reference remained 
basically the same, with its mandate including ensuring that parastatal 
organisations moved towards efficiency. In its composition SCOPO 
remained dominated by civil servants though a representative from NUTA/ 
JUWATA headquarters was invited to its proceedings. 
SCOPO has given detailed directives on several aspects of the work 
situation and the conditions of pay over the last twenty years. 
Directive No. 2 issued on 17th November 1967 was on allowances and 
fringe benefits for various categories of parastatal employees: on 
housing, transport, entertainment, leave, and medical care. 
On housing, for example, it was directed that parastatal 
organisations were under obligation to provide housing and furniture 
only to senior management (managerial, accounting and executive staff) 
with a salary not less than 3,001/= per month and to branch managers 
as deemed fit by headquarters management (Para. 4). 
No employee would be entitled to rent free accommodation (Para. 6). 
Among paiastatal employees entitled to furnished housing were: the 
Governor of the Bank of Tanzania; the Chairman and Managing Director 
of The National Bank of Commerce (N. B. C. ); the General Manager of 
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N. D. C. and any other top executive approved by SCOPO (Para. 5). 
On transport no employee would be entitled to be provided with 
a motor vehicle or monthly car allowance. Company vehicles were 
not to be used for private domestic purposes (Para. 7). 
Those mentioned in Para. 5 above were to be for transport 
between house and place of work "where this is considered essential 
or in the best interests of the organisations': Group transport for 
other staff was to be approved by SCOPO. 
While the monthly entertainment allowance was to cease, those entitled 
(as approved by the Management Headquarters of their organisations) 
would be eligible to claim reimbursement (Para. 7). 
Employees would not be entitled to paid servants or servant 
allowances, except for a pool of grass cutters! 
Water and electricity bills would be the responsibility of each 
employee (Para. 11). 
On the issue of allowances for travel on duty different categories 
of employees would be granted assistance "appropriate to their status" 
(Para. 18). 
On these allowances and fringe benefits, the Directive emphasized 
that "the terms of the Directive have been approved by the President" 
(Para. 26). 
SCOPO Directive No. 3 of August 1968 set out salary scales in 
parastatals. The Directive identified eleven groups of employees 
in the public sector. At the top was that of Chairman and General 
Manager with an annual salary of between 34,400 sh and 54,000 sh. 
This was followed by senior management and accounting staff (within 
the range of 40,000-46,000 sh. ) and professional engineers; economists 
and lawyers; middle cadre administrative and-technical staff; clerks 
and secretaries to subordinate staff with an annual salary of between 
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2,880 sh. and 3,840 sh. 
In the salary/wage review of May 1974, the minimum wage was revised 
to reach 200 sh. in the rural areas or an increase of 15% if they had 
surpassed that rate. For those in urban areas the minimum wage was 
to be 340/= sh. per month. The review altered salaries/wages for 
other categories of employees with General Managers receiving between 
54,000/=sh. and 57,600 sh. per annum. Senior management would be 
in the 43,600-49,600 bracket. Other categories were as follows: 
Chief Engineers 39,600/=sh. - 49,600/= sh. per annum; Engineers 
22,380-32,220/= sh.; Chief Accountant 45,600-49,600 = sh.; 
Foreman 10,200-17,760/= sh.; Artisan 6,600-11,040/= sh.; Clerk 
5,400-10,440/= sh.; Subordinate Staff 4,080-5,040/= sh. [SCOPO, 
1974]. 
SCOPO's recommendations were approved by the Economic Committee 
of the Cabinet and by the President for different groups and posts. 
These scales were to be applied to the lower ranges in adjustments 
made in July 1969. While decisions on wage/salary levels were made 
by SCOPO, the smooth implementation was left to each parastatal. The 
measures would take effect after authorisation by the relevant Board 
of Directors (Para. 16). 
Another Directive related to the establishment of Appointment 
Committees to deal with appointments, promotions and discipline 
(Directive No. 6 of 15th March 1971). 
The Directive set out three categories of employees: (a) those 
between the basic salary of 8,800 sh. per annum and 19,440 sh. per 
annum, i. e. the middle cadre. These would be under the Appointments 
Committee chaired by the General Manager, with the Personnel Officer as 
other and three members. 
(b) those with the basic salary 
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of above 19,440/= sh. per annum i. e. higher management and technical 
staff who would be dealt with by the Appointments Committee, but this 
decision would not be implemented unless ratified by the Board of 
Directors (Para. 3a). (c) those with the basic salary lower than 
8,800/= sh. per annum, i. e. the lower category of workers who would be-under 
the direction of the General Manager or his delegate (Para. 3b). 
SCOPO Directive No. 8,1971, put an end to special staff discounts 
and prices on goods sold or manufactured by the organisation. 
SCOPO Directive No. 10 related to procedures for the employment 
of non-citizens in parastatals. In succeeding years, wage and salary 
scales were made periodically by SCOPO following the government's 
changes in the minimum wage. The Urban Minimum Wage was increased 
to keep up with rising costs of living to 170% sh. in 1969,240%sh. in 
1972,340/= in 1974,380/=shin 1975,480/ sh. in 1980, adjusted to 
580/= in 1980 and 801/=shin 1984. 
In line with the government's policy, SC0PO's mandate involved 
improving employee's conditions in an egalitarian manner, that is 
reducing income differentials while ensuring maximum efficiency. There 
was as a result a marked improvement in differentials in favour of those 
in the lower range of the wage/salary scales when compared to the 
position in the pre-1967 era. However, some of the regulations have 
been circumvented in practice in work-places. 
As our case studies help to illustrate, loopholes exist on the 
use of parastatal transport for domestic private purposes, as discretion 
is left to Headquarters Management to grant permission in the best 
interests of the organisation. Employees in the higher grades are 
entitled to subsidised housing - the 121% deducted from their basic 
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salaries as rent does not cover the economic rent of the housing - 
while lower grades have to look and pay for their own housing. Another 
source of differentiation is in subsistence allowance for duty travel, 
with top executives receiving 60/= a night but subordinates only 10/= 
in 1967. By 1976 the rates were 175/= sh. and 75/=sh. in large towns 
or 100% shand 50% in small towns [SCOPO]. 
4. REGULATION OF LABOUR RELATIONS SINCE 1967 
One of the most important elements in the political leadership's 
strategy of consolidating its power over labour was through the 
Permanent Labour Tribunal Act of 1967. Like the Act establishing 
NUTA, this Act defined the form of the state's domination over two 
central issues: (a) the control of wages and (b) the regulation of 
industrial conflicts. The Act set out the procedures for wages 
regulation and defined the parameters for the resolution of industrial 
strife. The state's power lay in its definition of "the rules of the 
game", in determining acceptable levels of wages and salaries as well 
as the procedures to be followed before wages/salaries could be raised 
legally. By the same Act industrial disputes between employers and 
employees were to be carried out within the rules set out by the 
National Assembly and as applied by the Industrial Court. 
Industrial unrest was obviously not very conducive to societal 
integration and harmony. To ensure a measure of industrial peace, 
the state after independence continued the practice of wage control. 
In 1962, a territorial statutory minimum wage for employees was fixed 
at 150/= per month for Dar es Salaam and Tanga townships, 125/= sh, 
for the other bigger towns and 100/= for workers in agricultural 
plantations. This was the first statutory minimum wage. Valentine 
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[1981, p. 9] has estimated that as a result of this measure there was 
a real rise in wages of about 45%. The government took these popular 
measures following a consultancy report by the Territorial Minimum 
Wages Board (1962). This legal measure was important in improving 
the incomes of wage earners. Before the average minimum wage had 
been a mere 49/= per month, although in 1960 slight adjustment had 
been made to the level of 107/ . 50 per month. Salaries of several 
senior and middle-level posts held by Africans through the project of 
Africanisation also increased considerably. 
In 1967, following the study made in 1966 by an ILO team on the 
issue of incomes and wages the Permanent Labour Tribunal Act was passed. 
During the Parliamentary Debate which preceded the passing of the Act 
[10th Session of the National Assembly (Bunge), 24th October to 27th 
October 1967] several-members of parliament were not in favour of 
certain sections of the intended legislation as they imposed (according 
to them) restrictions on workers' and the union's capacity to bargain 
with employers on working conditions and especially on wages. Several 
speakers opposed to the bill argued for a law which would oblige 
employers and employees to bargain over the level of wages and salaries 
after considering the national income and the level of profits, instead 
of submitting to a binding decision of a governmental organ such as 
the envisaged Labour Court. Others spoke at length of the need to 
have workers discuss the economic performance of factories and thus 
create industrial democracy. There should be a reduction of income 
differentials in the light of the principles of the Arusha Declaration 
which had been enunciated earlier in the year. For example, the then 
Secretary General of NUTA, who had earlier also been the Minister for 
Labour, spoke at length opposing the legislation for curbing the union's 
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bargaining power. He considered it to be legislation in favour of 
employers, especially as employees were not to be given the chance to 
be informed on the performance of their industries or to see the 
balance sheets of the companies that employed them. 
Other speakers supported the Bill as tabled by the Ministry of 
Labour and argued that it would contribute towards industrial peace 
and increased production. The legislation was justified by the 
government on the grounds that the increase in wages was in stark 
contrast with the position of the majority of the population who were 
peasants and who were being exploited by these urban wage earners. 
Moreover, as the ILO report had asserted, the rise in wages was causing 
a decline in wage employment which was considered as detrimental as 
the tendency towards inflation which, it was argued, stemmed from the 
rise in wages. The supporters of the Bill outnumbered those against 
2 
and the Bill became law. 
The Act, Part II, set down a procedure for negotiating wage increases 
either as a result of a dispute or as a voluntary agreement. The 
agreement became operative only if registered by the Tribunal and was 
binding on all parties. Increases in wages and fringe benefits were 
not to exceed 5% in any one year and should not adversely affect 
industries of a similar kind. Other issues to be considered were 
effects on output prices; the effect on the foreign exchange balance 
of the country, and it should not destabilise the economy as a whole 
and trigger inflation. Decisions of the P. L. T. on awards or 
voluntary agreements were final and could not be questioned in any 
other court of law. 
In practice wage increases for both the public and the private 
sector were by government directive announced either during budget 
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speeches by the Minister for Finance or in Presidential announcements 
on May Day. The P. L. T. registered agreements on fringe benefits 
like bonuses which were registered along with the envisaged production 
targets which needed to be surpassed before a bonus could be granted. 
Once the government made an announcement on wages, adjustments were 
made accordingly to the wage and salary scales taking into consideration 
length of service and employee qualifications. This was done by SCOPO 
for employees in parastatal enterprises. SCOPO also approved fringe 
benefits for employees in parastatal enterprises. Private enterprises 
could register their voluntary agreements. But as government and 
parastatals were the major employers they placed constraints in private 
establishments on wage/salary differentials likely to be permitted. 
The Act also established in Part IV the procedure for the settlement 
of industrial disputes. This revolved around the Industrial Court, 
consisting of a Chairman and two Deputies, who are appointees of the 
President of the Republic and two assessors (one from NUTA/later JUWATA 
and one from the Federation of Tanzania Employers) appointed by the 
Minister for Labour. This was the body responsible for resolution 
or legal arbitration of industrial disputes. Before a complex procedure 
had been gone through and exhausted strikes could not be carried out 
and were illegal and punishable by law as a criminal offence. This 
compulsory arbitration could not be entered into by an individual 
worker or by the workers of a factory; only the official trade union 
was to take up the cases and only its national leadership could call 
workers out on strike. 
This state of affairs has meant that there have been no legal 
strikes in Tanzania since 1967. This does not mean, however, that 
there have been no strikes, nor does it exclude 'go slows' or outbreaks 
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of absenteeism amounting to a form of industrial action. While there 
may be fewer reported strikes(as reported by Jackson [1979]) this does 
not mean that the Tanzanian industrial relations' scene is free of 
tension and conflict or that strikes have disappeared in Tanzania 
completely. 
To take a well reported recent example, the Daily News of July 
29th and 30th, 1986 reported the rioting of 500 sugar cane cutters 
at the Kilombero Sugar Company in Morogoro. At dawn the previous 
Sunday (27th July 1986) the workers reportedly blocked the gate 
of the factory "protesting against low wages", against "drastic 
deduction made on their wages to recover cash advances extended by 
the company" and against "management for delaying payment of the 
special allowancees announced in the 1986/87 Budget speech". 
The riot led to a confrontation with the Police Field Force Unit 
and to the death of three workers and the injury of 17 workmen, three 
of them seriously (including a woman). Enquiries were carried out by 
Regional authorities and a three-man Commission of JUWATA. The University 
of Dar es Salaam Legal Aid Committee and the Academic Staff Assembly, 
(UDASA) in statements condemned the atrocities and called for an 
Independent Judicial Commission of Enquiry to establish the culprits. 
Although rather unusual in respect of the violence of the repression 
unleashed by the authorities, this incident suggests something of the 
tensions underlying the apparent calm of the Tanzanian industrial 
relations scene. As we shall see in later chapters, grievances to 
do with deductions and the timeliness of payments are among the most 
frequent and strongly felt in Tanzanian factories. 
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Footnotes 
1. Minutes of NUTA General Council Meeting of 28th to 31st October 
1969, Agenda No. 8. 
2. Several of the speakers who were against or had reservations on 
the Bill were from the Trade Union. 
3. One of the more publicised legal industrial conflicts took place 
in 1982 between JUWATA and management of the Agricultural and 
Industrial Supplies Company (AISCO). The issue went before the 
P. L. T. over a number of irregularities involving misuse of company 
finances, the issuing or sale of company goods to some high 
government officials allegedly contrary to procedures and the 
use of company finances fora wedding. The ruling came out in 
favour of JUWATA and led to some dismissals [Uhuru: several 
issues in April, May, June, July, November 13th, 1982]. 
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rHAPTFU I. 
TWO TANZANIAN FACTORIES: MANAGEMENT AND PARTICIPATION 
The preceding chapters have discussed the emergent socio-political 
processes since independence and the labour policies covering public 
sector workers in Tanzania. These, it has been argued, are not just 
the result of the political leadership's desire to maintain close control 
of the public sector labour force, but also express its broader project 
of promoting national unity and social stability through a combination 
of organisational incorporation and redistributive social measures. 
The political system is thus characterised by the policies and structures 
of 'inclusionary' corporatism. The stress is on national unity, 
consensus, central state control and multiple forms of organised and 
state controlled popular involvement, which mask in many ways the deeper 
attempts of depolitization [Stepan, 1978, Chapter 3 and 4]. 
The remaining chapters of this thesis explore the workings of this 
system further by focusing on empirical data from a small number of actual 
work-places studied by the author. Two work-places in particular, 
Factory A and Factory B, were studied in some depth and are discussed 
at length. The present chapter concerns itself with the work context 
and the basic structures of management and participation (Workers' 
Councils) in the two plants. Chapter 5 introduces other structures, 
including those of the trade union. Chapter 6 reviews the ways certain 
major issues were handled and is devoted to a selection of key episodes 
in the lives of the two factories, with some reference to information 
on similar episodes elsewhere. Throughout, the main focus is on 
relations between management and workers, particularly how workers' 
representatives participate in decision-making. Other important themes 
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are the nature and exercise of managerial power, the factors preventing 
a more effective intervention in the participation system by employees 
or their representatives, and the ways workers see and relate to the 
agencies that represent them. 
The discussion of Factories A and B in this chapter begins with 
some of the more salient aspects of the work context in the factory. 
The following aspects of the work context are considered especially 
important: 
(a) The industrial environment [Blauner, 1964, p. 6]; that is`-the 
economic and technological base of the factory emcompassing the kind 
of machinery, raw materials, labour skills and products involved as well 
as the system of financing of the enterprise. 
(b) The organisational structure of the factory: the administrative set 
up of the factory, particularly as it affects the way the workforce is 
categorised and formally organised. 
(c) The differentiation within the workforce in terms of job, skills, 
education and pay. 
(d) A general view of the conditions of service, such as transport, meals, 
medical care etc. 
The above aspects of the work context will be a basis for an 
examination in this and subsequent chapters, of how workers' represent- 
atives participate in decision-making at the factories. Decision- 
making and workers' participation in decision-making processes have 
several dimensions, as suggested by Stephens [1977, pp. 17-18]: 
(a) The range of decisions; that is, on which issues or decisions can 
or do employees have decision-making power? In any hierarchy of 
decisions, which issues are open to the workforce and which to manage- 
ment? 
(b) The degree of decision-making - whether there is information, joint 
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consultation, co-determination or control by the workforce. 
(c) The time or direction of decisions, in terms of initiating or veto 
power over decisions. 
Our descriptions of participation in Factory A and Factory B will, 
as far as possible, cover each of these dimensions. 
1. FACTORY'A': INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENT, WORK ORGANISATION, CONDITIONS 
OF SERVICE 
The Public factory which for the purposes of this account will be 
called Factory A is situated about 8 km to the west of the city centre 
of Dar es Salaam, within the Ubungo industrial area. Within walking 
distance to the east and the south are some of the most populous 
areas of Dar es Salaam, the main industrial and urban centre of Tanzania. 
Established in 1968 as a wholly-owned government factory, Factory 
A is one of the public factories initiated by the post-independence 
Tanzanian government in line with the political leadership's aspirations 
to national economic independence and its commitment to self-reliance. 
Following Mwalimu Nyerere's visit to the People's Republic of China in 
1964, during which the President had been impressed by China's small 
scale rural industries, an agreement was signed between the governments 
of China and Tanzania. Under the agreement financial assistance was 
accorded to the Tanzanian government in the form of a long-term soft loan 
and technical expertise for the creation of a centre dealing with the 
production of hand tools, agricultural implements and animal-drawn tools. 
After feasibility studies, the National Development Corporation (N. D. C. ), 
the state body for the promotion and management of state and parastatal 
industries, recommended the opening of a training centre for agricultural 
tools manufacture. However, a government decision from the Presidency 
opted for the creation of a factory with the task of manufacturing hoes, 
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axes and plough butts. These implements had hitherto been imported from 
abroad by foreign private companies. The decision reflected the desire 
to reduce dependency on foreign imports for implements considered vital 
for the largely peasant based agricultural sector of the country. 
Historically, then, the factory's inception and financing were linked 
to the highest levels of government and imbued with the political 
leadership's policies. N. D. C. was assigned the task of organising the 
project. 
After the construction phase, trial production began in August 
1969, with actual production commencing in March 1970. After initially 
making small losses the enterprise made a small profit in 1972. In 1973, 
the factory not only held the monopoly of the manufacture of hand-operated 
agricultural tools and implements but was also granted by government the 
monopoly over the import of such implements and of all animal-drawn 
ploughs. The factory was expanded in 1977 by the construction of a 
foundry; for recycling materials and the making of some spare parts as 
well as plough wheels. 
The factory's machinery installed from 1968 onwards was designed 
in and supplied from China. Initially, raw materials and spare parts 
were from the same source but by 1980, raw materials were being obtained 
from other countries: semi-finished plough parts from India, raw iron 
from Japan, dyes from Britain and chemicals from West Germany; machinery 
and spare parts continued to be procured mainly from China. Given the 
very limited iron, steel and chemical industries in Tanzania, the 
technological constraints faced by the factory and its dependence on 
outside supplies are evident. Electric power is supplied by TANESCO's 
hydro electric scheme at Kidatu, which serves the city of Dar es Salaam. 
The scale of production and sales from the plant over the years is shown 
by Tables 4.1 and 4.2 
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TABLE 4.2 
FACTORY A: SALES IN MILLION SHS. 
Year Actual Sales 
1970 1.68 
1971 2.05 
1972 5.47 
1973 13.59 
1974 24.29 
1975 55.948 
1976 60.808 
1977 59.628 
1978 77.211 
1979 101.723 
Source: Factory 'A' Report to the Minister of Industries, 
December 1980, p. 4. 
The factory began with a small labour force of 112. This increased 
to 330 in 1973 and to 541 in 1979. In 1983 there were 680 emnlovees 
belonging to different departments of the plant and supporting services. 
The plant itself, which on the organisational chart of the company is 
shown as the Technical Department, is the part concerned directly 
with the production processes of the factory. It consists of 434 
workers (for the two shifts) who are divided into 14 sections. The 
-latter correspond to the basic technical processes involved in the 
production of hoes, axes and grass slashers and the assembly of plough 
parts. This is the first aspect of the work context of the factory. 
The work process for the production of hoes and axes begins in the 
materials preparation section where pieces of iron and steel are cut 
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into the required sizes. The workers need certain basic skills such 
as those involved in measuring and handling of manual and/or electric 
saws. The cut pieces are then taken to the forging and pressing 
sections, where after intense heating in furnaces, the red hot pieces 
are repeatedly beaten into the required shapes on anvils by the use 
of electrically operated hammers controlled by machine operators who 
work as craftsmen. The pieces are then pressed into the standard 
shapes of hoes or axes. Forging and pressing operations are carried 
out when the hoes and axes are still hot. 
Workmen are organised in teams of six, one of whom is the group 
leader. A supervisor is in charge of each of the 14 sections and acts 
as the foreman. Further, each shift has two technicians - blacksmiths 
whose job is to see that the different sections and groups work 
smoothly without interruption. Work on the anvils and presses is 
initially learnt on the spot over a period lasting six months during 
which a blacksmith trains and supervises apprentices in their work. 
Heat treatment and quenching follows forging work. This process, 
as the name implies, involves the intense heating of hoes and then 
cooling them. This hardens the hoes to specified standards through 
the quenching process. The pieces are also reduced to the required 
sizes. Workers place and remove items from heaters after the required 
period of heating and cooling. The next process is grinding and 
polishing, consisting in smoothing out surfaces on products and grinding 
them to give cutting edges. The products are held on grinders and 
rotating polishers which are electrically run. The final process is 
the painting of the products in the oil-painting section. 
In the plough assembly part of the plant, work consists in welding 
different imported prefabricated parts and frames. Other sections in 
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the Technical Department are the Lathe and Bench sections where 
fitters and turners carve out bolts and small spares. These fitters 
and turners have all had technical training in trade or vocational 
schools. 
Working in different sections of the plant there are also 
electricians, masons, maintenance crew, carpenters and quality control 
inspectors. These have had specialised training in their respective 
fields. The Technical Department or the plant sections of the factory 
work in two eight-hour shifts with a one-hour lunch or me4l break. 
In addition to the plant proper, the factory has other supporting 
departments as follows: 
The Administration Department engaged in general personnel and 
administrative matters and housed in the Administrative block. Headed 
by the Manpower and Administrative Manager, the department had 110 
employees in 1983: drivers (17); security guards (29); office 
assistants and attendants (9); personal secretaries, clerks and 
typists (12); dispensary personnel (7); canteen and welfare services 
staff (14); personnel affairs officers (4) and gardeners (5). 
The Accounts Department, headed by the Chief Accountant, had 24 
employees consisting of accounts clerks (2); accounts assistants (8); 
assistant accountants (5); a cashier, an account machine. operator 
and a cost and a financial accountant. 
The Marketing Department led by the Marketing Manager had 3 sales 
attendants, 2 shop assistants (auxiliaries), 3 cleaners, 1 cashier, 
3 stores assistants, 3 sales clerks, 5 sales asssitants, and 10 
marketing officers. 
The Purchasing Department had two stores led by the Senior Stores 
Officer, who is acting Purchasing Manager. There were a total of 30 
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employees divided into various sections ranging from stores auxiliaries 
to stores assistants and purchasing officers. 
The workforce in the factory is thus differentiated in the first 
place according to whether they work in the plant sections or in the 
supporting services. Related to this differentiation are the various 
skill levels and various formal educational and vocational qualifications. 
Most employees in the different sections of the Technical Department 
are manual workers known as machine operators who have craft skills 
learnt on the job during their periods of apprenticeship. Their 
skills cover the handling of saws and the operation of pressing or 
forging machines. Even though some of the work is repetitive, such as 
grinding or forging, considerable craft skills are needed to carry on 
the main work operations of cutting pieces, forging, welding and 
painting. The formal education of the workers is usually seven years 
of primary school, though it is less in a few cases. 
Other workmen in the plant, such as electricians, carpenters, 
masons, welders, laboratory technicians or those in the Lathe and Bench 
sections, are artisans. Their skills were learnt outside the factory 
before they were employed. Most have formal technical training as 
blacksmiths or artisans over and above their formal primary and in 
some cases secondary education. 
During the first six years, Factory A's top technical personnel 
were expatriates. The Technical, Maintenance and Design Engineers 
were from China, while the Chief and Cost Accountants were from India. 
Since 1974, those posts have been manned by Tanzanians trained on the 
job from among the artisans. The Technical Manager, who is in overall 
charge of production, is a man in his late forties with two years of 
secondary education in a technical secondary school, a certificate in 
156 
mechanical engineering from City and Guilds and-in-plant training in 
welding and production management. He is assisted by eight production 
engineers whose formal education ranges from'eight years of primary 
education (for six of them to four years of secondary school (1) and 
two years (1)). Their technical training also varies - four have in- 
plant technical training, two have grade III trade test certificates, 
and two have general certificates in engineering and diplomas in 
foremanship and supervision. [Source: Technical Department, Training 
Program of the Factory 1981-1983, cyclostyled papers]. 
Formal professional training and certificates or diplomas are 
essential for jobs in the 
Accounts, 
Marketing and Purchasing Departments. 
In the Accounts Department employees have four or more years of secondary 
school with further certificate courses in book-keeping and accountancy. 
As for the Chief Accountant, she has ICCA and CPA awards. In the 
Marketing Department employees have similar formal secondary education 
to those in the Accounts Department - with diplomas in business admini- 
stration or marketing. Professional certificates, including diplomas 
in business administration, storekeeping certificates and book-keeping 
are also in evidence in the Purchasing Department. 
Employees in the Administration Department are of mixed formal 
education and training. At the bottom end of the formal schooling are 
messengers, security guards and cleaners. Their formal education, 
if any, is primary school and their work generally requires no specialised 
training. On the other hand, drivers have had some training and work 
experience and are held in higher social esteem. At the other end, 
are the personnel and welfare officials and administratives heads. 
They have higher levels of formal education and professional diplomas 
in administration and management. Given their formal training and 
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the nature of their administrative work, they are referred to as 
wasomi (those who have gone to school or "elites" in the pejorative 
sense) or ofisa (official) in contrast to vibarua (strictly meaning 
casual labourers but used to refer to machine operators). 
Formal education and professional training are important criteria 
affecting the employees' wages or salaries. The salary/wage scales 
follow the different grades set up by the directives of the Presidential 
Standing Committee on Parastatal Organisations (SCOPO) for different 
posts in the parastatals. Within the same job categories (e. g. 
machine operator) there are differences due to length of employment 
in the factory. The Parastatals Wages Grades are known as M. S. U. 
(fi-an the Kiswahili Mshahara wa Shirika la Umma). Grades in this 
factory range (1983) from M. S. U. 2 at the lower scale to M. S. U. 12 at 
the top end of the scale. In the low wage category are machine 
operators (in the Technical Department), cooks, messengers, cleaners 
and watch guards (in the supporting departments). Their basic wages 
are within the bracket M. S. U. 2 and M. S. U. 3 ranged between 620/= di and 
700/= a month or 740/= and 980/= a month respectively. In 1983 the 
official exchange rate was 12/ 
50-- T. sh. =1U. S. $. The black market 
exchange rate was about 80/=sh= 1 U. S. 
1 
In the Forging and Pressing section, for example, out of 172 
employees, there were 111 machine operators in the M. S. U. 2 bracket 
receiving the basic monthly wage of 660/=; 40 workers in the M. S. U. 3 
category with a basic monthly wage of 850/=; 15 earning between 1085/= 
and 1605/=; 5 receiving between 1680/= and 2240/= and one with over 
2340/=. Similarly in the Heat Treatment section, of the total of 
34 machine operators, 27 were in the M. S. U. 2 bracket; 5 in the M. S. U. 3 
grade and one each in the M. S. U. 4 and M. S. U. 5 categories. The latter 
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two are long term machine operatives who were recruited in 1969. 
In the supporting departments, the messengers, gardeners, cooks and 
security guards received wages within the M. S. U. 2 and M. S. U. 3 categories. 
Management salaries were considerably higher, with the General 
Manager receiving 4405/= a month and other Heads of Departments being 
in the M. S. U. 10 category with a basic monthly salary of around 4300/=. 
These are the Technical, Marketing, Manpower and Administration Managers 
and the Chief Accountant. Their basic salaries were thus up to six 
or seven times the wages of the operatives or of minimum wage earners. 
Middle-level management (such as financial and cost accountants, senior 
stores officers, and senior production engineers) are in the M. S. U. 7 
or 8 categories with monthly salaries ranging between 2590/= and 3450/=, 
and between 3215/= and 3840/= respectively in 1983. Senior technicians, 
artisans and electricians (some of whom are supervisors), as well as 
the accounting and administrative personnel such as the personnel and 
welfare officers, personal secretaries and assistant accountants, are 
in the middle categories of pay receiving basic monthly salaries in 
the M. S. U. 5 and M. S. U. 6 categories - salaries which ranged between 
1460/= and 1950/=; and 2040/= and 2490/= respectivdly in 1983. 
Differences in overall remuneration between employees also arise 
through indirect payments and the provision of services, such as housing, 
transport and medical care. The factory has no housing of its own 
for employees and most workers therefore rent rooms in different parts 
of the city, in nearby popular suburbs of Manzese, Ubungo and Mburahati 
(up to 2 miles) or farther away in Magomeni or Ilala, where they pay 
at the commercial rates. The rooms cost from 30/= to 70/= apiece 
(1983) depending on location in the city and construction material used. 
For management with salaries above M. S. U. 8, the factory rents houses 
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in the medium or low density areas of the town from various individuals 
at commercial rates of 3000/= or 4000/= a month per self-contained 
house. These are located in the new housing estate of Sinza or less 
populous areas of Kinondoni or Upanga, and they are allocated to members 
of the above-mentioned management categories at the charge of 1221% 
of their basic salaries, which at the most cannot exceed 800/= at 1983 
rates. 
The company bus is used to provide transport to and from work for 
the afternoon shift, which ends at night, and to work only for the 
morning shift. The bus picks up those who live far from the factory at 
designated collection points. For managerial, administrative and 
accounts staff transport is arranged in the company's three vans 
('combis'), a minibus or other smaller vehicles. There is a car 
permanently assigned to the General Manager, the Marketing and Plant 
Managers have the use of vehicles assigned to their departments as 
'personal'cars. 
The factory has a dispensary for employees and their families 
constructed in 1978 and staffed by two assistant medical officers, a 
laboratory technician, three nurses and a medical auxiliary. For more 
serious specialised treatment and for hospitalisation, employees are 
referred to the Magomeni government dispensary, to the Muhimbili 
government hospital or to one of the Occupational Health Group dispen- 
saries at Kisutu. Those on salaries above the M. S. U. 7 grade, on the 
other hand, are sent to the Aga Khan private hospital at the company's 
expense. Hospitalisation in a private hospital is worth up to 200/= 
a night. 
The factory has a canteen offering subsidised meals, usually 
consisting of rice or ugali (maize meal) with meat or beans. Workers 
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have a right to one subsidized meal per day when at work. Meal 
payments vary with salaries and wages. In 1983 those receiving 
between 390/= and 750/= per month were charged 31/=90 a month for 
meals, while those receiving above 750/= a month, paid 63/=80 a month. 
Operatives working in the dusty or hot sections of the factory floor 
are entitled to a milk allowance or a free packet of milk a day. 
Canteen costs for 1980 totalled shs 537,752/=; 25% of this expenditure 
was met by workers' contributions and the balance by company funds 
deriving from an excess production of 7500 hoes per month. The 
daily meals one finds in the canteen cost five to seven times the 
subsidised price in the open market, so subsidised meals are of 
significant financial help to employees. For many bachelor machine 
operators, in fact, the factory meal is the only main meal of the day, 
especially towards the end of the month when they are waiting for the 
next pay. 
2 MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES IN FACTORY A 
Organisationally, Factory A is characterised by a management 
hierarchy on the lines set out in the Presidential Circular No. 2, 
1969 (The Rationalisation of Parastatal Organisations), the Public 
Corporations Act of 1969 and the Prime Minister's Directive of December 
12,1974 (setting up Management Committees). While the Public 
Corporations Act of 1969 had created Boards of Directors composed of 
Ministers, the Presidential Circular No. 2 of 1969 placed corporations 
under their relevant sectoral ministries with a Board constituted not 
by Ministers but by members who would be appointed by the relevant 
ministry to deal with the affairs of the Corporation without constant 
ministerial involvement. The objective was also to create some harmony 
161 
among enterprises engaged in similar activities by placing them under 
a common Holding Company, especially as regards research and training 
programmes among subsidiaries. The composition of the Boards of 
Directors tended to come mainly from outside the concerned enterprises 
- from the government bureaucracy. As civil servants, many board 
members were on several boards in the difficult position of dividing 
their time between parastatal affairs and the work of government depart- 
ments. Moreover, there tended to be a separation between decision 
makers and those involved in implementation. 
To overcome those limitations, the Prime Minister's Directive of 
December 1974 spelt out anew the composition of Boards of Corporations 
and set up the Management Committees. The Directive stressed the need 
to have 60% of Board members who were neither civil servants nor para- 
statal employees. This would give Tanzanian citizens and leaders 
from the Party and its affiliated organizations a greater say in the 
running of Public Corporations. Views would come both from parastatal 
employees (from within) and from outside among the political leadership: 
the Party, Members of Parliament or other Party affiliates. 
As for the Management Committee 40% of its membership would be drawn 
from inside the factory. This was an advance on the earlier situation 
in that those directly at the work-place would now be involved in the 
plans. This, it was hoped, would facilitate better performance and 
implementation [Prime Ministers' Directive of December 12,1974, para. 
7]. 
In 1981, Factory A's Management Committee consisted of: 
a) From outside the enterprise 
Chairman: the Managing Director and Chairman of N. D. C. (ex-officio 
member, appointed by the President). 
Secretary: a company secretary from N. D. C. headquarters. 
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Members: - two officials from the Ministry of Finance and another from 
the Ministry of Industries, both economists. 
-a lecturer in Engineering from the University of Dar es 
Salaam, appointed by the Minister for Industries. 
- the General Manager of TAMTU (The Tanganyika Agricultural 
Machinery Testing Unit). 
- the Member of Parliament for the area in Dar es Salaam where 
the factory is situated. 
- the Member of Parliament from Shinyanga, the area which uses 
the highest number of agricultural implements. 
(All the-above members of the Management Committee are appointees of 
the Ministry of Industries and are not employees of the factory). 
b) From inside the enterprise 
- the General Manager. 
- the CCM (Party) branch and JUWATA branch chairman (ex officio 
members). 
-a blacksmith and a production engineer, appointed by the 
Workers' Council. 
- the Technical Manager and the Marketing Manager, appointed 
by the General Manager. 
The Management Committee thus contains both appointed officials 
and elected members and reflects the political commitment to have 
committee members from both inside and outside the factory. It also 
has-. a variety of views and expertise both from the wider Tanzanian 
society, in the form of Members of Parliament, and from the Ministry 
of Industries; it has officials and individuals with technical know-how, 
and finally it has views from the employees. All are perceived as 
working for the common good in the improvement and development of the 
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factory. The complexion of the Management Committee of Factory A 
thus reflects the preoccupation and design of seeking different 
views from both within and without the factory and arriving at a 
consensus. 
Among the members chosen from among the employees, the directive 
stressed the need to have workers who were members of TAND and NUTA, 
literate and well disciplined. _1o other specific technical skills 
were required. In this factory, both the CCM Chairman and the JUWATA 
Chairman were machine operators in-the Forging and Pressing sections. 
They have been in the factory for 10 years. The other "insiders" were 
a blacksmith and a production engineer and two departmental managers 
appointed by the General Manager who was himself an ex-officio member. 
In principle, the "outsiders" or the elected "insiders" and outsiders 
could out-vote the managers. In practice, in the Management Committee, 
Managers have tended to dominate for a number of reasons. They work 
in the enterprise and retain control of their sections on a number of 
levels. They have control of the information on the human and material 
resources of the factory which is vital for effective decision-making. 
Their technical know-how related to the enterprise lends weight to 
their views in discussions. Documents and papers submitted for 
discussion to the Committee were prepared by the enterprise management, 
who furnished formally the information to the Committee. Those from 
"outside" the factory did not have other links with the factory or with 
its employees for sources of information or views. The meetings took 
place within a framework of formal consultation-and this was an 
advantage for management, who could withhold information. Committee 
members did not utilise other than formal channels to learn about the 
performance of the factory. In one event, it needed the intervention 
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of a high level party probe team to rectify some "unbecoming" 
activities by members of management. Management was (in the words 
of the 1981 Annual Report of the Chairman of the Committee) "slow to 
accept suggestions and views" made by members who were not employees 
of the enterprise. 
There were other reasons for the managerial dominance. According 
to the 1981 Annual Report by the Chairman of the Management Committee, 
the meetings of the Committee were few. In 1981 there were only 
three sittings, not really sufficient to monitor effectively the 
implementation of decisions. Among decisions not implemented by 
management was the preparation of a report on the reasons for the break- 
down of new production lines. No report was prepared (contrary to 
directives) for four months without any explanation. In its April 
14,1981 Session the Management Committee complained: 
(a) In an earlier session it had directed that an investigative 
document be prepared for discussion on possibilities of starting a credit 
union among employees. The move had been recommended by a report of 
the Tanzania Audit Corporation as a means of reducing debts by employees 
which were taking enterprise funds. Contrary to the directives of 
the Management Committee, no such study was made and presented for 
discussion. 
(b) The Management Committee had demanded that session papers should 
be distributed in time for members to study them properly before sittings. 
This had not been done. 
(c) On the employment of new employees, which fell under the 
Management Committee authority, factory management should only make 
recommendations and suggestions and leave room for the Committee to 
decide. This had not been adhered to in practice by factory management. 
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The Management Committee seemed powerless in the face of such "sabotage". 
[Source: 1981 Report by Chairman of Management Committee]. 
The day to day responsibility of organising and monitoring work 
in the enterprise is placed under the General Manager assisted by the 
Departmental Managers in charge of their respective departments. Each 
Manager authorises payments for the department within the budget of 
the company and as approved by the General Manager in consultation 
with the Chief Accountant who monitors the overall financial position 
of the company. Managers authorise the movement of products. They 
also determine the placement of personnel in different sections, and 
approve sales and purchases. 
Departmental Managers have technical know-how gained through formal 
training, like the Manpower and Administrative Manager and the Chief 
Accountant; while the General Manager has long administrative and 
organisational experience. The Production Manager also has experience 
in metal work. This gives them weight not only in the Management 
Committee but also in other bodies like the Workers' Council, in the 
deliberations and in the implementation of their decisions. 
In terms of accountability an important fact is that the Management 
Committee does not have the authority to sanction the General Manager 
since he is a Presidential appointee; the disciplinary body for the 
General Manager is the Presidency. This creates. an ambiguity in terms 
of the power of the Management Committee over the factory's management, 
for the General Manager can appeal to and justify his decisions and 
actions before the authority which appointed him. The Management 
Committee relies on the General Manager for the implementation of 
decisions taken and for monitoring progress made. And it is the 
management headed by the General Manager who are the responsible 
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body for the success and especially shortcomings in the enterprise 
performance. This helps to explain among other things how management 
were in a position to use their posts for personal. and private ends 
in the ways documented in the following chapters. 
3 FACTORY A: THE WORKERS' COUNCIL 
a) The Full Council 
To advise the Management Committee there is the Workers' Council 
which in Factory A was started in 1970, immediately following the 
Presidential Directive of that year, as discussed in Chapter 3. One 
of the characteristics of the Workers' Council, as with other enterprise 
organisations, was the presence of a combination of appointed ex-officio 
members, usually departmental heads (managers), and members elected 
by the workforce from the ranks of longer serving, technicallyskilled 
workmen. Workers' Councils, as discussed earlier, are required to 
include the General Manager and the Departmental Managers, the Chairmen 
of the Party and Union branches, and workers elected from the employees. 
The members of the Council elect their own Chairman (except the first 
year when the General Manager became the first Chairman). The Secretary 
to the Council is an appointee of the General Manager. His work is 
to coordinate affairs relating to organising Council meetings, distribution 
of papers for discussion and taking minutes. 
During the period 1981-1983 the composition of the Workers' Council 
in this factory was as follows: 
1. As Chairman, the members elected the General Manager. He is an 
ex-officio member of the Council, but was elected to the chair. 
When the Workers' Council was initiated in 1970 the General Manager 
became the Chairman and later the post was occupied by another 
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member. In 1981 the General Manager was elected to that post 
again. This reflected the dominant position he enjoyed in the 
factory, together with elements of paternalism in an enterprise 
that was not very large. 
2. The Five Departmental Heads who continued to be ex-officio members 
in accordance with the Presidential directive on Workers' Councils. 
3. The Chairmen of CCM and JUWATA branches at the factory, who continued 
to attend Workers' Council meetings by virtue of their positions. 
4. Five members elected by the workforce. These included: 
- two blacksmiths; 
-a supervisor in the oil painting section; 
-a fitter and turner; 
-a production engineer. 
Of the two blacksmiths, one was a 32 year old senior artisan. He 
had successful professional training in his trade for which he had a 
Grade II certificate as well as a Trade Test Certificate. His 11 years 
of service at the factory made him one of the more influential persons 
in the enterprise organisations. He was also a member of the Management 
Committee. 
The other blacksmith was also an artisan with Standard Eight primary 
education and seven years' work experience in the factory. 
The fitter and turner was an artisan with a long period (11 years) 
of work at the factory. The fourth member elected by the workforce 
was a 35 year old technician with 4 years of secondary education followed 
by a certificate in painting. He underwent training in supervision 
and was the Head of the oil-painting section. Like the other elected 
members he had 11 years of service at the factory. 
The fifth member was one of the production engineers. His technical 
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training as a mechanical engineer and craftsman enabled him to work 
as an assistant to the Production Manager. He had also been working 
for a long time (12 years) at the factory and was active on factory 
committees including the Management Committee. The Personnel Officer, 
a man in his early thirties with Form Four secondary education and a 
Certificate in Secretarial Matters, was appointed by the General Manager 
as Secretary to the Workers' Council. 
The compositon of this Workers' Council fits closely the designs 
and purposes of the Workers' Council programme. As we have seen in 
Chapter 3, the Workers' Councils in Tanzania are seen as a means of 
involving members of the workforce in discussing the affairs of the 
enterprise with management. The members, even those elected from and 
by the workforce, however, do not represent the workforce in the narrow 
sense of advocating and advancing the interests of the workforce alone. 
They, in unity with others, are supposed to work for the common good 
of the enterprise and the country, and not of some narrow sectional 
interests (least of all those of the particular factory section they 
were chosen from). 
So in Factory A Workers' Council members come from different 
sections of the enterprise with the objective of pooling together ideas 
for the advancement of "the enterprise". In fact, they do not 
really consult the workforce. There are no institutionalised channels 
to consult or report to the workforce on the Workers' Councils 
deliberations as a regular means of getting suggestions from and 
reporting to the sections in which members work. Formally, Workers' 
Council sessions and deliberations are confidential and members are 
not expected to divulge what is discussed during the meetings. In 
practice there was contact with the workforce on an informal basis, 
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which meant that the rule on the so-called confidential discussion was 
not always kept. 
The Workers' Council in Factory A meets at least twice a year. 
As the minutes show, the meetings tend to, follow a standard agenda of 
the following type: 
1. Opening of meeting by Chairman (usually at 9 am in the morning). 
2. Reading and Approval of Minutes of Previous Meeting. 
3. Matters Arising. 
4. Reports of Enterprise Activities According to Departments: 
Production 
Purchases 
Sales 
Administration and Personnel 
Finances 
5. Other items as approved by Chairman or by Management. 
6. Formal Closure of Meeting. 
The meetings may take one or even two days, often extending up to 
midnight. A variety of issues relating to the enterprise are discussed 
on the basis of the departmental reports presented by the respective 
Departmental Managers. There are also items for noting by the Council. 
These are decisions which have been taken by the Management Committee 
or by government or action by other relevant bodies. Other items 
presented in the departmental reports are either for approval or for 
discussion, suggestion and approval. On the more technical issues, 
the meeting serves as a forum for informing the Council what is taking 
place in the enterprise as a whole. Information is furnished by the 
managerial members of the Council on such matters as orders for spares, 
sources of raw materials, and sales and purchases. The non-managerial 
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members of the Council such as the CCM and JUWATA Chairmen are more 
active in the deliberations on the less technical issues. Among the 
less technical items are personnel matters and social services, 
including new employment openings, increases in allowances, moves to 
improve the procedures for the payment of wages, leave payments, and 
so on. 
The 26th Workers' Council meeting which was held on the 30th December 
1980 will serve to illustrate the kinds of issues discussed by the 
Workers' Council. Information on this was obtained mainly from the 
minutes of the meeting. The issues deliberated and the contrib- 
utions of different participants were not always specified. However, 
I was told by one participant, the Personnel Officer (who sometimes 
took the minutes), that this can be taken to be because the item was 
tabled by a member of the factory management, and that there was no 
negative reaction from other participants. 
On matters arising from the previous meeting, the session of 30th 
December 1980 was informed of delays in the construction of a water 
tank as drawings had been altered. The meeting was also informed: 
of the difficulties of getting raw material supplies from China for 
1981; of moves to obtain supplies from Japan and India for the basic 
raw materials for ploughs; and also to obtain semi-finished products 
from India; of the purchase of a forklift; and of overtime payments 
to five supervisors. The session expressed the view that SCOPO-should 
be asked for permission for these-overtime payments as they were an 
incentive (= motisha) for the supervisors. The Council discussed the 
question of workers who had incurred debts with the company and agreed 
that all efforts should be done to try to recover those debts from the 
said employees. This was a perennial problem, the solution to which 
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was difficult to find given the low level of workers' incomes. A 
question about canteen cleanliness was raised and it was said that the 
distribution of meals needed to be improved. The latter was an item 
raised again by the elected members of the Workers' Council, who 
suggested an increase in the number of plates in the canteen. 
Issues relating to production were discussed during the session 
as introduced by the Technical Manager's report. These included the 
strengthening of ariana ploughs and planter designs. The Technical 
Manager also explained why targets for 1981 were higher than those for 
1980. This was due to the fact that new machinery had been installed 
after the expansion of the factory. He also explained the malfunction- 
ing of the heat treatment crane and reported that the shortages of raw 
materials, chemicalsand spare parts from China were brought about by 
changes in organizations in China which used to supply spare parts. to 
the factory. Such shortages were a constant problem in the early 
1980's. 
The Department of Purchases submitted its report on the activities 
of the department in a similar fashion. In the following discussion 
the Council agreed that all items bought and their prices should be 
shown in the Report rather than the total value of goods only. This 
would enable the Council to ascertain that the proper purchases had 
been made at the proper prices. The suggestion was made in order to 
stem inflated pricing on some items which could be concealed by the 
mere indication of total values. The session was informed by the 
General Manager that rolling dies which had been in short supply were 
on the way. The factory had obtained 75/= million in foreign exchange 
allocation out of the 107/= million requested for purchases. The 
session stressed the need to use this allocation on the more important 
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items in short supply such as raw materials and spare parts. Purchases 
should be carried out in close consultation and closer coordination 
with departmental heads and the General Manager. The Purchase 
Department had tended to make some purchases without close coordination. 
The Council was informed by the Sales Department that sales targets 
in 1980 had been reached, as the price of hoes had been increased. 
The Council agreed with the department's suggestion that plough parts 
which were in store should not be sold as spares but should be utilised 
as plough components to reach the 1980 target of 20,000 ploughs. The 
target for the first quarter of 1981 - 4,000 ploughs - had been reached, 
the meeting was informed. 
On the Manpower front, the departmental head proposed, and it was 
agreed by the Council, that vacant posts be filled as soon as possible 
in the first quarter of 1981 giving preference to those who had done 
People's Militia training; that a qualified factory security officer 
be employed, as the factory had expanded; that eleven office attendants 
be employed; that the drivers' roster should be improved to enable 
them to work eight hours without being exhausted. The Council further 
agreed with the suggestions to increase allowance for those working 
at the burner and for teachers coming from outside the factory. These 
proposals were to be tabled to the Management Committee. The Council 
further agreed to create a credit union beginning in February 1981 to 
deal with loans for employees. 
The Accounts Department's chief informed the meeting that the company 
had a bank overdraft of several million shillings. The meeting 
decided to follow up debts to the company incurred by one Regional 
Trading Company (Kagera) in an effort to improve the financial position 
of the company. Parastatal companies bought goods from the enterprise 
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on credit. Some were slow to pay, leaving the company in difficulties. 
Sales through private traders on the other hand wereagainst government 
directives on the sale of such goods. The meeting also agreed that 
there was a need to speed up the payment of wages and leave allowances. 
The CCM Chairman had raised this issue saying workers were unhappy and 
inconvenienced by the delays when going on their annual leave. 
On the 1981-85 Development Plan, the meeting was informed that the 
company was planning to cooperate with another company for the production 
of spades, nuts and bolts; that the plan envisaged raising the 
educational levels of the Workers' Council members, and that it was 
proposed to initiate a building society. To study the workings of 
the latter, a sub-committee was chosen. Other information reported 
was on new salary/wage scales as issued by SCOPO. 
The 27th meeting of the Workers' Council held on 13th April 1981 
at Tabora gives other insights into the types of issues discussed. 
The search for harmony through a consensus of views is once again a 
key feature. The meeting serves several purposes. On the one hand 
it is a platform for management to inform other employees about some 
aspect of the enterprise: a means of assisting departmental heads 
in the smooth execution of their daily duties in a harmonious atmosphere 
thanks to the goodwill generated by informing some members of the work- 
force. On the other hand, the Council also would serve as a platform 
for managerial recommendations and decisions to be presented to the 
Management Committee. The meeting on this occasion was held in 
Tabora to coincide with the opening of the company's depot in that 
town. The--depot was to serve as the main distribution centre for the 
plant in north and western Tanzania. The holding of the meeting 
outside Dar es Salaam would serve as a means for members to get a glimpse 
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of the country they are servicing in terms of the products. 
The 27th Workers' Council first reviewed issues of the previous 
meeting. The session was informed by management about matters which 
seemed to recur in several meetings. The Chinese technicians who 
were to construct the water tank and the training centre had arrived. 
The Accounts Department was in the process of completing the list of 
employees having debts with the company. The department was encouraged 
to follow this up and recover any money advances paid to employees 
including those who had left the company. The Chairman informed the 
meeting that canteen services were being improved and that the Accounts 
Department was gathering further information on the creation of the 
proposed Credit Union. Management hoped that this would reduce the 
need for company loans; workers would get loans from deposits they 
made with the Credit Union. 
The issue of the increased allowances that had previously been 
proposed was proving difficult to justify before SCOPO as the factory 
had had several incentives approved recently. Wages and other payments, 
crucial as they are, were outside the jurisdiction of the Workers' 
Council, being centrally regulated by the government agency. 
The Council then discussed documents prepared by Departmental Managers 
on different aspects of the factory. In response to the Technical 
Manager's Report on Production, the session recommended that the Technical 
Department strengthen its work by employing more technically qualified 
people in the technical and research sections. Approving the Purchases' 
list as reported by the Purchases Department, the meeting reiterated 
the need to plan better the placement of orders for raw materials and 
chemicals. The document reporting the=sales' situation, prepared by 
the Deputy Marketing Manager, was endorsed by the Council. On the 
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new salary and wage scales as reported by the Manpower and Administration 
Department, it was agreed to call meetings in all sections of the 
factory to explain the changes to the workforce to reduce complaints 
about increments. All vacant posts for security guards should be filled 
at once. 
The General Manager was re-elected Chairman of the Workers' Council 
for another three years. After this, a member from JUWATA headquarters 
suggested that documents and di`ecussion papers should reach members at 
least seven days before meetings to facilitate discussion. This was 
an attempt by the member to make the discussions meaningful instead 
of being a ritual formality as it tended to be when discussion papers 
were circulated during meetings. The proposal was accepted. 
On loans to workers for national or religious holidays - advances 
which assisted workers' families to have some' part in the festivities 
- it was agreed that loans be redeemed within three months instead of 
one month. Interviews with machine operators on the monthly deductions 
(= makato) that were made from their wages showed that invariably among 
the deductions was the item: mkopo wa sikukuu) (= loan for feast day). 
Other usual deductions were: income tax; JUWATA and CCM deductions; 
mid-month advances; and the National Provident Fund contribution. 
To summarise, different factory issues were brought into the Workers' 
Council's sessions for consideration and deliberation. The issues 
touched on activities of all departments: on the finances of the factory, 
sales, purchases, availability of raw materials and spare parts, 
personnel matters and social services. Workers' Council discussions 
covered a broad range of matters concerning the internal working and 
organisation of the enterprise as well as its relation with other outside 
bodies such as SCOPO or the Bank of Tanzania. This information has 
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been gleaned from a reading of minutes of Council meetings and from 
interviews with participants. 
As regards the scope or degree of participation, the Workers' 
Council sessions were for both information and joint consultation 
with management. Matters which had been decided upon by higher bodies 
such as SCOPO or the Price Commission were brought to the Council 
sessions as a matter of informing the members especially the non- 
managerial members. Relevant action which had been taken by other 
bodies was also brought to the attention of the Workers' Council. 
Other issues brought to the Council were for deliberation and approval 
for onward transmission to higher bodies for decision. The proposed 
recommendations were usually prepared by management and after discussion 
were endorsed for transmission to the relevant decision-makers. Other 
issues did not need decisions of higher bodies but management brought 
them to the Council as a means of consulting the non-managerial members 
on matters such as the improvement of services and work procedures 
thereby building up goodwill among the workforce. 
How and by whom were issues raised in the Council? Management 
usually initiated decisions or recommendations as previously generally 
agreed in consultations between the General Manager and Heads. Other 
individual members could and did make suggestions from time to time 
during the meetings as they saw fit. There were, however, crucial 
differences between managerial and non-managerial members of the Council. 
Management through their weekly meetings acted in concert and on the 
basis of previously agreed recommendations. Their views were often 
backed by reasons and information. For the non-managerial members, 
in contrast, their suggestions or proposals did not carry the weight 
of concerted organised action. Since Council members do not attend 
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the meetings as representatives of the Party, of the Union or of any 
other collective entity, any such co-ordination of opinion would have 
seemed quite inappropriate. Even suggestions made by the CCM or 
JUWATA Chairmen were an individual's suggestions and were not previously 
agreed upon; the one's interventions were not necessarily supported 
by the other, or by the ordinary non-managerial members. 
The management thus retains a dominant position in the Workers' 
Council in Factory A. They initiate and orient the direction of 
discussions by the preparation of documents and papers to be tabled 
at the meetings and the recommendations to be presented to the Management 
Committee. Management proposals form the core and the greater 
proportion of the Workers' Council's deliberations. Issues concerning 
production, sales, finances, and purchase orders are usually endorsed 
by the council after brief discussions and without changes, although 
as we have seen, on matters concerning pay and social services, non- 
managerial members tend to participate more. 
In Factory A management dominance is enhanced by the fact that the 
General Manager has been present as Head of Management since the factory 
began and has seen the factory grow from its small beginnings. His 
views and those of his management heads thus carry extra weight. The 
importance of this personal factor in this factory is attested by the 
repeated re-election of the General Manager as Chairman of the factory's 
Workers' Council for a further term of three years. In general, however, 
management has final responsibility for what takes place in public 
sector factories such as Factory A. Any suggestions made in the 
Workers' Council to management are implemented if, but only if, the 
managerial personnel are satisfied that they can justify them and defend 
them. 
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b) The Executive Committee 
The operational structure of the factory resembles the one in use 
in private enterprises. The work of organising and monitoring 
enterprise performance is formally placed in the hands of the General 
Managers and his heads. However, to advise the General Manager in 
this task is the Executive Committee of the Workers' Council. This 
was introduced in 1970 as a further means of involving non-managerial 
members of the workforce. The Executive Committee would include not 
only Departmental Heads but also the Chairmen of the CCM and Union branches 
and two elected members from the Workers' Council. 
In the period 1981 to 1983, Factory A's Executive Committee included 
a blacksmith and a production engineer chosen by the Workers' Council, 
of which they were members; and the CCM and JUWATA Chairmen. For the 
day to day monitoring of enterprise performance and activities, a 
Factory Planning Committee was initiated by the General Manager. This 
Committee, which met every Friday, included the CCM and JUWATA Chairmen 
and the five departmental heads and their assistants. Meeting= much 
more frequently than other sittings, this body served as an advisory 
management body, monitoring factory performance. The Committee's 
sittings were served with weekly reports not only from departmental 
heads on their activities, but also on the CCM branch activities and 
those of the JUWATA branch. These were in the form of reports which 
monitored performance and followed up resolutions. The conclusions 
of the Planning Committee were submitted to the Executive Committee 
which, headed by the General Manager, made suggestions governing the 
day to day affairs of the factory as deemed necessary. Since the 
members and the issues dealt with were virtually the same, there was 
often in practice little distinction between the two. 
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In the Management Committee, the Workers' Council and its 
Executive Committee, the factory management holds centre stage on the 
basis of its access to and control of the information of the factory; 
its initiation of the issues to be discussed in the various sittings; 
its links with the highest level of government, to which it is 
ultimately responsible; and its presence in all the various sittings, 
which is the formal role given to them in the organisation of the 
enterprise. The inclusion of JUWATA and CCM Chairmen as well as 
some members from the employees in a hierarchy of meetings is one of 
the main features of the organisational setting. The latter's impact 
is contingent on their technical know-how and skills coupled with 
experience and alertness in following up and reacting to issues raised. 
To some degree these factors can compensate for the weak position which 
is theirs in the structural organization of the sittings. While for 
the reasons just emphasised there is unquestionably a hierarchy of 
organs and sittings, the involvement of some members of the workforce 
in the Management Committee or Workers' Council mitigates the strength 
of the hierarchy - promoting a situation in which other personnel can 
give their views and thereby influence management decisions. 
What further factors shape work-place relations apart from the 
structural/formal set-up and the kind of industry and the level of skills 
of workers? As we shall see, other relevant considerations include 
the way the workforce relates to the hierarchy of factory organs and 
sittings; the extent to which the workforce responds to work-place 
organisations and the way they participate in them. Such variations 
are important even though the scope of those sittings are only informative 
and advisory. 
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4 FACTORY 'B' : INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENT, WORK ORGANISATION AND 
RECRUITMENT 
In the next chapter we shall extend our discussion of the politics 
of participation in Factory A by reviewing the roles of the Party and 
Union branches in the enterprise. Before doing so, however, we introduce 
Factory B- one of the largest public textile factories in Tanzania. 
In this section salient features of the work context are described. 
The final section studies management and participation with particular 
attention to the workings of the Workers' Council, providing a second 
case-study to complement that of Factory A. 
Factory B contrasts with Factory A in a number of ways. Firstly, 
this is in Tanzanian terms, one of the largest factories in the country 
with over five thousand employees. Secondly, the nature of the basic 
production processes, spinning, weaving and dyeing, means that the 
bulk of the workforce are machine operators, or to be more exact 
machine tenders, requiring less skills than in the case in Factory 
A, where craft skills are more needed. Thirdly, the basic raw material 
for production at the factory (cotton) is internally procured rather 
than imported from abroad. Other manufacturing inputs (such as 
chemicals and dyes) and machinery were, however, acquired from abroad. 
These factors create a different work context from that of Factory A. 
Textile production by local rudimentary crafts virtually disappeared 
in Tanzania during the colonial period. Textile needs were fulfilled 
through importation. Towards the end of the 1950's and with the 
approach of political independence textile mills began to appear. 
As we saw in an earlier chapter, the first were small-scale privately 
owned textile mills. The first large-scale textile mill was a joint 
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project between a local cooperative society and a foreign consortium 
which supplied the machinery. Local textile production obtained a 
further boost with the construction of another large-scale, state- 
owned factory in 1966. This Dar es Salaam-located enterprise was 
financed by a loan from China, and all the machinery in the plant was 
supplied by China. Other post-independence textile factories include 
a Dar es Salaam-based joint project between West German finance, which 
supplied the machinery, and the National Development Corporation (N. D. C. ). 
Other large joint projects are located in Mwanza, Arusha and Musoma. 
Further projects are earmarked for Mbeya and Tabora. The bulk of 
textile production is under the control of the state - initially after 
independence under the N. D. C., later under TEXCO (the Textile Corporation 
of Tanzania). In 1977, for example, total textile production was 
80 million square metres of which 67 million was accounted for by TEXCO 
subsidiaries and 13 million by private companies [Budget Estimates, 
Minister of Industries, 1978/79, p. 19]. 
Heavy reliance on imported machinery and spare parts as well as 
raw materials (other than cotton) is a striking feature of textile 
production in Tanzania. Machinery breakdown due to the age of the 
imported machinery or to lack of spare parts, is a regular occurrence 
at many factories. Another problem which textile mills share with 
other plants is the cuts in electricity supplies which affect production 
from time to time. 
From that point of view, Factory B's work context is not very 
different from that of other Tanzanian textile plants. The factory 
was constructed in 1966 on the basis of a 60/= million T. shillings. 
loan with the N. D. C. providing 10/= million T. shillings, making it one 
of the biggest textile factories in the country. At this point it had 
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40,000 spindles for spinning and 979 weaving machines. In 1975 the 
factory was extended, thus increasing its weaving capacity to a total 
of over one thousand (1,194) weaving machines. The machinery was 
supplied by China. Numerous other inputs required by the factory, 
such as spare parts, chemicals and dyes, have been procured from 
different foreign sources, including chemicals from English and Swiss 
companies, and spare parts from Japanese and Indian private companies. 
In 1983, as Table 4.3 shows, the factory had 5,111 employees 
distributed in seven functional departments which is the practice in 
both public and private sector factories in Tanzania. The mill 
sections or Production Department employs the greater part of the 
workforce, corresponding to the main work processes of textile production 
- spinning, weaving and processing. The other departments are support 
and maintenance departments. Factory B is an integrated textile 
factory combining the three basic manufacturing processes just mentioned, 
beginning with raw cotton and ending with the finished textile products. 
The factory produces dyes, bleached linen and shirting, bleached drill, 
dress prints, khanga and vitenge, mulmul and grey shirting, cotton 
yarn, bandages, curtains, bed sheeting and printed drills. Table 4.4 
gives some indices of--enterprise performance for the period immediately 
preceding-our study. - 
The production processes of the factory display the features of 
a "totally integrated cotton mill" so aptly described by Blauner [1964, 
p. 63], the classic example of the machine-tending technology, 
involving low levels of skills for the bulk of the workforce; the 
products (khanga, vitenge) are standardized and workers "mind or tend" 
spinning and weaving machines which are largely automatic. In contrast 
to craft production, machine tenders can hardly transfer skills outside 
automatic textile mills. 
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Table 4.3 
Factory B: Distribution of Employees, 1983 
Department/Section Actual - December 
PRODUCTION 
Office of the Production Manager 6 
Spinning I 717 
Spinning II 567 
Weaving I 1176 
Weaving II 1014 
Processing & Dyeing 550 
TOTAL 4030 
OFFICE OF TECHNICAL MANAGER 1 
Evaluation 55 
Research 2 
Chemicals 8 
TOTAL 64 
ENGINEERING 
Office of Chief Engineer 3 
Workshop 113 
Boiler 38 
Transport 33 
Metal 10 
Electric Workshop 69 
Water Cooler 28 
Air Cooler 31 
TOTAL 325 
ADMINISTRATION AND SERVICES 
General Manager's Office 73 
Personnel and Administration 381 
FINANCES 71 
PURCHASES 123 
MARKETING & SALES 44 
TOTAL 692 
GRAND TOTAL 5111 
Source: File Ref. 2/273/Vol. II 57. Letter of 7 April 1984, by Manpower 
and Personnel Manager to Labour Commissioner, Factory B. 
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Organized hierarchically, the Production Department is led by 
the Production Manager assisted by assistant mill managers, shift 
officers, supervisors and foremen, who with the machine operators 
form the production hierarchy. In 1984 the labour force was 
technically divided in the mill as shown in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 
Employees and Operational Hierarchy in 
Production and Technical Departments - 1984 
Machine Supervisors Foremen Shift Mill 
Operators Officers Managers 
Spinning I 533 9 24 5 2 
II 444 9 25 4 2 
Weaving I 884 28 30 11 2 
II 790 20 29 6 2 
Artisans Technicians 
Processing & Dyeing 468 15 
Engineering Workshop 89 6 
Boiler 27 4 
Electric Workshop 46 4 
Cooling Plant 17 5 
Senior 
Technicians 
14 
13 
1 
7 
1 
Source: As compiled by Training Officer on researcher's request. 
This technical division and hierarchy of posts is reflected in 
the employees' salaries and wages. Entry points for the salaries 
and wages were as follows in July 1981: 
Production Manager M. S. U. 11 i. e. 5065 sh. per month 
Senior Mill Manger M. S. U. 10-9 4945 
Assistant Mill Manager M. S. U. 6 2345 
Shift Officer M. S. U. 7 2970-3570 " 
Supervisor M. S. U. 6 2870-2345 
Foreman M. S. U. 5 1680-2240 " 
Machine Operator M. S. U. 2-4 600-1604 " 
Source: Schemes of Service, Factory B. 
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The levels of pay correspond to levels of education which the 
Personnel Officer estimated as follows: 75% of the employees 
(machine operators) had primary school education, i. e. 4 to 7 years; 
15% below Form IV, usually two years after primary; 10% Form IV 
and above. Those who were highly educated were found mainly in the 
support (especially Accounting) and maintenance departments. When 
the factory began, technical and engineering work was carried out 
by Chinese technicians. Since 1974, however, all these posts are 
manned by Tanzanian employees. 
Work in Factory B's mill sections takes place in three 8-hour 
shifts. Work is carried out following targets which are technically 
set on the basis of the machines' present capacity. In the spinning 
section two workers tend three machines, while in the weaving sections 
each machine operator tends 8 machines. Because of the age of the 
machinery, the operator is kept constantly moving from one machine 
to another in the bid to keep them working. Results are recorded 
on cards. Weaving is generally recognised as one of the most difficult 
operations in this factory. The work-place is characterized by heat 
and noise from the machinery. It is hardly surprising that every 
month about 40 workers leave work, especially given the fact that 
the hard work is compounded by the need to work night shifts. 
Overtime is allowed and paid for for essential work such as 
emergency repair or urgent spinning. However, those over M. S. U. 
4 are not allowed to earn overtime payments according to SCOPO 
regulations. This is not popular with some long-term machine 
operators and foremen who are in those categories and have to do 
those essential jobs. 
The majority of the employees were born and grew up in rural 
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areas outside of Dar es Salaam. They come from every region of 
Tanzania: Musoma, Mwanza, Arusha, Dodoma, Kilimanjaro, Mtwara, 
Rufiji, Tabora and Iringa, from where they or their parents migrated 
to Dar es Salaam in search of work. 
From the interviews I carried out with workers in the Weaving 
II, we get some hints of the kind of factors which may have led these 
Tanzanians to seek wage employment in town. Many of them mentioned 
difficulties in making a living in rural areas - especially the "low" 
prices of crops in rural areas. Agricultural activities were often 
perceived as not bringing in regular returns, with money coming in 
only after harvest, i. e. once a year. Some came from average or 
poor households without any money, assets (such as livestock) or 
permanent cash crops, and with only small food reserves. 
To illustrate some of the workers' rural backgrounds and their 
responses to my questions, four brief sketches are offered of workers 
from different parts of Tanzania and in different jobs. 
Mr. K, a 28 year old "beam fixer", machine operator, was born 
in rural Moshi, Kilimanjaro, the first of nine children from 
peasant parents. He completed primary school. His parents 
had a small plot of land (3 acres). He began to work as a 
labourer on road works. Later he came to Dar es Salaam in 1973 
and a neighbour introduced him to the Factory, where he got 
employed. He also has one acre in Moshi where he grows maize. 
He feels that if he had a bigger plot he would go back and 
carry on agricultural work. Wage-employment is something he 
depends upon in the circumstances, even though his wage of 
1170/= a month is insufficient. 
Mr. T., a 36 year old senior supervisor, was born in rural 
Tabora. He completed primary schooling in 1965. His parents 
were cultivators of maize and cassava and had some 16 goats 
which got stolen. After school, Mr. T. felt it would be better 
to look for paid employment. Prices of crops were not encourag- 
ing and in his village there were no permanent cash crops. 
He feels that his work as a Factory employee since 1968 (in the 
various posts of shuttle fitter, machine operator and now 
supervisor) is now a sort of habit but is comparatively a better 
situation than being without work or farming. Wage-employment 
is still a difficult way of making a living with rising inflation., 
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Mr. U., a foreman, was born in 1949. His father used to work 
as a head of work gangs along the Central Railway line, later 
retiring to become mkulima wa kawaida (= ordinary subsistence 
peasant) without any real property. Mr. U. completed primary 
school in 1966 and in 1967 began work as a machine operator, 
then becoming a clothing repairer and moving to foreman in 1980. 
Being employed is important for him. Farming does not bring 
as much money as being employed - "Ukulima hauna pesa! " (= Farming has no money). 
Mr. L., from Kilwa in southern Tanzania is a 35 year old machine 
operator in "Drawing Frame". His parents are subsistence peasants 
growing cassava, maize and some cashew nuts. He completed 
primary school in 1966 and stayed on in his village 
teaching literacy classes. In 1969 he joined the national Youth 
Service; then worked as a labourer on the Tazara Railway 
construction before being laid off in 1970. Farming life seemed 
to produce small returns, so he came to Dar es Salaam in search 
of work before getting employed in 1974 at the Factory. "Uchawi 
wa binadamu ni pesa" (= Money is man's magic wand), he believes. 
Wage employment would solve his problems. 
5 MANAGEMENT AND PARTICIPATION IN FACTORY 'B' 
a) Management Structures 
Factory B, in accordance with the Public Corporations Act of 
1969 and the Presidential Order of December 11,1973, establishing 
the Textile Corporation of Tanzania (TEXCO), became a subsidiary of 
the above holding company. The latter was established in an effort 
to rationalise and coordinate textile activities in the country by 
offering advisory services to companies as regards training and technical 
expertise whose costs individual companies could not have met alone. 
The holding company would also serve as a means of providing a uniform 
system as regards personnel affairs and the recruitment of higher 
technical cadres, as well as comparable standards in production. 
It is through TEXCO's Board of Directors that textile subsidiaries 
are related to the government. The Executive Chairman of TEXCO is 
a Presidential appointee; other Board members are appointed by the 
Minister for Industries. The Chairman of TEXCO's Board of Directors 
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is also Chairman of Factory B's Management Committee. The General 
Manager of this factory is also on the Board of TEXCO. Other Board 
members include two Members of Parliament; Ministry of Industries 
officials and knowlegeable citizens from non-commercial, non-productive 
parastatals, such as the Institute of Finance Management and Mzumbe 
Institute of Development Management. (According to the Prime 
Minister's Directive-of December 1974; members of the Board of 
Holding Companies would be drawn 40% from civil servants and para- 
statal employees, and 60% from outside, from notable members of the 
public such as the Party, Trade Union Cooperatives, Members of 
Parliament and Institutions of Learning - Paragraph 6). 
At the level of the factory (subsidiary) there is the Management 
Committee which is composed of 40% from the factory and 60% from outside 
the factory. At the time of the study the composition was: 
- As Chairman, the Executive Chairman of TEXCO, a long time government 
official who had worked as a Principal Secretary - appointed by the 
President. 
- The Company's General Manager. 
- Two Members of Parliament, one of whom was a judge. 
- The Principal of Kivukoni Party Ideological College. 
- Four Departmental Managers (Sales, Personnel, Finance and Production). 
- The Chairman of the Party Branch (the Spinning Manager who had been 
elected by Party members at the factory), and the Chairman of the 
JUWATA branch (the machine operator). 
-a Foreman in the Administration Department (a messenger; an elderly 
man who has been in the factory for over ten years and a former 
Chairman of the Party branch). 
The Board of the Holding Company, TEXCO, meeting twice a year, 
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had a mixed impact on its subsidiary. The company's plan was 
submitted to the Ministry of Industries and to the Board of TEXCO 
which would put pressure on the factory when the latter's activities 
were not in line with TEXCO's general investment plans (see the 
section below on the question of redundancies in Factory B). The 
Board was influential in the placement of managerial cadres below 
the General Manager (who, as we have noted, is a presidential appointee). 
The holding company was not popular with the factory management 
for it seemed to duplicate the work of the Ministry of Industries. 
In August 1976, for exmaple, the Workers' Council in the factory passed 
a resolution calling on the Party and Government to abolish the holding 
company as uneconomical and superfluous. A delegation consisting 
of the General Manager, the Political Commissar (on which more in 
a later section), the trade union Chairman and Chief Accountant went 
to discuss the issue but were unsuccessful (Workers' Council, Session 
14 of 3/8/76 - 22/8/76). 
In its turn the Management Committee of the factory deals with 
company issues and is crucial in promotions and demotions of employees 
under its jurisdiction and for disciplinary matters for those above 
the M. S. U. categories but below the managerial categories. As in 
Factory A, day to day activities are left to the factory management. 
The overall result is that the factory management have a generally 
decisive influence: not only do they have representation on TEXCO's 
Board of Directors but they also dominate the enterprise's Management 
Committee even though numerically they are in a minority. As in 
Factory A, whereas ordinary members of the Committee functioned as 
individuals merely presenting their own personal ideas, management's 
views were coordinated and could be presented as those of the enterprise. 
b) The Workers' Council 
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The Workers' Council in this factory was among the first to be 
established in the country following the Presidential Circular No. 
1 of 1970. A number of factors contributed to the early creation 
of the Workers' Council here. The factory had been constructed 
in 1966 but began actual production in the context of the Arusha 
Declaration, which stressed the creation of public factories. From 
1967, the leadership of the factory was drawn from trade unionists. 
The first General Manager was a former assistant and later Acting 
Secretary-General of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour, Deputy and 
later Secretary-General of NUTA/JUWATA, and one of the most active 
trade union leaders before and after independence [CCM, 1982, p. 352 
for a brief biographical note]. The high "political" profile of 
the factory meant that the first Chairman of the Party branch was 
the General Manager and that the factory was often in the forefront 
in the implementation of government policies. 
The successor to the first General Manager of the factory, also 
appointed by the President, was again from the trade union movement, 
then, in 1971, working at the NUTA headquarters as an Assistant 
Secretary. Furthermore, since this was the factory employing the 
largest number of workers in the country, the Secretary-General of 
the NUTA often visited the factory to mobilise the employees towards 
involvement in union matters and encourage them towards increased 
productivity. 
Management was thus from the beginning well disposed to the 
creation of the Workers' Council and the involvement of workers' 
representatives in discussing company plans and company performance 
and in keeping workers informed. The first General Manager on the 
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creation of the Workers' Council became also its first Chairman. 
Since that time the factory has had a "tradition" of the Workers' 
Council despite the changes in management. In 1974 the factory got 
another General Manager from NUTA headquarters, a former NUTA Assistant 
Secretary-General. In 1977 a manager from another textile mill was 
appointed General Manager. 
Initially, the organisation of production was in the hands of 
Chinese technical experts, one of whom was the Production Manager; 
personnel affairs were in the hands of a Tanzanian citizen, who had 
been active in the nationalist movement and a one-time Regional 
Commissioner. 
Given that the factory was large, the organisation of the Workers' 
Council here was based on two levels: each department had its own 
Workers' Council and then there was the master Workers' Council for 
the whole factory. This master Workers' Council, like the departmental 
ones met twice a year. 
It was the minutes of this master Workers' Council that were 
examined to see what issues were discussed and how they were discussed. 
In Factory B the minutes of the meetings were detailed with attached 
reports from each department. The minutes in each case were twenty 
to thirty pages long with sections for issues from each department, 
questions and suggestions made during the discussions, mention of 
those who spoke and a summary of the resolutions. In the next 
session, there would be a report on what had been done or implemented 
concerning the previous resolutions before new items were tabled and 
discussed by Council. Details of the procedure were checked against 
my interviews with the Administrative Officer dealing with personnel 
matters, the Personnel Officer, the Training Officer and the Chairman 
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and Secretary of the JUWATA branch. After an initial reading of 
the minutes, I took detailed notes on 14 sessions from the 15th 
Session of 20/12/76 to the 28th Session of 12/12/83. 
The minutes give a picture of the factory over the years, 
revealing some of the problems encountered as well as the factory's 
successes. For example, the 27th Session of the master Workers' 
Council of 28/7/83 to 30/7/83 which discussed the crisis the factory 
faced in terms of shortages of necessary spares, inputs and power 
cuts, contrasts with other sessions when the Council would be 
discussing bonus payments after fulfillment of targets. or the 
necessity to employ more machine operators (Session 15, Resolution 
No. 1 concerning the Spinning Department). 
The following is a summary of the 23rd Session held from 14th 
August 1981 to 19th August 1981 and illustrates the issues discussed 
and some of the ways they were discussed. I picked this Session's 
minutes because so many of the central problems of the factory were 
discussed: falling production due to problems of spares and water 
cuts; the question of incentives and overtime; schemes of service 
that were being awaited from SCOPO; new prices for the factory's 
products that were being awaited from the Price Commission; transport 
and thefts at the factory; and the financial problems incurred by 
sales on credit to state trading companies which delayed payments. 
The session presented an interesting view of how these were tackled, 
which in turn revealed in several ways the status of the Workers' 
Council and the nature of the politics of participation in Factory B. 
The meeting opened at 10 o'clock in the morning. There were 
a total of 76 participants. Thirty-one members were from the 
management (including the General Manager, Departmental Managers and 
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heads such as medical officer, the police officer in charge of the 
factory security and administrative assistants. Other participants 
drawn from the CCM and JUWATA branches included the Chairman of CCM 
and JUWATA, the Branch Secretaries and delegates from both branches 
including from the youth section and the women's organisation (U. W. T. ). 
From outside the factory came an Assistant Secretary at the JUWATA 
headquarters. The Member of Parliament for the District was also 
invited to attend the meeting as a guest of honour. It was a practice 
for sessions to have a prominent person to address the meeting, thus 
symbolically underlining the importance of the deliberations. 
The first item was on the concern expressed by the Chairman of 
the Council at delays in electing a new Workers' Council. The 
Administrative Manager was called to explain the delay. The explanation 
given was that they were waiting for instructions from the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Welfare on how to select participants from 
departments and from the departmental Workers' Councils for the master 
Workers' Council. The meeting agreed to proceed and await the 
instructions. 
The next set of issues dealt with were those which had been 
raised in the previous sesssion. These included a report by the 
Marketing Manager explaining the theft of goods which had been destined 
for export. The Council endorsed the report. Another issue was 
the granting of 30 per cent of gate receipts to members of the factory 
jazz bands. This had been suggested by members of the band. The 
Council directed that the jazz band should abide by the old arrangements 
and not raise their share of gate receipts unilaterally. 
One member from the CCM branch, an elderly Supervisor in 
Administration (and former Chairman of the branch), enquired on the 
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question of improving transport for the workers by increasing the 
frequency of trips. In reply the General Manager pointed to the 
fact that the capacity of the buses was limited and cautioned members 
against blaming drivers when the situation was beyond the factory's 
control - shortages of buses. 
The session was informed by the Administrative Manager that the 
Scheme of Service which had been prepared by management was still 
under scrutiny by SCOPO. He further informed the session that 
given the new salary scales, overtime payments would be for those 
receiving below 1,605 sh. per month. 
On the question of transport of cotton, a key raw material from 
up-country, the Purchasing Manager informed the council of shortages 
of railway wagons and the need to purchase lorries instead, to transport 
this necessary raw material effectively and on time. A resolution 
was passed to that effect by the Council. 
Then followed discussions on written reports tabled by Departmental 
Managers on the performance of their respective sections. First 
was the report by the Production Manager, who presented and highlighted 
the key issues in summary form. Then the General Manager took the 
floor to further stress various issues: (a) the critical situation 
facing the production of the factory; (b) the factors affecting 
production both from "within" and from "without" or beyond the factory's 
control. He called upon the Council to consider seriously finding 
means to raise performance and increase productivity, suggesting 
incentives for those who reached targets or contributed ideas. Water 
availability, electricity flow and foreign currency were mentioned 
as some of the problems affecting the factory's production. 
Among suggestions for improving performance strict supervision, 
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the freezing of any new employment and the retirement of those past 
the retirement age, were mentioned. Incentives such as a pair 
of khanga or kitenge material should be given to those who surpassed 
targets. On overtime payments, these should be checked and curtailed. 
Heads of Departments were asked to make sure all overtimes were genuine 
-a reflection of the fact that some workers in collusion with some 
supervisors approved bogus overtime payments as a strategy of raising 
their incomes. The Chairman of the Council suggested that workers 
should not be paid money in lieu of leave as several workers tended 
to do in order to improve their income. This was unanimously accepted 
by the Council. 
Since water shortage was a problem which constantly hit the 
factory, the General Manager suggested that the Ministry of Water 
be contacted over the issue. Government and Party leaders should 
be informed of the gravity of the situation which could lead to the 
closure of the factory. Another suggestion was the creation of storage 
wells. These were accepted by the participants. 
On the system of selling goods to State Regional Trading Companies 
on credit, the Council members agreed with management's views that 
this was detrimental to the financial health of the factory. The 
government, it was agreed, should be informed about it and the need 
should be stressed to change the system of sale of goods on credit 
to those companies. There were a lot of delays in the payment of 
the debts. This in turn created problems for the proper functioning 
of the factory. 
Some participants suggested that the Engineering Department should 
be more innovative on the question of spare parts. With foreign 
exchange reserves limited, the procurement of spares from abroad 
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would continue to be a perpetual problem, including getting wrong 
specifications. 
Discussions then moved to the Department of Technology following 
the tabling of the Department's report. Concerning the quality of cloth 
produced the blame was put on poor supervision of the weavers. 
The Weaving Manager responded by complaining in turn that the partici- 
pation of JUWATA left much to be desired and was discouraging since, 
he alleged, guilty and lazy workers were left unpunished. This 
undermined management's authority. A JUWATA delegate responded by 
saying that the union never defended lazy workers and that any 
reconciliation decision was subject to appeal. Another participant 
from JUWATA alleged that most members of management were involved 
in "personal projects" and tended to neglect their factory responsi- 
bility and accused workers instead. Workers should be given the 
chance to improve in their performance. It was finally agreed that 
there should be cooperation by all employees without blaming each 
other. 
Discussions moved on to the report of the Engineering Department. 
This dealt with the new engineering workshop. A JUWATA participant 
enquired who had incurred the costs of creating the workshop. The 
Chief Engineer in response indicated that this was part of the 
development programme of the section in an effort to make on the 
spot items needed in the factory. This was commended by the Council 
which resolved that the Department should also indicate the values 
of items made and how much the factory had saved by making them. 
It was also agreed, on the suggestion of another JUWATA' participant, 
that all tasks which could be performed at the factory should be 
carried out by the Department and not subcontracted. 
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Concern was expressed on the question of thefts of spare parts 
and the Chief Engineer called upon the Council to find ways to deal 
with those thefts. One member from CCM complained about the 
negligence of some members of management who - it was repeated - 
only indulged in personal private projects and neglected their duties. 
The General Manager replied that if there was any evidence on this 
he would take action. 
Then followed a report by the Sales and Marketing Department. 
After favourable comments on the sales achieved by the Department, 
a question was raised on the government's practice of linking bonuses. 
to the sale of export products worth at least 49 million shillings. 
Management promised to look into the matter. 
One member raised the question of prices but since this was being 
considered by the Price Commission the Marketing Manager said nothing 
could be done until the Commission had agreed to fix new prices. 
Prices of industrial products were not under the jurisdiction of the 
factories or parastatal decision-making but had to be approved by 
the national Price Commission. 
The Purchasing Department report, next on the agenda, dealt with 
the purchase of drugs, uniforms and soap, which seemed in short supply. 
The Manager explained that due to the condition of the country's 
economy, these were in short supply; that this was a general, 
national problem. 
Over the days, the discussion then went on to deal with the 
report tabled by the Administrative and Personnel Manager on the post 
of the Personnel Officer which, one participant felt should be filled 
by better trained staff and should deal with more substantial duties 
other than issuing loans and signing leave of absence chits for workers. 
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The Administrative Manager reported that a seminar was in the 
pipeline to train the personnel staff and that some of them would 
be going for further training. 
Questions were asked about the performance of cultural groups 
and how much money was raised from their activities. The Admini- 
strative Manager gave information on the money raised by those groups 
and the factory's hiring of its Social Hall for dances. He also 
reported on procedures for the repainting of the factory's five 
hundred houses. 
One member charged the Administrative Manager with sanctioning 
over-employment in his department. The General Manager intervened 
and informed the session that the issue would be discussed between 
him and the Administrative Manager. This was accepted by the 
Council to avoid embarrassments. 
On the report by the Financial Manager concerning the factory's 
debtors and why they were not listed, the Council was informed that 
this would embarrass the debtors, the list, however, was with the 
holding company TEXCO. One JUWATA delegate wanted to have the Internal 
Auditor's Report tabled. The General Manager responded by informing 
the Council that such a report was his concern and confidential and 
could not be tabled before the Council. That settled the matter. 
On the rise in administrative costs from 13 million sh. to 16 
million sh. in one year, the Financial Manager explained that this 
was due to rises in costs including overtime. This prompted a 
discussion on the question of the overtime payments which was costing 
the factory so much but which many managers were reluctant (wary) 
to stop as that might affect work performance of their subordinates. 
This was a touchy issue but managers and supervisors should be prepared 
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to face it to reduce the factory's costs. 
A report was presented by the Department of the General Manager 
on the security and safety of the factory. On the question of thefts 
in the Finance Department, raised by a CCM delegate, the General 
Manager informed the sitting that measures had been taken and the 
culprits sent to court. 
Under "Any Other Business", one delegate suggested that management 
inform the workers about the decisions of the Council. In response, 
the General Manager said it was the duty of the elected delegates 
to inform the workers. Another member complained about the way some 
members of management tended wrongly to accuse JUWATA delegates of 
absenteeism when they were fulfilling their duties attending to 
reconciliation cases at the JUWATA branch office. On the question 
of working hours, the Council unanimously agreed to maintain the 7.30 am 
to 3 pm day, with a half hour lunch break at 12.30. Winding up, 
the General Manager commended the participants on their work and quoting 
the President, he said leaders should be people of action not words. 
He then invited the Member of Parliament to address the sitting. 
The M. P. commended the factory for its work and exhorted all employees 
despite the difficulties to continue with their work which was so 
important to the nation. He promised to look into some of the questions 
raised which could be dealt at the level of Ministries (e. g. Water) 
or Parliament (the question of Holding Companies). 
Typical of the 14 meetings on which I made detailed notes, the 
23rd Session of the Workers' Council of Factory B was also strongly 
reminiscent in several ways of the Workers' Council sessions at 
Factory A. Although larger and more structured (and hence better 
recorded in the minutes), the Factory B sessions showed crucial 
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similarities with those of our first case study. As in the first 
case, the Workers' Council dealt with different aspects of the 
factory's life, being informed on and discussing improving production, 
marketing, personnel matters, prices, incentives, and so on. Discussions 
were on the basis of reports prepared by Departmental Managers who 
prepared the agenda, though individual participants could bring in 
suggestions and views which could be taken as resolutions if acceptable 
to the participants. While membership of the Council was drawn 
from both management and other sections of the workforce, the manage- 
ment through the departmental reports were able to act as a group 
and present positions which had been more or less agreed upon previously. 
The other members gave their suggestions but not as the position of 
the Union or Party branch as such, but as mere suggestions from 
individual delegates. Most non-managerial interventions were for 
suggestions or seeking information. 
Workers' Councils Sessions were followed by resolutions for future 
action. Some of those decisions/resolutions were implemented or 
a follow-up was made on them (for example on the question of prices 
for products, or schemes of service, which were under the authority 
of the Prices Commission, or SCOPO respectively). Other decisions, 
however, were not implemented and would have to be raised again (e. g. 
the issue of transport). 
The Council's deliberations often involved either advice to 
higher authorities, or getting information or giving directives to 
lower bodies when acceptable to management.. Other issues were 
a matter of getting information on why certain things had been done 
by management and explanations were given by management on different 
activities that had provoked concern with some of the participants. 
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What seems important in all this is the overall impact of the 
existence of the Workers' Council. Workers' participation was 
clearly of the inclusionary controlled type. Given the system of 
representation and the social ideal of working together to solve 
common problems through consultation and discussion, the Council 
only marginally affected managerial power. As a merely advisory 
body it could not insist on its decisions being put into practice. 
On the other hand as a forum in which the management was occasionally 
forced to defend itself against potentially embarrassing questioning 
from non-managerial members, the Council provided more than a purely 
symbolic avenue of popular participation. The following chapter 
pursues these issues by examining the roles of the Party and Union 
branches in factory situations. 
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Footnotes 
1. During the 1970's and 1980's Tanzania encountered a number of serious 
economic problems. A number of issues both domestic and international 
or a combination of both have been cited as the causes of those problems. 
Reasons often quoted include: the world oil price increases, severe 
droughts, the movement to villages in many parts of rural Tanzania, 
disruption of agricultural marketing; and the Uganda war in 1978/79. 
Among the effects have been rising inflation and a fall in the 
country's foreign exchange earnings. These had telling effects 
on industrial performance and the real incomes of wage-earners. 
As a consequence there has been the necessity to constantly revise 
the minimum wage and other wage and salary scales to cope with rising 
inflation during these years. From 1972 there has been a rise of 
the minimum wage as discussed in Chapter 3 above. Valentine [1981, 
p. 58] has compared the rise in prices with the growth of money wages 
and has shown that the price rises have outstripped the rise in wages. 
The price rises are much more felt by lower wage earners on food, 
housing and clothing. The situation has been aggravated by shortages 
in maize meal (= sembe), sugar, rice, soap, and cloth, giving rise 
to escalating parallel market prices (nicknamed popularly in Kiswahili 
mwendo wa kuruka (literally = flying speed) and to all forms of 
hoarding and marketeering (= ulanguzi). 
The period is also marked by a rapid fall in the exchange value of 
the Tanzanian currency, the shilling. The official exchange rate 
in 1983 was 12/=50 for the U. S. dollar. This was considered in 
many circles as overvalued, with the market value of illegal traders 
offering 70/= to 80/=. sh. for the U. S. dollar. Since 1984 a series 
of devaluations of the Tanzanian shilling have been made as a result 
of which the rate has fallen from T. sh. 16/=50 to the dollar to about 
T. sh. 70/= to the dollar in mid-1987. According to the Financial 
Times of 23rd October 1987, the current exchange rate was 71/=, set 
to fall to 90/= by January 1988. 
2. Housing in the popular and populous areas of Dar es Salaam ranges 
between the house made of cement bricks with a corrugated iron roof 
and the type with wooden poles-cum-mud brick walls and tin or makuti 
(palms) roofing. The former improved type usually has a cement floor 
while the latter may or may not have a cement floor. Low wage earners 
(machine operators, messengers, junior clerks) live in these houses 
whose design is known as the Swahili type of house. This consists 
of one main front building and a built up backyard. The front 
building has six rooms and a middle corridor. At the backyard, there 
is the common kitchen, bath and toilet and other smaller rooms let 
out to tenants. In one such house or housing unit, several families 
usually live, each family having a room or rooms according to their 
capacity to pay. Rooms in the front houses in areas like Ilala 
and Magomeni in 1983 cost about 70/= up to 100/= for a seven by eight 
feet bare room. Those at the back tended to cost less, from 30/= 
to 50/=. Tenants have a common water source or fetch water from 
one of the nearby street kiosks. Incidents and tales of frictions 
and conflicts between residents, their families, and the usually 
elderly landlords or landladies are rife. 
Similar types of houses in the nearby Manzese or Tandale have rooms 
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(without a ceiling) to rent with the improved houses having 
electricity for lighting, instead of the more common kerosene-tin 
wick lamps (= koroboi). Some of the older artisans and technicians 
have built their own houses in these areas and may let a back room 
or two to other workers. 
The managerial and middle level administrative and accounting staff 
live in houses in which the family usually occupies a housing unit 
or flat, with two to three bedrooms with water and electricity. 
These are in the medium or low density areas of the city. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE PARTY AND THE UNION 
A factory is a site of relations, a context or field in which 
management and workers compete and/or cooperate over issues in pursuit 
and in the realisation of objectives. In this interaction management 
and workers have differential resources at their disposal. One of 
those resources is the organisation of the factory. The last chapter 
dealt with some of the aspects of factory organisation which shape 
management/worker relations: after introducing the industrial environ- 
ment and the composition of the workforce in the two factories, we 
focused on the organisation of management and the structuring of 
workers' participation through the Workers' Councils. Another major 
feature of the organisation of Tanzanian public sector factories are 
the enterprise-level branches of the Party (CCM) and the national 
trade union (JUWATA), and it is on these that we focus in this chapter, 
paying attention throughout mostly to the case of Factory A. 
In examining the factory Party and union branches, our objectives 
are to see not only how those agencies are organised, but also the 
way employees perceive and relate to them and how they articulate their 
membership of those agencies in pursuit of their interests. The 
approach adopted is that these agencies are considered as sources or 
a medium of power and therefore essentially dynamic. Their "saliency" 
depends not only on the way they are formally organised but also on 
the way the members of those organisations and other relevant actors 
perceive, define and articulate their relation to them. By looking 
at the matter in this way, we hope to overcome some of the limitations 
of the formalist and functionalist conceptions of those agencies 
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which were criticised in the Introduction - conceptions which assign 
them a simple and straightforward "character" on the basis of the 
formal/legal structures or an assumed function or functions within 
a wider scheme of things. Those approaches not only neglect the 
way different actors (management and workers) see and relate to Party 
and union bodies; they also necessarily oversimplify the problem of 
the way these organisations' written rules and regulations are actually 
implemented in the real world of factory life. 
1 ORIGINS OF WORK-PLACE PARTY BRANCHES 
Before introducing the Party branch of Factory A, it will be 
helpful to make a short digression on the origins and significance 
of work-place branches in relation to the history and structure of 
TANU/CCM. The introduction in 1969 of Party branches in work-places 
created a new dimension in industrial relations, particularly in para- 
statal factories. TANU Party organisation up to that year had been 
based on residential and administrative divisions. This had been 
one of the main organisational features of the pre-independence 
nationalist movement. When residence-based Party cells were first 
introduced in Dar es Salaam city in 1965 and later extended to the 
whole country, they became the grassroots sections of the Party. 
The cell comprised all TANU members in designated nyumba kumi (= ten 
houses). This organisational structure on the basis of administrative 
divisions was a reflection of the mainly electoral preoccupations of 
the Party leadership in the pre-independence days. At that time Party 
branches (through the activities of their leadership or those of the 
ordinary members in public meetings or through private contacts) served 
as a means of recruiting new members into the movement, as well as 
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a source of mobilisation of the general public in support of the 
leadership's competition with other organisations (such as UTP or 
the Congress Party) as well as in the struggle with the colonial 
administration. 
After independence the branches continued to be organs for 
mobilising popular support for the independence TANU government. 
Mainly through public meetings, the Party organisation continued to 
fulfil that function as well as being now a forum in which partici- 
pants could present their demands and wishes to the political leader- 
ship. Another role the TANU organisation continued to play was to 
be the medium of recruitment of new political activists, later leaders, 
in the different positions of the expanding political hierarchy after 
independence. Given the virtual dominance of TAND and the weakness 
of other political organisations, TANU organs at the grassroots after 
independence played a variety of social functions including serving 
as local avenues for the amicable, ex-judicial settlement of disputes 
by conciliation among neighbours or sometimes between spouses [Muzo 
et. al., 1976; Bienen, 1967]. The 1965 introduction of Party cells 
to deal with neighbourhood issues such as security and crime reflected 
further changes and extensions to the functions the Party organisation. 
The introduction of Party branches in work-places in 1969 was 
related both to changes in the Party organisation and to the growth 
of parastatal enterprises heralded by the Arusha Declaration in 1967. 
The rationale for the creation of Party branches in work-places lay 
in the political leadership's feeling that in the new period Party 
membership and Party leadership needed to become more involved in 
work-place issues (such as production and discipline) and that the 
existing Party structures were too much what the President/Chairman 
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of the Party called "talking shops". This view was expressed by 
the Party Chairman during the National Executive Council (N. E. C. ) 
meeting of March 1967: 
"TANU is an instrument to encourage and stimulate 
the implementation and realization of the policy 
of socialism and self-reliance. One of the tenets 
of this policy is work; we must work. If we have 
to work and if that is the way to implement the 
policy of socialism and self-reliance and the 
vehicle is TANU, we need to ask ourselves: 'When 
TANU was founded and its various structures 
established, were those structures for work or 
for talking? ' The answer is that TAND meetings 
are for talking not for action! We did not create 
avenues for implementation". [TANU, 1969, p. 11] 
(Author's translation from Kiswahili) 
The Party Chairman argued for the need to make TANU structures 
organs for putting into action the policy of Socialism and Self-reliance 
and that there was no better context to put into effect the Party's 
policy than in work-places, especially in parastatal enterprises, where 
work would be carried out for the benefit of the whole national community 
as well as for those employed in the factory. 
Following the decision of N. E. C., in March 1969, to introduce 
Party branches in work-places, the Party, National Secretariat was given 
the task of implementing that decision taking into account that work 
discipline should be enhanced, leading to increased production. Taken 
by the central organs of the political leadership, the decision was 
naturally framed in general terms, leaving many practical issues to 
be dealt with. Ambiguities remained on the role of the work-place 
branch leadership, its relation with management of enterprises, its 
relation to the workforce and other existing factory organisations 
such as the Workers' Committees (later NUTA/JUWATA branches). 
As far as the National Party leadership was concerned, the work- 
place branches were supposed to play an important role in the political 
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(ideological) education of the workers. To enable them to participate 
fully in socialist production and planning, branches would facilitate 
discussions on technology and Party policies. The Party branch would 
also function as an avenue for the workforce to present suggestions 
and views to the Party leadership and the government. Work-place 
Party branches would operate as ! 'sessions for discussing technology among 
the workforce" (These general functions are spelt out in TAND 
[1969, p. 12]. 
The general nature and necessarily vague definition of the position 
and role of Party branches left the situation open for various inter- 
pretations. This led to an ambiguity over whether the Party's role would 
be chiefly one of exhortation and mobilization (i. e. motivating the 
workforce) or whether it should play the supervisory role (acting as 
a watchdog and monitoring management performance), or indeed whether 
the Party branch should be involved in managerial affairs. Those 
ambiguities have continued to dog the organisation and performance 
of work-place Party branches, reflected in branch leadership's often 
vacillating or inconsistent patterns of behaviour. 
In practice, as we shall see, the position and role of factory 
Party branches emerged gradually as elements of strategies adopted 
by the membership, leadership and management. While management's 
stance and definition of the role of the Party branch tended towards 
making it a tool aiding management and facilitating production and 
discipline, workers perceived it as a resource in their work situation 
- one which they could utilise to enhance or improve or protect them- 
selves. The strategy or stance adopted by the branch leadership was 
shaped by and depended, on the particular personal capacities of the 
Party branch leadership, the resources at their disposal and the 
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conditions under which they operated (the economic and financial position 
of the factory, for example), in addition to the constraints imposed 
upon them by the formal structural organisation of the factory, which 
weighed in favour of management. 
2 THE PARTY BRANCH AT FACTORY 'A': MEMBERSHIP, PERCEPTIONS AND 
ATTITUDES 
Like other public factories, Factory A has a Party (CCM) branch. 
Started in 1970 as a TANU branch with 50 members, the branch has grown 
in membership and has seen the different, organisational innovations 
which were attempted during the 1970's. Membership of the Party 
branch increased as the workforce grew with the expansion of the factory. 
In 1977 there were 280 members out of a total workforce of 403. These 
TANU card holders and regular Party contributers (known in Kiswahili 
as wanachama hai (= living or active members) became the "founder" 
members of CCM. in 1977 when TANU on the mainland and the Afro-Shirazi 
Party on the Isles became one Party. In 1980 there was a further 
increase, to 461 members out of 670 employees, and by 1981, there were 
as many as 502 card holders and fee-paying members. 
One notable characteristic of the Party membership in 1970 was 
the predominance of blue-collar workers, machine operators, and lower 
supporting staff, (drivers, guards, supervisors, messengers and cleaners) 
together with sections of top management. Middle-level administrative 
staff such as clericals and accounts clerks only became more active 
from 1975. This pattern is explained by the history of the factory, 
with its close links to the national political leadership in its 
inspiration and inception as one of the projects of the TANU government. 
It will be recalled that the General Manager appointed by the 
President 
to head the factory was a prominent trade unionist. He also had been 
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an active Member of Parliament, one of those who spoke strongly in 
favour of forms of workers' participation in the 1967 Assembly 
discussing the Labour Tribunal. The Personnel Officer was also an 
active trade unionist and a member of TANU. The first workforce 
in the plant section was recruited from different parts of the country 
among young men who had gone through the National Youth Service and 
were members of the TANU Youth League. On starting work they became 
full members of the Party. Other employees had become members in 
different ways. Some, like the General Manager or the CCM Chairman, 
at the time of our study, were Party members before independence and 
before starting work at the factory. On the other hand, TANU Youth 
League members (like the CCM Secretary at the time of the study) had 
been young men associated with Party activities in residential areas 
who were recruited for work in posts as machine operators which did 
not require any post-primary formal education or training. 
Becoming a Party member at that time was not very formalised. 
Membership was through payment of 2/= T. sh. for the TANU card at any 
of the TANU offices and a monthly contribution of 50 cents. Never- 
theless, for jobs like typists, secretaries, clerks, accounts clerks 
and general administration, recruitment for employment was on the basis 
of having some skills in those fields. Membership of the Party did 
not feature greatly as a factor in recruitment for such positions even 
though it was already important for both the top management posts and 
the lower cadre machine operators and supporting staff. 
In contrast to the situation of 1970, since 1975 the middle-level 
administrative staff with secondary formal education and training in 
clerical work and accounting have also tended to become members. 
According to the Chairman and Secretary of the branch, administrative 
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staff started joining in the hope of getting posts in the different 
Party echelons, with the more motivated aiming for posts at the 
Divisional, District or Regional levels. 
Joining the Party branch at the factory is also more formalised 
than it used to be. One has to apply formally by filling in a form 
which details one's background including age, formal education, marital 
status, any previous convictions or membership of other political 
organisations (Items listed on application for membership form). The 
application is followed by a three months' course of political education 
organised by political education teachers from the District Party 
organisation. The course consists of a popular general history of 
the country, the history of colonisation, the Party's history and 
constitution, the Arusha Declaration and the country's Constitution 
[Political Education Syllabus for New Party Members]. Among the 
other requirements for membership are good conduct, discipline, no 
drunkenness as well as adherence to the Leadership Code. Since the 
1974 Musoma Resolution of N. E. C., members as well as leaders have to 
adhere to the Leadership Code. 
In practice at Factory A, after regularly attending the political 
education classes, aspirants are assessed orally for their political 
knowledge and granted membership by the branch Committee. Membership 
cards are issued to them in a ceremony at which they swear loyal 
membership in the presence of an invited Party leader from the District 
or Regional office as the guest of honour who presents the cards to 
the new members. The application of the procedures for membership 
is rather generous, refusal of admission being unusual. In 1978, 
for example, three were refused membership at the factory on the 
grounds that they were waiting trial on charges of theft and had not 
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regularly attended political education classes [Minutes of Party 
branch, Mkutano wa Halmashauri ya Tawi, of 9/10/78]. 
Employees who profess belief and acceptance of the Party's 
policies and attend the political education classes regularly become 
members, with the effect that in 1983, non-Party members at the factory 
were mostly those recently recruited to work at the factory, according 
to the CCM branch Chairman and Secretary. Party membership is thus 
now drawn from all sections of the workforce: from the top management 
to the machine operatives and office cleaners. While the earlier 
membership tended to be among the blue-collar workers and top manage- 
ment, the present membership of the branch incorporates in its member- 
ship as well, middle-level administrative staff, and accounts clerks. 
The Tanzanian Managers of the factory have naturally been members 
of the Party from its inception as this is a state factory and one 
that plays an important role in the country's agricultural sector. 
Initially working with the Chinese technicians who headed the Technical 
Department, managerial as well as political qualities were obviously 
important in the appointment of the General Manager and Personnel 
Officer both of whom had been trade unionists. When the factory 
expanded and all the departments came to be manned by Tanzanians, the 
heads of departments were expected to be Party members as well as having 
technical skills. Party membership for the management is not a 
necessary qualification or condition, but an "expected" one for persons 
holding leadership positions in a parastatal factory. "Party 
supremacy" involves not only the approval by the National Party leaders 
of persons to take charge of specified leadership posts but also 
involves the principle that those persons would, wherever possible 
come from among Party members. Thus although membership to the 
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Party is not compulsory, there is moral pressure for persons wishing 
to rise into leadership ranks, or those already in them, to be members 
of the Party. 
Thus in Factory A in 1983 all departmental heads as well as the 
General Manager were active members of the Party branch in terms of 
party contributions and the attendance of Party meetings in their 
sections. By visibly responding in a positive way to the national 
leaders"-call for committed membership and leadership, departmental 
heads thereby showed themselves to be good potential for appointment 
to higher management positions. Membership in the Party was an asset 
for department Managers for another reason too. It smoothed the daily 
exercise of their supervisory work as it tended to mean that they were 
perceived as being cooperative and in unity with the lower members of 
the workforce. 
Since the 1974 Musoma Resolution whereby applications for further 
education or higher training needed the approval of the workplace Party 
branch [Musoma Resolution, Section 35] membership within the Party 
is important for anyone wishing to improve his career prospects by 
pursuing further training in one of the country's institutes or univer- 
sities or abroad. This consideration is particularly relevant among 
middle cadre accounts and administrative staff and among technicians 
and artisans who wish to improve their professional knowhow and careers 
(interviews with members of staff in those categories, February 1983 
and with the CCM Branch Chairman). 
As mentioned earlier, machine operators and supporting staff such 
as messengers had been recruited among persons who had passed through 
the Voluntary National Youth Service and were thus Party members or 
in the youth wing. Membership for them had been useful in getting 
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employed. Once on the job, continued active membership was perceived 
as being helpful and the last resort for securing just treatment and 
fairness particularly in protecting themselves against victimisation 
by supervisors or officials. In the residential areas of the town 
where workers return after work, membership of the Party accompanied 
by a card is also a form of insurance against harassment by the People's 
Militia and accusations of vagabondage, idleness or other forms of 
incriminating behaviour. For machine operators and lower supporting 
workmen, Party membership is perceived as the "stick of the weak" 
(fimbo ya mnyonge) to which they can appeal for support in unity with 
other workers and citizens. The Party is thus perceived, as in the 
days of the movement for national independence, as the unity of patriots 
pursuing common interests regardless of tribe, creed, race or social 
status. Belonging to the Party gives one a sense of social identity 
and solidarity with other people from different parts of the country 
- an asset especially in an urban setting in which the workers live 
with their families. 
Some of the daily affairs of urban residents formally require 
the approval or "blessing" of the Party cell leader or branch leader- 
ship as a recognised authority or witness - for example, new registration 
of children's education. In the neighbourhood setting it is also 
the case that quarrels or small conflicts between neighbours are 
settled at the cell level or branch level with the Party leadership 
acting as arbitrators. A new resident taking a room in a residential 
area of the town normally informs the cell leader in the street. These 
are usually elderly men, whose houses have the Party flag in front. 
The cell or the Party branch does not become an administration as such, 
but is a forum or centre for the spreading of information from the 
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government. During 1982 and 1983 when there were acute shortages of 
consumer items, the Party cells and branches served as distribution 
networks for the rationing of maize meal, flour, sugar, soap and 
clothing material (khanga and vitenge). These facets of the Party's 
role in the extra-factory situation must have helped to shape the 
machine operators' and messengers' view of CCM as the union of the 
patriotic, law-abiding citizens and the refuge of the weak. 
In one way or another, then, employees considered Party member- 
ship as an asset. The following illustrations will help to develop 
the point. Party membership was considered useful chiefly in facili- 
tating chances for further education or training. This "instrumental 
perception" of Party membership was aptly expressed by a worker whom 
I shall call A. M. A. M. was a 25 year-old machine operator in the 
Forging Section. When in primary school he was a youth winger of 
the Party. On completing Standard Seven, he spent a year in his rural 
area before coming to Dar es Salaam, where he stayed with his cousin 
who works in a nearby factory. With his primary school education 
he found it difficult to get work. When he "managed" to get employed 
in the factory as a machine operator, he felt that further training 
was important if he wanted promotion or to change jobs. ne therefore 
became a full member of the Party as, he felt, this could enable him 
to overcome any hurdles if he made an application for courses in fitting 
or turning. Without Party membership, he thought, the Party leader- 
ship could not be favourable to his application for training, as he 
might be considered not to be cooperative. 
Another 25 year-old machine operator, an ex-primary school leaver, 
held similar views. M. S. was being trained as a craftsman. Though 
he was then a non-Party member, he had decided to join the Party 
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because this was important. "Nimeamua ku_jiunga maana bila 
kitambulisho cha CCM inakuwa matatizo. Mtanzania au mfanyakazi bila 
hiyo huwezi kusafiri nie an kusoma" (= I have decided to join because 
without the CCM card one can have problems. A Tanzanian, or a worker 
might find it difficult to travel abroad or take courses). Similar 
views on Party membership as a form of insurance were expressed among 
middle-level administrative clerks and accounting staff, many of whom 
wanted to improve their positions and to go for courses. 
This "instrumental view" of Party membership was not only, however, 
for those who wanted to go for further training or courses. We mentioned 
that in the residential areas it was a means of self-protection. For 
F. M. for example, it was an asset both outside and within the factory 
situation. F. M. was a 40 year-old machine operator in the Forging 
Section. When he migrated from his rural area to go to look for work, 
first in sisal plantations and later in Dar es Salaam, he saw the Party 
membership card as important. This was, for him, a form of identifi- 
cation that he was a law-abiding citizen and not a thief. This was 
helpful in getting accepted and in getting employed at the factory, 
where he had been employed for the last 11 years. In the work-place 
he saw that Party membership was helpful in dealing with practical 
problems of daily life (such as uniforms or food). The management 
needed someone to remind them, to shake them from their sleep 
( kuwaamsha )- otherwise they would ignore workers' complaints or 
demands, he declared. 
For C. O., another machine operator (aged 23) in the Forging Section, 
Party membership was a ngao (shield) in the residential area to 
resolve quarrels with neighbours or some unreasonable landlords. In 
the factory sometimes, he felt, one could be mistreated by a supervisor 
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or have one's rights trampled on.. In that case one could consult the 
branch leadership to redress the situation by talking to management. 
For other employees, Party membership was synonymous with good 
citizenship and patriotism. This was the perception of J. S., a 41 
year-old machine operator who had worked in the factory since 1973. 
He joined the Party even before coming to work at the factory because 
he wanted to be "in unity with his fellow men" (= Niwe n uvu mo_ja na 
wenzangu) and as a citizen of the country. O. M. S., a younger (23) 
machine operator who joined the Party within a year of being employed 
felt the same. As an indigenous (= mzaliwa wa) person of Tanzania, 
it was natural, he felt, that he become a good member of the Party, 
for the Party had brought independence. 
A 26 year-old quality control assistant with Form 4 secondary 
education joined the Party as a way of increasing unity among Tanzanians 
and helping them to work together for the good and the development 
of the country. In the factory the Party would be helpful in reducing 
favouritism or nepotism in management, he believed. K., a purchasing 
officer and a university graduate in economics, saw Party membership 
as a way of voicing one's views and of reducing unwarranted managerial 
practices in relation to employees (such as nepotism). One could 
also voice views for improved services and training courses. K. was 
a member of the Party Youth League when in secondary school and continued 
his membership when he started his working career, so that he might 
actively participate in different representative positions in the 
factory agencies. He unsuccessfully contested for the Chairmanship 
of the Party branch. 
As for S. M., a 36 year-old male machine operator in the Heat 
Treatment Section, his views on the Party and his membership in it 
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are related to the circumstances which led to his joining the Party. 
He was a Youth League member in primary school. Then he started work 
in a private textile factory owned by an "Indian". It was there that 
he joined as a full adult member in 1972, when he saw the need to 
support actively the government's call to protect the economy of the 
country. The dangers seemed especially real in that private company 
where the owner's commercial activities "might be detrimental to the 
country's economy" by any illegal transactions. Now in the public 
sector factory, he was of the view that Party membership should play 
a part in checking managerial malpractices. 
While the ordinary membership had varied views and perceptions 
concerning the role of the Party branch, the perceptions of the leader- 
ship and those of the management also showed some variations. The 
Branch Chairman saw himself and the branch Committee as a link (= 
kiungo) both between management and workers, and between workers. 
When employees had a problem or a demand to make, they would do it 
through the Party sittings or leadership. According to the Chairman, 
if an employee had a grievance, the Chairman's task was to tell the 
worker the person or official who could resolve the issue. Kamwone 
fulani (= Go and see so and so), "then come and tell me how things 
were resolved or dealt with". If the grievance was generalised, 
the leadership could take the initiative by talking to the Personnel 
Officer or the General Manager as the case might be. On the other 
hand the leadership defined as one of its tasks the encouragement of 
workers to be disciplined and to avoid laziness and increase product- 
ivity: Kazi ya uongozi wa tawi ni kuhimiza uzalishiji na utimizaji 
wa malengo (= fulfilment of targets). 
For the Branch Secretary, the task was to encourage harmony and 
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increased production at the factory, but also the Party was to be 
vigilant to ensure that decisions concerning the factory were imple- 
mented; to see to it that management did not go against the policies 
of the party (Uongozi wa kiwanda usikiuke siasa ya chama); and that 
there were no malpractices carried out by management as regards 
recruitment or sales of company products. The branch leadership 
had also the task to speak on behalf of employees vis-a-vis management 
(kuwatetea unfanyakazi). 
This view of the task of the Party was echoed by cell leaders 
in Materials Preparation, Forging and Pressing (A and B) and Heat 
Treatment. The main task of Party leadership was to defend the 
workers (kuwatetea wanyonge = to defend the weak) in the work-place. 
This view held by cell leaders corresponded to the perceptions of many 
ordinary members among the workforce. 
As far as management was concerned, the factory Party branch was 
for the proper functioning of the work-place by involving the leader- 
ship of the branch in solving conflicts that may arise at the factory 
and to mobilise and exhort workers. The Party should involve workers 
in matters affecting the factory, but they should not meddle into 
affairs that were "purely managerial". 
1 The Party branch was there 
to enhance cooperation and common endeavour among the workforce and 
with management. The important thing was to effect a good relation- 
ship between management and the Party members. 
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3 THE PARTY BRANCH: ORGANISATION AND ACTIVITIES 
a) Leadership 
The grassroots organisation of the Party at the factory consists 
of 15 Party cells which correspond to the administrative sections of 
the enterprise. Each cell has an elected cell leader. These cell 
leaders and two delegates from each of the Mass Organisations in the 
factory (Youth, Women and trade union (JUWATA)) constitute the branch 
council led by the elected Chairman and the appointed Secretary of 
the branch. 
Day to day affairs of the Party are administered by the Secretary 
of the branch who works as a full-time official. Appointed by the 
District party leadership from among four other machine operators 
(appointment of Secretaries is a general feature of CCM organisation), 
the Secretary is a long-time employee of the factory and had been 
active as a cell leader in the Forging and Pressing Section. His 
formal education is Primary level and since his appointment as Secretary 
he has attended a 6-month leadership course in Party Affairs and 
Organisation at one of the Party Zonal Colleges. His work is general 
administration of Party affairs, scheduling meetings, dealing with 
correspondence and attending meetings both within and outside the factory. 
One copy typist from the factory is attached to the Party office. 
The branch Secretary works in this office whose expenses are catered 
for in the branch budget. 
2 Salaries on the other hand, for the Party 
Secretary and Chairman are paid for by the company. This is a general 
feature of Party organisation, with national echelons run on a govern- 
ment subsidy voted for by Bunge. 
The branch Secretary works in constant consultation with the 
elected branch Chairman. The latter has an office in the 
Party offices 
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block. The post of Chairman is not a full-time job. The Chairman 
normally works as a machine operator and only comes in the office when 
there is a scheduled meeting or during the lunch break to get up to 
date with developments and be briefed by the Secretary. Factory A's 
Chairman was employed in 1970 as a machine operator. A middle-aged 
ex-Standard 8 man from one of the coastal peoples, many employees 
consider him as mzee (= an elder, wise man) for which he commands 
respect among workers. His views and counsel among the workforce 
and management are difficult to ignore. His long-time employment 
and his age were instrumental in his winning the election over a 
younger and more educated Purchasing Officer. 
The Party organisation and leadership at the factory have been 
modified from time to time. When the factory began full production 
after the period of trial production, the branch was started under 
the inspiration of the General Manager, who became the first Chairman 
of the branch; one machine operator was elected Secretary from the 
workforce, working on a part-time basis during work breaks or when 
off-duty. The branch office then consisted of a room allocated 
by management. Later Party membership contributions led to the 
building of the Party Block which houses the office of the Secretary, 
Chairman, a typist's office, a meeting room and an office for-JUWATA. 
In 1975 TAND Political Commissars were introduced in parastatal 
factories throughout Tanzania. Nominally modelled on the experience 
of several East European countries, these were officials appointed 
by Party national headquarters to act as Party branch Secretaries 
working on a full-time basis in an effort to give impetus to Party 
work-place branches in the supervision of the implementation of 
Party policies in those enterprises. This was the period when the 
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issue of "Party Supremacy" came to the forefront of national policy. 
The Political Commissars enhanced and gave structure to many Party 
activities, increased membership, and stimulated the creation of cells 
and subcommittees. The Commissar had similar status to a depart- 
mental manager, and some of the same rights. He was not an employee 
of the factory, though his pay was budgeted in the annual plans of 
the factory. The Commissar attended management meetings and took 
part in the deliberations as one of the invited members. His position 
in the factory was peculiar in that he was under the control of Party 
headquarters and reported to them; he was not under the factory 
management. On the other hand, factory management was not answerable 
to him. His main task was to organise Party programmes while being 
the Party's watchdog on what was happening in a given parastatal 
enterprise and report it to the National Party headquarters. The 
Political Commissar's role was thus controversial. The innovation 
had not "been thought out fully before" and its relation to management 
was ambiguous [interview with Msekwa]. Pressures quickly built up 
leading to its abolition in 1979. 
In Factory A as elsewhere, the post of the Political Commissar 
led to several frictions with management. The management, which believed 
in "the right to manage", were unhappy with the existence of such a 
post and often resisted suggestions by the Commissar. In one incident, 
the Commissar spoke against the granting of a twelve thousand shilling 
loan to an employee of the factory as that was against SCOPO regulations. 
Several managers stood out against the objection and even intimated 
that the Commissar was simply jealous! They proceeded to grant the 
loan. Other members of the Party branch Council did not, it appears, 
support the Commissar. On another occasion the Commissar queried 
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the loss of 136,000 shs. of company property but no answer was forth- 
coming from management on the grounds that this was "confidential". 
[CCM Branch Council Minutes of 10/9/77]. 
A particular source of conflict in Factory A was the inexperience 
of the Commissar, which sometimes led him act as an alternative 
Personnel Officer in matters related with work discipline, including 
writing warning letters to workers for indiscipline or bad conduct. 
This--was naturally seen as interfering with the work of the Manpower 
and Personnel Office and was resisted by management. While the 
incumbent's inexperience, combined with the lack of clear definition 
of the Commissar's position, contributed to tensions with management, 
the deeper reason for the conflict lay with the management's basic 
antipathy towards "this interference" with their work. In factories 
in other parts of Tanzania where the author gathered data, the results 
of the Political Commissars episode were more dramatic than they were 
in Factory A. 
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In 1979 the present structural organisation was created, reverting 
to the system of a Party secretary chosen from the work-place's own 
employees. The post remained an appointed one, incumbents being nominated 
by the higher echelons of the Party. 
b) The Cell System 
As we have noted, the grassroots sections of the Party organisation 
in Factory A were the 15 cells which corresponded to the administrative 
units of the enterprise. Formally, cells were supposed to meet once 
a month to discuss issues relating to their sections [Section III, 
26 (1) of Katiba ya CCM (Constitution) 1982]. But this was not strictly 
adhered to and cells met irregularly, as Table 5.1 indicates. 
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Table 5.1 
Party Cell Meetings in Factory 'A', 1978-80 
Section Numbers of Meetings 
1978 1979 1980 
Materials Preparation 
Forging & Pressing A 
Grinding & Polishing 
Heat Treatment, Laboratory 
& Design 
Lathe & Bench 
Oil Painting 
Bohari/Stores 
Repairs 
Accounts 
Administration & Personnel 
Forging & Pressing B 
Kariakoo Shop 
Design (1980 only) 
2 1 1 
2 4 4 
6 3 4 
4 1 2 
5 3 3 
6 3 3 
1 0 6 
4 3 2 
2 3 3 
3 3 4 
4 4 5 
3 2 2 
- - 2 
Source: Annual Reports of Branch Activities for 1978-1980; Minutes 
of Party Meetings. 
The frequency of the meetings depended on the respective cell 
leader. Cells which met comparatively often, for example, the Forging 
and Pressing Sections A and B, were often simply those with active 
leaders. In some of the sections which did poorly, such as the 
Accounts cell, there was a long vacancy for the post of cell leader. 
Elsewlere there was apathy when the meetings did not always produce 
the results desired. or when the same things were always voiced. 
Cell meetings are designed to bring together a section of the 
workforce to discuss matters arising in their work-place. The meeting 
is open to all workers including non-members and differs little, if 
at all, from a section meeting or work meeting except that it is 
chaired by the cell leader. Every employee is welcome to participate 
in the forum without distinctions. There is no membership control 
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except for candidates. The departmental Manager usually attends or 
otherwise someone who can answer questions on his behalf. 
Issues dealt with-An the cell meetings include questions of Party 
membership, payment of fees and attendance in meetings. These are 
raised by the cell leader, who does not have many sanctions when workers 
do not come to the meetings. Personnel affairs and services linked 
to conditions of work are constant matters raised in cell meetings. 
Matters relating to production and work discipline are favourite issues 
raised by supervisors and management. Members of the rank and file 
workforce often raise matters relating to social services, while 
departmental heads take the occasion to raise problems concerning work 
discipline and the necessity to increase productivity by working hard. 
In other words, the cell has no one specific function but is perceived 
and used differently by the various participants. 
To illustrate some of these issues let us take some extracts from 
the minutes of meetings of the cells of Forging and Pressing A and 
Forging and Pressing B from the end of 1977 to the end of 1980. Similar 
views were expressed by employees in interviews generally. 
The issues discussed during the cell meeting of 13/12/77 were: 
a) The problem of lack of morning transport: the person responsible 
should be on time since some people started work at seven. 
b) Issues concerning food and the way it was served: workers complained 
about the procedure for serving tea in the morning; there were too 
many delays. Furthermore, the food in the evening was not enough 
and some people missed their shares. 
c) On availability of components: Workmen: were reminded that the problems 
concerning the shortage of dies were well known; workers nevertheless 
were encouraged to work hard. 
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d) Late payment of dues: A letter from the branch Secretary was read 
reminding nine workers who had not paid their party contributions to 
do so. 
The meeting held on 4/2/78 discussed: 
a) Working conditions: Machine operators raised the question of work 
uniforms, gloves and boots and petitioned that those concerned should 
supply them when required. 
b) An issue of work safety: Where switching of "single point machine" 
is done by hand instead of foot workers considered this risky; the 
technician in charge promised to look into the matter. 
c) The issue of shortage of evening food raised again: Demands were 
made that it be increased; the problem of the procedures of serving 
tea was also not yet resolved, according to the machine operators. 
d) Productivity: There was general consensus that there should be 
better cooperation between workers in this section and those in the 
Repairs Section and the Lathe and Bench Section in order to increase 
productivity. Workers agreed that they would increase their efforts 
and stop being late or slovenly at work. 
When the cell met five months later on 10/7/78 members were again 
admonished to value cell meetings and not miss them. The question 
of uniform and boots was raised by machine operators. The section 
head informed the meeting that the necessary items of uniform had not 
been available in the market for some time, but from now on things 
would be alright. As for the work boots the meeting was informed 
that some workmen had got their share and further supplies were being 
awaited for from Arusha. The question of transport was discussed 
again: machine operators complained that the driver passed too early, 
before scheduled time, leaving many workmen behind. Health services 
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were discussed: workmen petitioned for the restoration of the former 
system of medical examination every six months. The meeting concluded 
with a reminder from the cell leader about payment of Party contributions. 
The cell meeting of 6/12/78 discussed the Annual Report prepared 
by the branch, and congratulated the branch leadership for preparing 
such a report for the first time. The meeting agreed that anyone 
involved in theft should be dealt with. The session agreed with the 
suggestion of the Technical Manager to break the second shift and move 
some workers to the Grinding, Heat Treatment and Oil Painting Sections 
in order to increase production and reach the plant's targets. Members 
who had not paid their fees were reminded that at the end of the year 
they would have to reapply for membership if they did not pay their 
arrears. 
The session which was held on 10/4/79 was attended by all members 
and workers from the section. This meeting was informed by the Technical 
Manager that materials for uniforms were now available. Machine 
operators suggested they be served with ugali (= maize meal) instead 
of the potatoes they were being given since rice was in short supply: 
potatoes made too light a meal for men. doing hard work. Members 
were again reminded to pay their Party dues. 
On 16/8/79, the cell-met and was informed that arrangements for 
medical checks and treatment were being made. Some machine operators 
complained that they had no work boots, and the Sectional Manager 
informed them that the popular sizes (No. 8) were not available in 
sufficient numbers. The cell leader and a technician urged workers 
to work harder in production as the country had just ended a war (in 
Uganda). The meeting was also informed of the procedure for distrib- 
uting basic items such as cooking oil, khanga dress materials and sugar. 
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The 19/11/79 meeting reveals asimilar pattern of types of issues 
discussed and style of interaction. Once again cell members were 
urged to pay their Party fees. Due to the long breakdown of one machine 
the section would not reach its output target of 80,000 hoes, and so 
workers were urged to work harder. It was suggested that they even 
work overtime on Sundays. The cell leader and section head were asked 
to present these suggestions to the relevant authority. Washing soap 
for uniforms was not being issued as it was hardly available. 
During 1980, the cell of Forging and Pressing A had a total of 
four meetings, in April, June, July'and December. Both the issues 
and the style remained very much as they had been during the previous 
two years. In each meeting there were new petititions, old demands 
which were now being met, and new appeals for greater effort in 
production. 
To sum up, the Party cell through its meetings and leadership 
functioned as a forum for members of the workforce. Within the work 
section it served as a medium of information as well as a platform 
for workmen to air their views, present their petitions on working 
conditions, iron out small disputes and query certain managerial practices. 
For management it was a useful vehicle for efforts to maintain work 
discipline: a means of increasing production through group discipline. 
Giving workers an outlet for minor grievances helped to maintain a 
cooperative atmosphere in the factory, without compromising in any 
way the responsibility and decision-making authority of the section 
head. Much the same was the case of the Party cells in Factory B. 
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c) The Branch and Branch Council 
To some extent, the role of the cell at the section level is 
reproduced in the role of the branch leadership at the level of the 
whole enterprise. The branch through its periodic meetings is 
supposed to make the presence of the Party felt. Apart from urging 
for the payment of membership fees and so forth, the Branch leadership 
organises general meetings for the whole workforce which bring together 
issues touching the employees both as employees and as citizens of 
the country. 
When the Party branch opened in the early days of Factory A, the 
Party general meetings was the most common type of Party meeting. 
This was before the coming of the Political Commissar and before the 
creation of cells in different sections of the factory. The general 
meeting would be called by the Secretary in consultation with the 
General Manager, who was the first Chairman of the branch, whenever 
there was an important issue to be announced to the employees or when 
a political personality visited the factory. With the coming of the 
Commissar and the creation of CCM in 1977, the public general meeting 
became a once-a-year affair. According to the CCM constitution 
[ CCtii, 1982, paragraph 30(5)] a general meeting is supposed to be 
held once a year and all members of the branch are supposed to attend. 
In Factory A, given the size of the attendance at these meetings, 
the issues to be dealt with could only be of a general nature. When 
interviewed on whether they attended meetings and what was discussed, 
employees invariably responded that issues discussed concerned the 
payment of membership fees and contributions, increasing work effort, 
combating negligence or matters concerning those in the militia who 
were either on training or on guard duty either at the factory or other 
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parts of the town. Alternatively, meetings were organised when a 
political personality came to visit the factory and address the workers 
(e. g. a Member of Parliament, a member of N. E. C. or a Minister). 
The minutes of Party General Meetings were not so well kept as 
those of the cells and the Party Branch Council. This 
was no doubt due to their being held once a year. I was, however, 
able to read a summary of three General Meetings. Two were Annual 
General Meetings of the factory (1980 and 1981) and another was an 
Ordinary General Meeting (in September 1981) on the occasion of a visit 
by the local Member of Parliament. 
In the latter meeting, which had been called at a rather short 
notice during work time, there were 263 attending and 183 absent from 
the meeting. The Chairman introduced the M. P. who had come to get 
to know his constituents and talk about ways to tackle the severe 
economic crisis. The M. P. talked at length about the problems then 
facing the country: floods in some places, drought in other parts, 
the collapse of the East African community and the consequent need 
to finance some services on own costs instead of sharing with other 
countries. The country was facing severe foreign exchange shortages 
as it spent 60% of its foreign exchange earnings on oil whose price 
had increased. The prices of manufactured goods had also risen. 
This was leading to shortages of consumer items. 
The M. P. urged workers to increase production and to be especially 
careful with machinery and raw materials. He also urged the management 
and the Party branch leadership to cooperate and look for common 
solutions. Then followed some questions from employees. What plans 
were at hand for improving industrial production by government? (This 
was being studied). What was government doing to stop racketeering? 
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(The M. P. responded that the Central Committee had called on Party 
members not to buy or sell goods at hiked prices). There was concern 
about water shortages due to cuts in the District. The M. P. said 
this was due to the age of the pumps and scarcity of spares. The 
meeting ended with the Chairman exhorting members to take to heart 
and go and practice what had been said by the M. P. 
Efforts of inculcating the "ideology" of the political leadership 
were clearly evident during this meeting. In another illustrative 
example, the Annual General Meeting of 7 February 1981 consisted mainly 
of a report of the annual activities of the branch. Members were 
urged to attend meetings in their cells more regularly, and JUWATA 
was urged to hold meetings for workers. It was resolved to increase 
production for the year and fulfil targets. The General Manager then 
addressed the meeting. He informed them that a bus had been bought 
by the factory to transport workers. He went on to urge everyone to 
do their best, to avoid slovenliness and reach their production targets: 
the Party leadership should help in that endeavour. The Manager also 
informed members that the factory's club which had just opened that 
month would help raise money to build houses for workers. The Chairman 
closed the meeting urging all to take into account what had been said 
and inviting non-members to join the Party and work together. 
In Factory B, General Meetings used to take place, but given the 
size of the factory they became organisationally impractical. Another 
factor that may have contributed to their demise is that with the 
expansion of the factory some of the General Meetings had deteriorated 
into a near-"riot". During one General Meeting machine operators 
persistently enquired (i. e. complained) about goings on in the factory 
cooperative shop which they felt was being "misused" to enrich some 
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individuals from the factory through illegal sales of factory products. 
Between General Meetings or in their absence, the Party organ 
concerned with factory-wide matters was the Branch Council or Committee. 
According to the Party Constitution [CQ1,1982] 
consists of the Chairman, the Secretary, ten members elected by the 
Branch General Meeting and two delegates from each of the Mass 
Organisations of the Party (Youth, Women, Trade Union, Elders and 
Cooperative Union). In practice in Factory A the Council had 25 
members, the elected cell leaders (15) from each section and two rep- 
resentatives each from all the Mass Organisations except the Elders, 
with the Chairman and Secretary completing the number. 
The Council was divided into several subcommittees, the most 
"powerful" of which was the Political Committee. In this factory 
it consisted of the Chairman, the Secretary, the JUWATA Branch Chairman, 
two technicians, a senior artisan and a senior production engineer, 
the last sometimes serving as Chairman in the absence of the Chairman. 
The Party leadership in this factory had some similarities with 
those in Factory B. In both the initial years when the General Managers 
in both factories were also Chairmen of the Party branches, now the 
leadership tended to be drawn from the production sections among the 
longer serving employees. In Factory B, the elected Chairman of the 
branch was the Production Manager, who took over from a electrician 
who had been preceded by an elderly foreman. In Factory A, though 
the Party leaders were designated as machine operators, they were group 
leaders in their sections. (In other factories visited during our 
exploratory research, I found that the group of manual workers and 
messengers who tended to be in the leadership positions initially was 
now being replaced by long-serving technicians or artisans, some of 
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whom were in supervisory positions). 
The activities of the Branch Council in relation to factory life 
included both its own (and its Political Committee's) meetings, 
and the participation of the Chairman and the Secretary in the various 
meetings of other committees or bodies at the factory (the Appointments 
Committee, the Workers' Council, the Workers' Education Committee and 
the weekly Planning Committee), as well as in approaches to management. 
A reading of the minutes of the Party Branch Council in Factory 
A was carried out to see what issues were discussed and what activities 
the Party branch was involved in. These may be grouped into two: 
a) "Specifically Party Affairs". These related to issues like reminding 
members of payment of contributions; organising the recruitment and 
political education of new members; organising recruitment and training 
of the People's Militia with other work-places under the coordination 
of the District Party headquarters; interviewing those aspiring to 
Party and-union posts; and organising meetings in the general sphere 
of raising social awareness. 
b) Matters related to the personnel and work at the factory. These 
included "unbecoming" conduct by workers, such as absenteeism, thefts, 
and lack of performance of duties. The Party leadership would, for 
example, send letters to the more subordinate staff who were in need 
of correction. Other such matters related to workers' demands and 
petitions which would be forwarded to management and which were of 
very much the same kind as those recurring in the cell meetings: 
questions about overtime, transport, canteen services, delays in payments 
of monthly wages, availability of loans, and settlement of conflicts 
in an amicable manner. In these activities the Party branch leadership 
played an important social role in the factory. 
235 
It was through its participation in other bodies that the Party 
branch leadership got involved more directly in issues related to the 
work of the factory. But as has already been-discussed in relation 
to the Workers' Council, and as will be illustrated by our review of 
selected issues and episodes in Chapter 6, this involvement marked 
a change without however transforming in any fundamental way the 
relations between management and workers. 
4 TRADE UNIONISM IN FACTORY A 
Trade union organisation in Factory A has taken different forms 
but is as old as the factory itself. The first form of union organ- 
isation was the Workers' Committee which was established in 1970 under 
the encouragement of the General Manager and the Personnel Officer, 
both former trade unionists, and in line with government labour 
regulations requiring the creation of a Workers' Committee as the only 
legal avenue through which workers might present their grievances and 
demands to management. Since this was a parastatal enterprise and 
recently commissioned, members of the workforce were "encouraged" to 
be NUTA members. As the factory expanded new recruits among the work- 
force were deemed to be members of NUTA, through the "closed-shop" 
practice - which stipulated that when 50% of employees were members, 
the rest of the workforce could be considered as NUTA members. Deductions 
were made monthly from their pay through the "check-off system" to 
meet their union dues. 
From among these early members, a Workers' Committee consisting 
of machine operators and a messenger was constituted, working closely 
with the Personnel Officer. Since the 1964 legislation setting up 
NUTA as one, national and centralised union, all categories of workers 
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belonged to NUTA, but leadership in the Workers' Committees 
could be drawn only from the lower, rank and file wage earners. - those 
receiving a wage of less than 701/- T. sh. a month. The Security of 
Employment (Amendment) Act No. 45 of 1969, however, made the Workers' 
Committee open to administrative staff and clerks receiving a salary 
of less than 701/= T. sh. a month. The Workers' Committee leadership 
in Factory A, nevertheless, continued to be drawn mainly from machine 
operators and messengers. 
The 1975 Labour Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 1, abolished 
the Workers' Committees and created NUTA work-place branches in their 
place, opening up leadership positions in factories and work-places 
to all employees. This led to the election to union leadership 
positions in Factory A of some members of the administrative staff: 
a quality controller in the production section, a cost accountant and 
a marketing officer. 
When in 1977 the trade union became one of the Mass Organisations 
of the Party, changing its name to JUWATA, this did not make any practical 
differences in terms of membership. By making the union a department 
of the Party organisation, all employees became ipso facto members 
of JUWATA. In that way any workers' organisation and activity would 
ultimately be controlled by the political leadership. In Factory 
A this was the case already and union dues were already being deducted 
- 3/= T. sh. for those with monthly pay below 701/= T. sh. and 5/= T. sh. 
for those with more than 701/= T. sh. Factory A thus had a union branch 
to which all employees (from the General Manager to the machine operators) 
belonged. 
All union leadership positions in the enterprise were elective 
under the Party guidelines which also stipulated that candidates for 
237 
JUWATA posts had to have been members of CCM for at least five years 
and shown themselves to be disciplined workers. Aspirants were vetted 
by the Party Branch Political Committee. Then the list of candidates 
was approved by the District Party Political Committee for polling 
by all employees. 
On September 29,1978, elections for JUWATA leadership positions 
were held at the factory. Polling was carried out during a public 
meeting, and a JUWATA Committee of 15 was eventually elected. This 
consisted of the Chairman of JUWATA, the Union Secretary and one 
committee member from each department of the enterprise [Taarifa ya 
Halmashauri ya Tawi JUWATA]. 
To the chair of JUWATA (considered a relatively important post) 
was elected a machine operator who was a long-serving employee of the 
enterprise (employed there since 1970) and who had been an active 
member in the NUTA Committee. He was regarded as a fair and reasonable 
person who could be trusted to present workers' grievances and speak 
in their defence to management. 
To the other important post, the Secretaryship of the JUWATA, 
was elected a fitter and turner who also had been in the factory since 
1970. The other members of the Committee were: -a twenty-eight year- 
old senior artisan, employed at the factory since 1977 in the Heat 
Treatment Section; -a 34 year-old blacksmith with work experience 
at the factory since 1969 in the Heat Treatment Section and now a 
supervisor and group leader; -a thirty-two year-old technician grade 
II who had worked at the enterprise since 1969 and was now a super- 
visor; -a twenty-nine year-old senior artisan and blacksmith in the 
Design and Testing Section; -a thirty-two year-old technician with 
nine years at the factory, a group leader and supervisor in the Oil 
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Painting Section; -a male machine operator in the Forging and Pressing 
Sections who had been in the factory since 1974; -a male quality 
control assistant who had been at the factory since 1969; -a male 
machine operator, being trained to be a quality control assistant, 
on the job since 1971. 
Elected to the union leadership positions, then, are long-service 
employees in their thirties or older. Apart from the Chairman and 
another committeeman who were machine operators, other members of the 
union branch leadership were elected among artisans and/or technicians, 
usually employees with supervisory or leadership duties in the work- 
place. Such people would have been preferred because their potential 
as leaders would already have been seen by the workers. They could 
be counted on not to be timid in front of management. 
The JUWATA Branch Council/Committee in the factory formed three 
sub-committees to deal with specific aspects of the union's work. 
These were Discipline and Economy, Defence and Security, and Education 
and Culture. The Chairman of the branch also headed the most important 
and active sub-committee, that of Discipline and Economy, which dealt 
with personnel issues including disciplinary matters (sanctions, 
dismissals, conciliation services). and employees' pay and fringe benefits. 
The Secretary chaired the sub-committee on Defence and Security, which 
dealt with protection of company property and safety at work. The 
34 year-old supervisor-blacksmith chaired the sub-committee of Education 
and Culture. 
The leadership of the union at the factory has been dogged by 
instability. Several of the Council members elected in 1978 had left 
the factory by the end of the year. They included the Secretary, 
who resigned, two others who left work of their own accord and another 
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two who were dismissed for "personal mistakes". This adversely 
affected the activities of the union branch. During the whole of 
1979, for example, there were no meetings for all employees organised 
by JUWATA. This prompted the General Manager on 2 January, 1980, 
to call in a delegation of three union leaders. He exhorted them 
to arrange general meetings for all workers at least once every four 
months, and he suggested that the union Council should meet at least 
once a month. 
Meetings of the union Council remained irregular and not always 
marked by successful deliberations. For example, the minutes of 
the 17/12/81 meeting which discussed the schedule of activities for 
1982 was marked by disagreements, with complaints that Council members 
were not active in attending meetings and that CCM was not very helpful 
in filling the posts of those who had left. The meeting ended abruptly 
without agreement and with recriminations. 
Despite these shortcomings the union was active through its sub- 
committee of Economy and Discipline, and through the Chairman who was 
a member of other enterprise committees and bodies. 
As far as the National political leadership is concerned, the 
function of the JUWATA branch is as spelt out in the JUWATA regulations: 
a) to foster improvement in work performance; 
b) to supervise and insure the implementation of workers' 
education programmes; 
c) to see to it that employers and employees reach production 
targets and protect the country's economy; 
d) to strengthen JUWATA at the work-place, and hence the 
unity among the workforce; and 
e) to enhance cooperation among employees and between employees 
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and between employees and management (own translation of 
Kanuni za Jumuiya ya Umoja wa Wafanyakazi wa Tanzania, 
Sehemu ya Tatu, 15). [JUWATA Regulates, n. d. ]. 
These regulations or procedures of JUWATA were approved by the 
National Executive Committee of CCM. Similar views on the role of 
JUWATA branches are discernible in speeches by the political leadership. 
On January 28,1980, in a speech at a symposium on the Role of Workers 
in the Construction of Ujamaa held at the University of Dar es Salaam, 
R. M. Kawawa, a member of the CCM's National sub-committee on party 
affairs, spelt out some of the functions of JUWATA in work-places. 
These included, he said, workers' education, the running of workers' 
shops and canteens, and kindergartens for working mothers. He added 
that unlike NUTA, JUWATA was a part of CCM. Opening a seminar in 
December 1982 on Party branches in the Ilala District of Dar es Salaam, 
Kawawa, now the Party Secretary-General, reiterated the need for Party 
branches and JUWATA to put into effect those tasks[Mzalendo, 12 December 
1982, p. 3]. 
Some of the above definitions and perceptions on the role of union 
branches were echoed by members of management in Factory A. During 
his meeting with JUWATA officials of 2/1/80, the General Manager called 
upon the JUWATA branch leadership to educate workers to have disciplined 
conduct, to establish good relations among employees and to maintain 
good relations between workers and management. Similar views were 
expressed by the Manpower Development and Administrative Manager who 
saw the union's role as a way to involve workers in the affairs of 
the enterprise "except for those which were purely managerial" [interview, 
January 1983]. adding further that union leaders and Party leaders at 
the factory were fully involved in the affairs of the enterprise. 
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The JUWATA leadership for its part, saw itself as the "link 
between the employer and the employees" [Minutes of JUWATA branch 
meeting of 29/9/78]. The union's task as seen by them consisted 
in uniting all workers for the day to day affairs of the work-place 
in order to enhance cooperation and instill discipline and work 
enthusiasm. This aspect of being the channel or link between employer 
and employee was stressed in the above-mentioned branch meeting of 
1978. The Committee wanted this understood by every worker. 
In an interview with the Chairman of JUWATA a second definition 
emerged of the role of JUWATA branch, as a tool to protect the rights 
and material interests of employees [interview, January 1983]. The 
latter was certainly the more pervasive definition of the task of the 
JUWATA factory branch held by workers, as was evidenced by the 
employees interviewed. Asked what the union branch leadership's task 
was, they responded with: to deal with problems of workers and speak 
for their interests; to be the workers' spokesman and encourage work 
performance; to protect employees from victimisation; to reconcile 
any conflict between management and workers; to facilitate loans or 
advance payments; or to ask pardon when real mistakes have been made 
by workers. Such perceptions of the tasks of JUWATA branches were 
the prevailing ones among workers in the plant sections. (Similar 
views were often expressed concerning the Party branch, whose functions 
were often confused with those of the union. ) 
The fact that there had been no General Meetings held by JUWATA 
since 1978 did not raise particular concern among the rank and file 
union members. The employees had become members of the union, in 
many cases, on being employed at the factory; and as it was the only 
union, being a member of JUWATA was one of those things linked to being 
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employed and when one had difficulties in the work situation. . -The 
Committee itself had irregular meetings and had to be encouraged to 
meet by management. This did not, however, prevent the JUWATA leader- 
ship from being involved in factory affairs through membership in the 
different factory committees and through dealing with conciliation, 
settlement of disputes and intervention against unwarranted punishments 
and/or dismissals. The latter took up the greater part of the JUWATA 
leadership's time. Moreover, since the Party branch was active in 
presenting grievances and demands as well as holding general meetings 
for employees additional meetings called by JUWATA would have been 
seen as duplication. 
The usual form of communication between union and employees was 
more on an informal basis; either individual workers suggested issues 
to the JUWATA leadership or, since the committeemen worked in the 
different sections, they became aware of some of the complaints of 
employees which they could then voice in the factory committees. 
Similarly, in the absence of any regular JUWATA meetings, issues 
discussed with management were informally communicated back to the 
workers by the JUWATA leadership. Much hinged around the "militancy" 
of the leadership - something which was shown more by the 
Chairman 
and two of the committeemen than by other leaders. 
When the union leadership met it was usually to present petitions 
or voice complaints. Some meetings were held with members from 
management (either the General Manager or the Manpower and Admini- 
strative Manager, or the Personnel Officer), with the latter as invited 
participants who would answer questions raised or promise "to look 
into the matter" and report back to the union leadership. At other 
times the union held meetings alone, and then sent the issues to 
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management. 
A number of issues were covered during such meetings, as the 
minutes of meetings show. During the union Council meeting of 2/1/80, 
for example, complaints were brought by security guards concerning 
their section head who allegedly did not listen to their problems: 
that he did not accept excuses from work due to sickness; that he 
was inflexible in arranging the guard roster and did not listen to 
anybody's advice; that he was not circumspect and told off his juniors 
publicly; and so on. The union Council in the presence of the 
Personnel Officer agreed that the Chief Guard should be advised to 
mend his ways and that he should be instructed in leadership practices. 
The 21/1/80 union Council meeting discussed services at the 
factory, especially soap, canteen services, workers' education and 
transport. Members also raised concern that they were not involved 
in planning for the Tenth Anniversary of the factory. As a follow- 
up, on 28/2/80 the Council was informed that soap would be available 
and that soap arrears would be paid in money; that a workers' 
education officer would be employed full-time to deal with raising 
workers' education; that a bus would be available for the evening 
shift; and that attention was being given to the fringe benefits 
(milk) for those in the Heat and Grinding Sections. 
Other issues discussed at these meetings were: concern about 
the misuse of company cars (the head driver and Manpower and Management 
Officer would be invited to dicuss the issue); lack of transport 
leading many to arrive late for work (8/7/80); complaints that some 
of the leaders in the company did not value JUWATA delegates; complaints 
that the work performance of the Accounts Office was resulting in 
delays in payment of loans or wages (17/10/80); discussion of the 
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President's speech on the need for increased discipline and to combat 
late arrival for work (13/11/80); and delays in purchases of materials 
for the factory. 
The scope of these petitions and the way they were handled is 
illustrated by the meeting of 22/7/80, which was attended by the 
General Manager and the Manpower and Administrative Manager. JUWATA 
had five items on the agenda for this meeting which they had earlier 
prepared on 18/7/80. These were: 
1. The termination of JUWATA's participation in interviewing 
prospective employees. 
2. Management's failure to inform appropriate bodies of those 
elected for further training in the country or abroad. 
3. Lack of a Chief Security Officer in the factory. 
4. Workers' transfers to sections not relevant to their training 
or skills. 
5. Workers' evening transport. 
In answer to the complaints, management responded by saying that it 
had been management's decision to involve JUWATA in the interviews 
of prospective employees and it had been management's decision not 
to include JUWATA for they did not have the technical knowhow to 
select the best applicants. Management argued that it would be better 
to include heads of relevant sections in the interview, and that since 
JUWATA leaders were elected, one tended to have different persons for 
the committee, leading to lack of continuity. Branch leaders were 
in any case in the Appointment's Committee and in the Workers' Council 
and so they could have their voices heard. 
On the question of education programmes and involving JUWATA in 
selection for training, no committee had been constituted yet, but 
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plans were in hand and the General Manager promised to follow the matter 
up. On transfers, management argued that they were responsible for 
all personnel so there was no need to consult with JUWATA. If there 
was a need and if it was deemed important they would do so. But this 
remained within managerial competence. On transport, the General 
Manager explained that the company did not have enough vehicles and 
they were waiting to buy a company bus. The Personnel Officer added 
that in the six months of 1980 there were only two workers who had 
been warned for coming late to work. 
JUWATA petitioned management to send abroad some of the lower 
paid employees so that they might also be motivated to work hard. 
They also asked management to improve payment procedures, as workers 
were taking a long time and having difficulties in getting their wages. 
Management were also asked to follow up the conduct of several typists 
and office attendants whose work performance was wanting. The meeting 
ended with a call for love and cooperation between JUWATA and management 
over their joint decisions [Minutes of meeting]. 
This meeting illustrates how the union leadership related to 
management. The branch remained a platform for grievance and petition 
presentation by workers and a channel of information by management 
to workers without interfering with management's right to decision- 
making. On questions of recruitment or training, management retained 
its power to choose candidates. On questions related to improving 
services such as the issues of a regular supply of uniforms, facilitating 
payments of loans, and canteen or medical service improvements, the 
union was more successful in obtaining results. By the same token 
it objectively was playing the role of Assistant Personnel Officer 
by informing workers of management's decisions and thus reducing any 
i 
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potential for friction through lack of communication. 
As we shall see more fully in the next chapter, the domination 
of management is mitigated in issues dealing with discipline and 
sanctions against workers. A great part of the union leadership's 
activities in the factory was involved with conciliation and settling 
of disputes following alleged infringements of the disciplinary code. 
This was done by the JUWATA Subcommittee of Discipline and Economy 
chaired by JUWATA Chairman. Infringements of work discipline at the 
factory ranged from arriving late at work to absenteeism, thefts, 
drunkeness, failure to reach daily work quotas and bad behaviour. 
Appropriate sanctions for each type of breach of work discipline 
are enumerated in the Appendix to the Security of Employment Act of 
1964. These range from a warning to a severe warning, fine or dismissal. 
In Factory A, minor infringements and warnings were usually (according 
to the JUWATA Chairman and the Personnel Officer) dealt with on the 
shop floor. The foreman would talk to the concerned worker in the 
foreman's office in the presence of the supervisor and/or the JUWATA 
Departmental Representative. In the major or more serious cases, 
however, especially those involving serious warnings, fines or 
dismissals, the Personnel Office would be informed by the departmental 
head, thus putting into motion the conciliation/sanction machinery. 
The Personnel Office on behalf of the employer filled in what is known 
as Form 1 giving notice to the worker of the infringement of work 
discipline and the sort of sanction envisaged. A copy of the form 
would be sent to the union branch which would indicate whether it 
intended to defend the worker or not. 
Getting a form from the Personnel Office was considered by workers 
as serious. This would affect one's job and jeopardise one's job 
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security, especially if the form involved a sanction or serious 
warning, a warning with a fine or dismissal. These touched either 
on one's job security or one's pay at the end of the month. Those 
served with such notices usually saw their JUWATA Departmental 
Representative or the JUWATA Chairman. Despite the general lack of 
interest in JUWATA public meetings among workers, the question of 
protecting one's job was very important and so recourse to the union 
branch when one's job was in danger was prompt. The JUWATA leader- 
ship in its turn was keen to come to the help of affected workmen 
[Summary of notices of intended sanctions issued to workers by the 
Personnel Office and reactions of the JUWATA branch from January 1982 
to January 1983]. 
In the cases involving imminent dismissal or serious warning the 
union responded by seeking arbitration. In cases in which the intended 
sanction would not seriously affect the worker's job, the union would 
accept the discipline after checking informally with the worker and 
if the worker did not raise objections. Some of the cases involved 
workers being absent from work for four consecutive days without 
informing management. Even so, the union still insisted on checking 
the whereabouts of the workers before final action was taken by manage- 
ment. Contrary to suggestions that unions were tools of management, 
the union branch did play a defensive role, prompting management on 
occasion to tell the leadership that they were not there to protect 
indisciplined workers. 
The union leadership was involved in two types of arbitration 
concerning breaches of the work code. The first was the factory-level 
arbitration in which cases for conciliation were considered every 
Tuesday. The Personnel Officer and his assistant would sit down with 
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the union sub-committee on Discipline (usually the JUWATA Chairman 
and the sectional representative) as arbitrators. Evidence would 
be sought from, for example, the time keeper (for absenteeism or 
being late for work) or the foreman and other witnesses for issues 
at the shop floor. The arbitration would be arrived at by consensus 
between the union representative and the Personnel Officers. 
This happened for example in the case of one machine operator 
in December 1982, who had been given notice of dismissal for not 
completing work targets several times and for absenting himself from 
work. Evidence was given by his supervisor and fellow group workers 
showing which days he had not reached the required work targets; they 
described his constant complaints that his wage was not sufficient, 
his late arrivals, his neglect of work instructions and his frequent 
absence from the job (which meant that his fellow workers could not 
function, as they were working in a line of production). The Technical 
Manager had sent a memo to the Administrative Manager advising dismissal 
on those grounds. This was also discussed. For purposes of justice, 
the JUWATA Chairman said, the union leadership had insisted on arbi- 
tration, though the case was clearly one deserving dismissal. This 
was to avoid victimization or future complaints from the worker or 
from the Party branch leadership that the union leadership was not 
doing its work properly. The final decision was taken to dismiss 
the machine operator. 
The second type of arbitration was the more formal one involving 
recourse to the legal procedures of a trade dispute settlement under 
the provisions of the Permanent Labour Tribunal Act of 1967. This 
arbitration was sent to the District Labour Office where a Conciliation 
Board sits with the District Labour Officer (or one of his deputies) 
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as Chairman. Other members are from industry: the factory Personnel 
Officer and JUWATA Chairman, the District JUWATA Chairman, and a 
Personnel Officer from a related enterprise. The concerned worker 
is a witness. 
One discrepancy in the whole arbitration system was that though 
the union was the body entitled to raise the matter on behalf of the 
workman, in practice the JUWATA representatives became arbitrators 
with management. This, according to the JUWATA Chairman, ensured 
that their voice was heard. Another paradox was that the union was 
unlikely to make an industrial dispute out of one affected worker unless 
a number were touched by a case, -in which case it would be forwarded 
to the Labour Tribunal. In this factory no cases ever reached that 
far. All were resolved by factory or District level arbitration whose 
decisions could not be reviewed in ordinary courts. 
Despite those limitations, the active involvement of the union 
as spokesman of the workmen did on the whole make managment in Factory 
A cautious about victimization and arbitrary sanctions or the "impetuous 
actions" which used to be the case in private employment. The following 
chapter, which includes a broader view of the way work-place organisation 
affect the issue of job security in our two factories, tends to confirm 
this conclusion. 
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Footnotes 
1. This view was not only found in Factory A. In another factory, 
visited during the "exploratory research" in Tanga, one General 
Manager expressed the view that the workers and the Party branch 
leadership should not interfere with "managerial" issues: 
Wasiingie jikoni (lit. they should not enter the kitchen i. e. 
be cooks). There would be discussions in which Party branch 
leaders would participate, but after that the Manager becomes 
mnyampara (= the boss). 
2. The Factory Branch Estimates of Income and Expenditure can be 
gleaned from the following Budget Estimates of the branch for the 
year 1978: 
Income 
- Membership fees: 1250 sh. 
- Contributions by the factory football team: 1600 sh. (contribution 
for strengthening Party branch through matches) 
- Voluntary contributions by members: 500 sh. 
TOTAL: 3350 sh. 
Expenditure 
- Salaries for Typist, Messenger, Driver, Assistant Secretary and 
Secretary: 65,900 sh. 
- Car transport: 15,000 sh. 
- Allowances (for Party delegates attending meetings outside factory: 
1700 sh. 
- For Seminars in factory: 1600 sh. 
- Filing Cabinets: 
2 Fans 
Cupboard 
Small fridge 
Electric kettle 
Office chairs 
Table & 35 chairs 
2000 sh. 
2000 sh. 
8000 sh. 
2000 sh. 
500 sh. 
2000 sh. 
3500 sh. 
Safari (= transport) for outside factory: 5000 
To welcome visitors (= entertainment) 3000 sh. 
Contingencies 5000 sh. 
sh. 
This total of 117,200 sh. would be included in the total annual plan 
of the factory [Source: Party Branch Council Agenda of 5/11/77]. 
3.. The case of the Tanzania Fertiliser factory in Tanga is an instance 
that could be cited here and on which I collected first-hand 
information. Since the story is worth telling at some length, it 
has been included as an Appendix III. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION: 
ISSUES AND EPISODES 
The last two chapters have focused attention on the history and 
organisation of the main work-place agencies - the Workers' Council, 
union and Party - including the way employees relate to those agencies 
in our case-study enterprises. In this chapter we take a closer 
look at some key issues in the life of these factories. How these 
issues were confronted and resolved throws further light on the relations 
between the different actors in the factories. In some instances 
we concentrate on a single episode or sequence of events which high- 
lights some aspects of the nature and distribution of power in the 
work-place. The underlying approach here is that a work-place such 
as a factory is not only a site for the production of goods but is 
also where social relations are woven between actors. The cooperation 
or contention, however, is between unequal parties with varying 
resources who struggle to advance their interests. 
The issues which are considered were selected from among those 
that for obvious reasons are central to factory life or factory 
activities. The chapter looks in turn at recruitment issues, 
further education and training for the workforce, job security and 
"shady deals" and corruption in factory management. The main focus 
of attention is Factory A, but complementary information was also 
taken from Factory B. Generally, since the issues were treated 
in very similar ways in the two plants consideration of Factory B 
tends to be limited to supplementary anecdotes. Experiences from 
a small number of other work-places are incorporated in the same spirit 
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at certain points. 
1 RECRUITMENT ISSUES 
The deterioration of living conditions in rural areas and the 
annual increase in the number of school leavers have been mentioned 
as some of the factors which have swollen the ranks of those looking 
for work in urban areas, especially Dar es Salaam. The shortage 
of wage/salary employment on a permanent basis has meant that there 
is a lot of competition for the few jobs especially in the unskilled 
categories. Under these circumstances employers do not find it 
difficult to hire their workforce. 
In Factory A, the first batch of employees was hired through 
the national youth service through the Dar es Salaam Labour Bureau. 
But since the early 1970's the factory has had its own Personnel 
Department headed by a Manager who deals with the recruitment of the 
workforce. In the early days a number were engaged at the factory 
entrance on a casual basis before being hired permanently. This 
was also the practice at Factory B where large numbers of labourers 
were employed for loading and unloading of cotton bales and building 
materials. With the creation of the Personnel Department and with 
the shortage of jobs, however, the gaining of a post has to pass 
through several stages. 
At the gates of both factories there is the usual sign Hakuna_ kazi 
(= no vacancies). Recruitment has to follow certain laid out 
procedures. On the basis of recruitment authority one can distinguish 
four basic categories among the employees: 
(a) Those below 980 shillings a month (1983), who are in the 
province of the General Manager. 
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(b) Those below M. S. U. 6- within the wage/salary scale 
1085 sh. and 2345 sh. a month - who fall under the Appointments' 
Committee but need to be approved by the Management-Committee. 
(c) Those above 2240 shillings a month, who fall under the 
authority of the Management Committee via the N. D. C. 
(d) The General Manager, who is an appointee of the President. 
Category (a): The General Manager has the mandate to hire 
employees in these categories. In practice in Factory A (also in 
B) this function was delegated to the Personnel Office under the 
Manpower and Administrative Manager. The process of interviewing 
prospective candidates/applicants was carried out by the Personnel 
Officer and his two assistants; also present during the interviews 
was the prospective Departmental Manager or his representative. This 
category was composed mostly of machine operators who would be under 
the control of the Technical Manager. The General Manager subsequently 
approved the names selected by the Personnel Office. The key process 
in the hiring of this category of employees is the interview. 
It was from these recruitment interviews that the JUWATA branch 
leadership was excluded in Factory A. In its meeting of 18th July 
1980, the JUWATA leadership queried their exclusion from interviews 
when earlier they had been involved, which, they felt, meant that 
they were being ignored by management. The General Manager explained 
that JUWATA's initial inclusion in the interviews had been optional 
not compulsory and depended on the decision of management. In the 
larger factory, B, a JUWATA representative participated in the 
interviews of this category of workers -a measure which was a 
concession to the active JUWATA branch. 
Employees in Category (b) could be employed on approval by the 
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Appointments' Committee composed of Departmental Managers and chaired 
by the General Manager. The Party and JUWATA leadership participated 
in the Committee's deliberations. But, according to the Party Branch 
Secretary, their influence was limited, as the interviews and 
selections had already been carried out by the Personnel Office in 
conjunction with individual Departmental Heads. The Committee was 
usually asked to confirm the appointments. (For example, the Record 
of Appointments Committee, Session of 6th June 1980, reads: "Committee 
informed of the engagement of 31 machine operators and lower staff. 
... 
Committee is asked to confirm the engagement of 5 new technicians 
and purchase officer". ) Many of the applicants in this wage/salary 
category are secondary school graduates with certificates from business, 
accounting or technical institutions (e. g. Dar es Salaam Business 
College, Dar School of Accountancy). What is crucial in their getting 
employed are their certificates. Within the Appointments Committee, 
the General Manager and the secretary to this Committee (the Manpower. 
Manager) were the main actors in the decisions over selections, and 
also in the implementation of the decisions through sending letters. 
Category (c): The third category of senior employees with salaries 
above 2345 shillings per month (1983) are hired by the Management 
Committee. This group includes the Departmental Managers and senior 
engineers and accountants. In practice they were posted by N. D. C. 
headquarters to fill the different posts initially; then when 
vacancies arose, management promoted existing employees to the posts. 
This was the case with the present Purchasing Manager, Training Officer 
and Cost Accountant. The Management Committee was virtually informed 
only of the action [Vide Annual Report of the Chairman of the Management 
Committee for the Year 1981, complaining of this practice]. Instead 
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of recommending appointments,,, the management had already filled the 
posts -a situation which was difficult to reverse. Union and Party 
leaders at the factory had evidently limited say, if any, in the 
hiring of these categories of employees, even though they participated 
in the sessions which confirmed the new appointments. 
At the top of the factory hierarchy the General Manager, the 
chief executive of the enterprise, was appointed by the President. 
When the first General Manager in A was relieved of his job by the 
President after a Party probe committee on "irregularities or shady 
deals", he was replaced by another Presidential appointee from another 
factory. The Party branch and the union leadership had no role in 
law or in practice in this appointment. 
All this points to the conclusion that the process of recruitment 
was in the hands of the Personnel Department which short-listed the 
prospective candidates for interviews and finally sent the letters 
for those who had been selected. The manipulation of the recruitment 
of the lower categories of employees was made possible as the procedures 
were structured in the belief that management was the competent body 
to deal with those issues which (like firing) were perceived to be 
the preserve of managerial duties. This factor contributed to the 
strange paradox where in recruitment management in a public factory 
acted in a manner very close to that of private employers. 
The shortage of jobs in Dar es Salaam factories leads to 
competition for vacancies among existing employees looking for placements 
for their relatives or acquaintances. The minimum qualifications 
of basic literacy and physical strength necessary for the work of 
machine operator of lower ranks of supporting staff (e. g. cleaners, 
cooks, attendants) are not sufficient to differentiate applicants. 
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On the other hand, as we have seen, the organisation of recruitment 
leaves a lot of power in the hands of management, especially the 
Personnel and Manpower Office, with room for favouritism and corruption. 
This is especially true for the employment of machine operators (with 
so many applicants and little in terms of required qualifications). 
In Factory A, there were some allegations of favouritism. Some 
employees believed that to get a job, "deals" and mipango (= "arrange- 
ments") were necessary; and that the technique of saying "Come 
tomorrow" was a hint to come with some chai (= tea) - in other words 
a bribe to accompany the application. Even to put in an application, 
it was alleged, one had to know someone in the factory hierarchy 
or be accompanied by a note of introduction. 
In Factory B which employed a number of women in the production 
sections, especially in spinning, allegations of "harassment" were 
not uncommon during the early 1970's. This was at a time when the 
factory was relatively new and was recruiting large numbers. Such 
harassment seems to have stopped or to have been considerably reduced 
through complaints raised by JUWATA and Party branch leadership. 
One of the usual allegations in recruitment concerns the question 
of "tribalism". This type of complaint was implied in the allegations 
of mismanagement in Factory A in 1982. The regional origins of the 
factory's workforce in 1982 was as follows: 
Factory A: Regional Origins of Workforce 
Morogoro 106 Iringa 37 Mwanza 18 Zanzibar 8 
Kilimanjaro 89 Ruvuma 30 Dar 14 Shinyanga 7 
Pwani 79 Mtwara 28 Singida 12 Arusha 4 
Tanga 48 Bukoba 27 Dodoma 12 
Mbeya 47 Mara 25 Kigoma 9 
Lindi 41 Tabora 20 Rukwa 9 
Source: Information read to author by Personnel Officer. 
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Employees from one region, Morogoro, seem to have been over- 
represented. It was the view of the Manpower Office that the 
proportion of machine operators from Morogoro region was higher than 
would be expected. But they argued that these had been employed 
earlier by Chinese technicians from the workforce who had been employed 
building the Tanzania-Zambia railway line. The fact, however, that 
the Head of the Manpower office was from that region was seen by some 
employees as evidence of favouritism and abuse of position. Another 
allegation was that it was not accidental that the second highest 
number of employees came from the same"home"region as the General 
1 
Manager (Kilimanjaro). 
But rather than necessarily implying malpractices, the allegations 
are more a reflection of how people actually get jobs. Information 
about vacancies in a factory is usually through informal channels; 
relatives, people from the same region/local background, or friends 
tell jobs seekers about potential openings long before they are actually 
advertised (if they ever are). Potential applicants for jobs are 
more likely to learn about vacancies in different factories if they 
have relatives, "tribesmen" or friends in management positions 
especially in the Personnel departments. Where competition for 
work is so intense it is hardly surprising if they are also more likely 
to be shortlisted for interviews among a host of applications, for 
the less skilled jobs, and more likely to be engaged. 
2 FURTHER EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
Acquiring further education or training becomes an important 
objective for those who are successful in obtaining a job in Factory 
A or B. Formal training and the acquisition of formal certificates 
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remains in Tanzania an important element in a person's life in general, 
and for an employee in particular. Obtaining a job and rising in 
one's occupation or profession is partly determined by the formal 
education and training one has undergone. Formal certificates can 
enable an employee to move to another factory or work-place or even 
change occupation. At another level, the acquisition of technical 
skills such as fitting, turning and carpentry are a means of carrying 
on (outside the paid employment) a part-time or self-employed activity 
among artisans, carpenters and technicians. 
Among managerial, administrative and supervisory staff, the 
possession of formal certificates is also a great asset for rising 
up in the managerial and supervisory grades. While experience and 
long service is appreciated in work performance, possessors of formal 
certificates retain an advantage in terms of pay and rising up in 
the different grades. The quest for further education and training 
in search of skills and formal qualifications engages not only 
managerial staff, administrative staff, supervisors and technicians 
but also machine operators who would like to improve their standing 
in factories and increase their incomes. 
Planning and selection for further training or for attendance 
of different courses are made at factory level and involve some of 
the factory's resources. This makes it one of the salient work- 
place issues attracting the attention of employees. 
In the Technical Department of Factory A, which comprises the 
plant (productive) sections and the maintenance and repair sections, 
one could distinguish two basic skill categories among employees. 
There were (a) the machine operators in the materials preparation, 
forging and pressing sections, who were semi-skilled workers who had 
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learnt and acquired their skills during their apprenticeship at the 
factory. Most of them were primary school leavers. Conducted in 
Kiswahili primary schooling consists of seven years in the three R's" 
and elements of Tanzanian history, geography, general science, and some 
English. Primary education continues to function basically as a 
preparation for secondary and higher education for the small section 
of the primary school pupils who get selected for the relatively few 
secondary schools. The 1982 JASPA Report estimates that 95% of 
Standard Seven leavers would not enter secondary school in 1985/86. 
"The curriculum is still heavily academically biased" and the aspir- 
ations of parents, pupils and teachers is to enter secondary schools 
[ILO, 1982, pp. 112,117]. It is no wonder that machine operators, 
most of whom were primary school leavers, expressed their desire to improve 
their formal education and acquire training in turning, fitting, 
welding, or carpentry or as blacksmiths, electricians or mechanics 
(all generally encompassed by the Kiswahili term of fundi (technician 
or craftsman)). These qualifications were seen as a valuable asset. 
(b) The second broad skill category in the Technical Department 
consisted of artisans, technicians and engineers. These were skilled 
workers. Many among them were primary school leavers but had acquired 
special skills on the job and/or had trained in one of the vocational 
or trade schools in the country. Skilled workers expressed the wish 
to get Trade Certificates or do further training in Technical Colleges. 
This would enhance their chances of promotion to supervisory or 
managerial positions. However, among those who had obtained their 
skills through experience and who were long-term employees of the 
factory, their low level of formal education in mathematics and physics 
was a handicap for admission to higher level courses. Secondary 
schooling was a prerequisite for admission to Technical College as 
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well as for the University of Dar es Salaam engineering courses. 
In the support departments, among administrative and accounting 
staff, courses preferred were in administration, financing, stores 
management and accounting. During the late 1960's and early 1970's, 
the relative expansion of public sector factories and services 
(banking and state trading companies) had opened up opportunities 
for citizens with certificates, diplomas and degrees in: (a) accountancy 
(from e. g. the Dar es Salaam School of Accountancy, the University 
of Dar es Salaam, the Mzumbe Institute of Management or abroad) 
(b) business studies (from e. g. The Institute of Finance Management, 
Dar es Salaam Business College); or (c) administrative and managerial 
courses. The contention for managerial and supervisory posts among 
the middle and higher level administrative and accounting staff spilled 
over into the search for training or courses among this category of 
employees. 
Education in the early post-independence period reflected the 
colonial legacy in respect of the absence of technical education and 
the dominance of productive activities which required limited technical 
skills and little formal education (e. g. sisal plantation workers, 
porters, dockworkers or construction labour). The expansion of 
primary schools through the Univeral Primary Education (UPE) (1974) 
programme, the stress placed on adult education and the expansion 
of secondary school and higher education. places, are some of the 
hallmarks of the educational policies of the post-independence 
government. Since independence, adult education in the form of 
literacy classes has been an element of the educational policies of 
the political leadership. The education of adults and specifically 
the policy of workers' education and training was given a boost by 
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the Prime Minister's Directive of July 1973 urging the setting up 
of programmes for different forms of workers' education and the 
setting aside of funds and time for the improvement of employees' 
levels of education and training. Despite these efforts, however, 
technical education has remained limited to a few vocational and trade 
schools. 
This situation was reflected in the training programmes of Factory 
A which until 1982 relied on in-plant, on-the-job courses for its 
machine operators for work in the plant sections. For employees 
in the other support departments, management organised the selection 
for different courses. The Manpower Development and Administrative 
Department Manager in liasion with the office of the General Manager 
selected employees for further training on courses on recommendations 
from sectional heads. Individual employees could apply, but applications 
had to be submitted through and approved by management. There was 
no direct involvement by the Party branch leadership or by the union 
in the selection and the organisation of the courses. 
In Factory A, the Committee for workers' education was created 
in 1982. In 1981, management in conjunction with N. D. C. Headquarters 
had completed plans for a 1.8 million shilling plan for the construction 
of a Training Centre at the factory. Plans for the centre included 
plant-related courses (such as fitting, turning, welding, forging, 
electricity); managerial orientation programmes (for supervisors and 
managers); and general formal schooling. The latter would be the 
equivalent of junior and senior secondary school, but would also 
include special courses in mathematics, chemistry, physics and 
engineering. By 1983, the project had not been implemented due to 
the financial constraints facing the factory. Training programmes 
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were instead carried out with outside educational institutions. 
Literacy classes were being run in the CCM. conference room at the 
factory. 
A variety of employees were selected by management to undertake 
courses in 1980. The courses included short leadership and super- 
visory seminars, seminars for members of the Workers' Council on how 
to read a balance sheet; technical courses in engineering or trade 
craftsmanship; long and short study tours abroad; and courses in 
which only one or two employees were involved leading to certificates 
in accounting, nursing and office management, and diplomas in business 
administration, metallurgy, agricultural engineering, commerce, short- 
hand and social welfare. The courses which took most employees were 
in adult literacy (29); short courses in craftsmanship at the National 
Vocational Training Centre Chang'ombe (49) and political education. 
Except for the political education classes, the courses were organised 
and arranged by management [Minutes of Management Committee, Session 
of April 9,1981].. 
Short study tours abroad were usually undertaken only by senior 
managers and officials of the factory. As with the other courses, 
management had the power to select and decide who was to go on these 
tours, which involved, it may be said, some economic benefits which 
were not necessarily less important for those selected than the 
educational benefits and the acquisition of new skills. 
Factory A's Workers' Education Programme was initially conceived 
as a means of improving the workers' general technical know-how, 
especially among those involved in the productive sections. It was 
also intended that union and Party leaders would be closely involved 
in selecting and monitoring. However, the realisation of those 
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goals has been hampered by a combination of the organisation of the 
programmes and the prevailing values which accord remuneration and 
promotion on the basis of certificates. Other hindrances are not 
of the factory's making but reflect the nature of the country's 
educational systems. Thus supervisory and administrative courses 
for the higher level manpower are given equal if not more weight than 
technical courses to the lower section of the workforce. To under- 
take further technical training there is the barrier of prerequisite 
qualifications and the language in which the courses are conducted. 
Some of the courses merely reproduced the secondary school education 
which many -machine operators missed but paradoxically in a way that 
perpetuates especially the more negative aspects of the secondary 
school in Tanzania. 
3 JOB SECURITY 
The protection of one's job is generally one of the key concerns 
among employees and logically one of the important aspects in the 
relationship between management and workers. In a situation where 
there is no system of social security or unemployment benefits the 
loss of a job assumes a further importance in workers' lives. Control 
over conditions or situations which relate to an employee's loss of 
employment is one of the aspects of factory "politics". We shall 
take here two aspects of the issue upon which contention or conflict 
tends to centre: 
i) The definition of the conditions under which loss of _job 
is considered 
legal and ii) the degree to which workers or their representatives 
can exercise power to prevent-dismissals. 
The definition of what constitutes just grounds for loss of 
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employment has been prescribed centrally in the Disciplinary Code 
of the Security of Employment Act 1964. This Act details the 
activities which are deemed to be breaches of work discipline that 
can lead to loss of employment. The question of lockouts by 
employers is similarly defined. At factory level the issue of 
contention tends to be whether or not a breach of discipline has 
occurred in a particular case. 
Breaches of work discipline in Factory A were coordinated in 
the Manpower and Personnel Office. Late arrivals or absence from 
work was recorded by the time-keeper who worked at the factory gate. 
In the plant, foremen and supervisors monitored work performance 
in their sections. Infringements of work discipline as defined in 
the Disciplinary Code of the Security of Employment Act 1964 were 
recorded and the Personnel Office informed. 
One of the positive effects of the above Act has been that any 
intended disciplinary action against a worker must involve the union 
branch leadership. When, in this factory, workers were given notices 
of warning or dismissal they usually went to see the union Chairman 
or the CCM Chairman (who would tell them to see the union Chairman). 
These were usually disposed to discuss the matter with the Personnel 
Office or plead for the worker. Warnings and minor reprimands on 
minor offences were usually resolved amicably with hardly any record 
kept. The presence of the union branch in that sense hindered 
arbitrary dismissals and victimisations. For infringements which 
were considered by management to be serious and as deserving dismissal, 
employees were suspended on half pay for six months. After the six 
months the suspension was without pay. 
In the course of the research I came across two employees who 
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had been suspended for indiscipline at work. These illustrate the 
limited extent of the union's power in cases of suspension. One was 
a machine operator who had allegedly been disobedient, had absented 
himself from his post without permission and had not fulfilled work 
targets on several occasions [Employer's Notice of 16/2/83]. While 
the case was waiting resolution at the District Labour Conciliation 
Board, he remained on half pay. Even though the union leadership 
wanted reconciliation on grounds of hardship, for the machine operator 
had a family and the half pay was proving insufficient to maintain 
his family, management insisted on waiting for the law to take its 
course. 
The second case was that of a secretary [Employer's Notice of 
11/12/82] who normally was a hardworking Personal Secretary to the 
General Manager, but had not delivered an important and urgent letter 
from management to the Ministry of Industries as requested by the 
General Manager. She was suspended for this infraction and was 
awaiting resolution of the case. The union leadership was working 
for her reinstatement but could not do anything against the suspension 
before the long procedure of reconciliation was exhausted. Mean- 
while she was on half pay and another person had taken her post. 
The union leadership felt that the suspension was unfair and that 
she should have been issued a warning instead, given her previous 
work record. That would have allowed her to continue working and 
earn her livelihood. 
As ordinary courts have no jurisdiction over labour disputes 
there is no other recourse in such cases to appeal for justice. The 
secretary had to whit and undergo the long procedure so long as 
management was unwilling to alter the penalty of "summary dismissal". 
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In cases where an employee was involved in a criminal offence (such 
as a traffic case (for drivers) or thefts) acquittal in the courts 
did not guarantee reinstatement in one's-job, and here again the 
union could not oblige the employer to reinstate the employee. 
Looking at the complete picture it does seem likely that the 
union and Party branch leaderships contributed to reducing the instances 
of ill-treatment or blatant victimization either by recourse to the 
legal procedures or by appealing to general exhortations on the basis 
of "utu" or "ubinadamu" (= humanity) as expressed in the Party documents 
on U7amaa and Mwongozo as a way of discouraging harshness among super- 
visors and managers. However, the scope of their action was circum- 
scribed by the legal framework which left plenty of room for legal 
suspensions and terminations. 
More generally, "job security" was a relative concept and employ- 
ment remained precarious for most of the workers in our factories. 
This was brought home by the episodes described below in the sections 
on "Unexpected Compulsory Leave in Factory A". and "Redundancies in 
Factory B". In both cases the loss of jobs was "legal". As we shall 
see, in this kind of situation not only did the unions and party 
branches acquiesce in the move, but the presence of the union and 
Party branch, and the position of these organisations tended to blunt 
any "militancy" which might have emerged. The authorities insisted 
that the workers use "existing channels" in dealing with grievances. 
The workers' action was limited to the point beyond which they would 
break "the law". On the other hand, in these instances as well as 
in more normal times the presence of organisations pressing the 
workers' point of view was helpful in preventing crude treatment by 
management and in resolving some of the less contentious problems 
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that were nonetheless important in the workers' lives. 
Episode 1: Unexpected Compulsory Leave in Factory A 
In August 1982, the management of Factory A, decided to send 
the bulk of its 661 employees on unexpected compulsory leave for two 
months. For at least a year the factory had been facing growing 
financial and technical problems. These were related to serious 
shortages of its essential raw materials: iron, plough parts, chemicals 
and dies. At the same time spare parts were also becoming difficult 
to secure for some of the plant's ageing machinery. These were mostly 
secured from abroad and since there was a general shortage of hard 
currency in the country for foreign purchases, the factory found it 
impossible to secure them. Moreover the factory had outstanding 
debts with several of its foreign suppliers which meant it was not 
able to buy goods on credit. 
The factory's precarious position had been discussed in several 
Workers' Council meetings and the weekly Planning Committee meetings, 
meetings which the Chairmen of the CCM and JUWATA branches attended; 
but no solution seemed feasible. Since the factory usually closed 
in December to allow general maintenance and repair to be carried 
out, it was decided that the factory should close in August for the 
workers' annual leave and then remain closed for another month while 
steps were taken to procure the necessary finance to purchase the 
raw materials and spare parts. The second month of the lay-off 
would be without pay. 
Workers were informed of the emergency measure in a public meeting. 
Those temporarily laid off were paid one monthly wage/salary and a 
fare to enable them to reach their home villages. The JUWATA weekly 
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report for the week ending 19th August 1982 reads: "Not a good week 
as workers were going on unexpected two months compulsory leave. 
Complaints could be heard from some though there was no way out of 
the situation". The Party branch leadership discussed the situation 
in its committee meeting but felt they could not do anything but accept 
the measure. The fact that the two organisations were informed 
in advance and participated in the meetings which approved the measure, 
pre-empted to a large extent any possible complaints they could have 
raised on the basis of not being informed. 
Though the measure was a difficult one for the branch leadership 
to accept, the deeper causes lay outside the control of factory 
management. The factory management had reached their decision in 
consultation with the N. D. C., the leading agency of the parastatal 
sector, and in these circumstances they felt that they could not 
challenge the measure. Since this was a public enterprise, one could 
not insist, they felt, on the due benefits for temporary loss of 
employment. JUWATA headquarters saw the management facing a genuine 
dilemma, as foreign exchange shortages were affecting the whole country. 
There was not much that could be done. 
The reaction of the workers in the plant was to grumble and to 
resort to their own individual strategies: many remained in Dar es 
Salaam doing some odd jobs they could find such as petty trading 
(e. g. selling vegetables or fruit) or as casual labourers on building 
sites. The more successful ones sought and obtained permanent 
alternative employment. These were "people with paper qualifications" 
(according to the Personnel Officer) who were the ones who left employment. 
When the factory reopened 50 employees did not come back. These 
were mostly fitters, turners, junior clerks, carpenters or service 
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personnel; only 3 machine operators failed to return. The majority 
of machine operators, many of whom may have sought but could not find 
alternative viable employment, returned to their jobs. 
On resumption, however, some of the working conditions had changed. 
Subsidised meals were not re-introduced until January 1983. There 
were to be no overtime work and payments. To many machine operators 
whose average monthly overtime earnings often amounted to the 
equivalent of the average monthly wage of 620/=, the loss of this 
source of income was a serious blow, especially when the temporary 
halt of canteen services is also taken into account. According to 
the Manpower and Management Officer there was a noticeable increase 
in pilfering and petty thefts of factory property during this period. 
The CCM branch leadership proposed stringent measures and 
increased vigilance in workshops and stores to protect company property 
- which was welcomed by the management. They also proposed a special 
allowance of 50/= for those in the production sections while waiting 
for the reopening of the canteen. This, however, was not implemented, 
though the suggestion hastened the opening of the canteen in January. 
Both proposals were supported by the union leadership as was the 
petition to reinstate overtime payments for those in the plant sections 
on the grounds that the monthly wage was not sufficient. Management 
argued that the financial position of the enterprise was not yet 
secure to reintroduce overtime payments. Overtime was still suspended 
in the factory as late as April 1983. 
In summary, this series of related events touched on questions 
of job security and working conditions as well as the role of extra- 
factory forces. The compulsory leave was imposed in consultation 
with union and Party branch leadership. The fact that the measure 
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was taken and carried out with their involvement assisted in its 
being implemented rather smoothly with minimum trouble. However, 
the involvement of those representatives and their suggestions did 
not mean that they had any real control over the situation or power 
to extract compensation for the temporary loss of jobs and income 
or for the fall in earnings with the abolition of overtime payments. 
In this relationship management had the upper hand. Factory A was 
a public factory and the solution had been discussed with N. D. C. 
and the parent Ministry. The country's "general economic crisis" 
was to blame and demanding compensation from a public enterprise 
was not "legitimate". The only recourse was to individual strategies 
of survival: seek alternative employment, petty theft, pilfering 
or individual hardship petitions to management. 
Through the intervention of the President to the Central Bank 
to grant the sum of 98 million T. sh. the enterprise acquired that 
foreign exchange to purchase the most pressing raw materials and 
spare parts. In other words, the temporary resolution of the issues 
was through the intervention of the state, which showed itself as 
always one of the main actors in industrial relations. 
Episode 2: Redundancies in Factory B 
In the early 1980's many Tanzanian factories faced acute 
production problems within the general economic crisis that was 
ushered in by the war in Uganda. Factory B did not escape that 
situation. The problems became particularly severe in 1982 and 1983. 
In a report to the Workers' Council Session 27, of July 28th to 30th, 
1983, the factory's General Manager gave a detailed account of the 
problems that were facing the factory. In the production sections, 
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work targets had not been reached. While in 1979 the factory had 
produced above set targets and workers had earned a bonus, by 1982 
spinning and weaving were now both 19 per cent below target. The 
mill No. III section was as much as 30 per cent below target. 
In 1983 the situation deteriorated, the main problems being listed 
out as follows: 
(i) shortage of chemicals and dyes due to foreign exchange 
shortages. 
(ii) lack of spare parts for the production of kh anga materials. 
(iii) Electricity cuts (16.25 hours) and lack of water (199 hours) 
from the main city supplies which had had technical problems. 
(iv) Constant breakdowns of machinery in the plant. 
These difficulties had led to falls in the quantity and quality of 
goods. Sales had also decreased at a time when the factory was 
incurring higher costs due to the rise in the price of raw cotton 
in July 1983 from 15/=60 to 19/=50 per kilogram. 
All new recruitment of labour was stopped in an effort to reduce 
costs. When this could not substantially improve the factory's situation, 
the Board of Directors of TEXCO, the holding company, opted for a 
reduction of the workforce. Out of the total workforce of 5,100 
in March 1983,475 employees were to be declared redundant and laid 
off. Instead of the former four shifts, the factory was to have 
three shifts per week. This important decision affecting such an 
important state textile mill was communicated to government. 
Different agencies in the factory were informed of the decision. 
This included the Workers' Council, the JUWATA branch leadership and 
the CCM branch leadership. These were asked to consider the best 
ways to effect the redundancies. The criteria which were agreed 
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upon between management and the workers' representatives, including 
Regional and District JUWATA officials, were to take into account 
good work record, length of service and importance of the job. 
Each department was to face a 22% reduction of its employees. 
Those laid off were paid one month's wages; 7 days of their entitled 
28 days annual leave; and fares to reach their home areas. They 
were also entitled to take their National Provident Fund contributions. 
Those who did not meet the agreed criteria and were selected for 
redundancy were mostly machine operators in the Technical Department 
but also included some members of the subordinate staff from other 
departments including clerks. 
During the implementation of the exercise a number of the laid- 
off workers were naturally disgruntled at the loss of their jobs and 
allegations of nepotism and favouritism were echoed against manage- 
ment. Some of them were also unhappy about the whole question of 
the redundancies and tried to present their case to JUWATA headquarters 
or talk to the news media. But such ad hoc actions were to have 
limited impact despite the Party sending a probe team. While the 
latter found minor irregularities in the selection of some of those 
who were laid off, the basic desirability of the redundancies was 
not questioned. According to the Personnel Officer, the different 
workers' organisations were involved and informed of the reasons for 
the redundancies - the severe situation facing the factory. Partici- 
pating in the Workers' Council session (April 1983), the CCM Branch 
Chairman in the closing speech exhorted participants to educate workers 
to face the difficult economic situation in the country; he asked 
management to be considerate in their dealings with employees and 
commended JUWATA leadership for being firm against those engaged in 
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intrigues to give a bad image of the enterprise. 
One element revealed by the event is the relatively ad hoc 
positions in which workers found themselves despite having organisations 
to represent them. Some of the workers who had been declared 
redundant went to complain to the Permanent Labour Tribunal, but they 
were not supported by the JUWATA branch at the factory. They were 
told that they had not followed the laid down procedure of presenting 
their grievances which was to have been through their JUWATA branch. 
On the other hand, the acquiescence of the union and Party branch 
leaderships was more the result of conditions (political and economic) 
which weighed against any options they could contemplate than of any 
alleged cooption of the union leadership by the management. Security 
of employment, as emphasised above, remained relative and dependent 
on management, who themselves were under strong pressure from the 
holding company and the general economic situation. In these circum- 
stances JUWATA through the branch leadership could do little else 
than help in the smooth carrying out of the operation by focusing 
on minor aspects such as victimization in the redundancy exercise. 
4 CORRUPTION AND "SHADY DEALS" 
During 1982 a number of complaints and accusations were circulating 
in Factory A concerning the conduct of members of the management. 
The charges levelled against the General Manager and some of his 
subordinates included corruption; misuse of company property; "shady 
deals" in the sale of products; and corrupt purchases. Many of 
these complaints and charges had reached the N. D. C. headquarters and 
the Anti-Corruption Agency from employees who had secretly written 
to those bodies. The General Manager became aware of these allegations 
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and decided to call meetings with different sections of the enterprise. 
In August and September management held a number of meetings 
(with which the Chairmen of the CCM branch and JUWATA were associated) 
to discuss and sort out the allegations. On August 31st, 1982, a 
special committee was created by the General Manager to deal with 
the allegations. The special committee was chaired by the CCM branch 
Chairman; the secretary was the Marketing Manager; other members 
were: the Technical Manager, the Administrative Manager, the 
Purchase Manager and the Chief Accountant. The committee was to 
study the complaints and allegations and report their findings to 
the General Manager. 
Among the allegations levelled against management were: 
(i) Shady sales to private traders. Government directives laid 
down that products of the company were to be sold to Regional Trading 
Companies. The committee was informed by the Marketing Manager that 
for the more important products such as hoes and plough parts, the 
government policy and directives had been followed. On other smaller 
products such as adzes, since these could be sold to private dealers, 
there were no misdemeanours. Moreover, it was argued, Regional 
Trading Companies and cooperatives bought on credit, while private 
dealers paid cash. (The regions owed the company more than 
33 million 
shillings, the General Manager later claimed. ) The Marketing Manager 
also had discretion to sell some of the goods outside the stipulated 
allocations provided this did not disturb the sales programmes and 
give rise to marketeering by private channels. 
(ii) Corrupt deals with some foreign suppliers. Management and 
the Qimexällýhuager .n particular, was accused of gaining unfairly 
by purchasing some spares and materials from overseas suppliers. 
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Management explained that the purchase of those items from sources 
other than China arose from the difficult financial position which 
the company had faced which meant that it could not be supplied with 
materials in the normal way. The said suppliers were willing to 
supply the products needed on credit. Higher bodies outside the 
factory (e. g. the Central Bank and relevant Tanzanian embassy) had 
been consulted before the company made the decision. 
(iii) "Suspicious gifts". It had been suggested that the General 
Manager was giving corruptly acquired cars to managers. The committee 
was informed that the three small cars and a lorry were free gifts 
from a supplier to the company, which had had problems with transport 
for collecting goods from the port and for the daily work of the 
managers. There were no grounds to refuse those gifts. 
(iv) Misuse of company vehicles. This allegation was denied 
and the committee concluded that on the whole company cars, whether 
the self-driven ones assigned to some managers or those in the transport 
"pool", were used well and for official purposes. 
(v) Malpractices related to recruitment were denied. The problems 
arose from many employees (including some leaders) asking for places 
for their relatives. Since there were not always enough places to 
hire all the people involved, this gave rise to the complaints and 
allegations. 
(vi) "Private projects". It had been alleged that the Technical 
Manager had a number of private projects involving the use of company 
goods. This was denied. The allegations, the committee was informed, 
arose from internal conflicts and jealousies within the Technical 
Department where some engineers despised their Manager, claiming that 
they were better trained than he was and that their suggestions were 
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not taken into account, leading to some of the plant machinery to 
break down. 
The factory probe, after going through the books, and relevant 
documents and interviewing some of the officials, found no evidence 
of misdemeanour. Six months later, however, the same allegations 
resurfaced in a number of newspaper reports [Daily News, March 15th 
and 19th, 1983; Uhuru, Machi 19,1983]. Individual workers had 
written confidentially to the national Party leaders and the 
Commission of Enquiry. The Party National Executive Council (N. E. C. ) 
decided to institute a probe team to investigate the allegations on 
shady sales contrary to Party policy and government directives. 
The probe team was composed of members of the National Executive 
Council (N. E. C. ). The Prime Minister and the Party Secretary-General 
revealed some of the findings of the probe team. The factory had 
followed directives on marketing products through R. T. C. 's but had 
sold some goods especially in some regions on the borders through 
private traders. In fact, sales to private traders had amounted 
to 41.83% of all sales in 1982. Moreover the company Cooperative 
shop had sold to private traders goods worth 3/= million sh. Employees 
had bought hoes worth "thousands of shillings" contrary to laid-out 
procedures -a fact that indicated that they were sold at 
hiked prices. 
The Party Secretary-General talking to the CCM branch leadership 
and members of the enterprise shop wondered whether the Party leader- 
ship was not really aware of those malpractices and asked how they 
could allow such serious practices to occur before their very eyes 
- questions which were greeted by silence 
by the branch leadership. 
The Party Secretary-General admonished the Party members to be more 
vigilant in the future. 
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The result of the probe, some weeks later, was a shake-up of 
management. The General Manager was relieved of his post after 
almost 15 years in the job. Two other executives were also sacked 
[Daily News, July 11th, 1983] during the nationwide anti-racketeer 
campaign. 
The issues raised by this episode relate to the control of 
managerial activities in public enterprises, and to the power of the 
Party branch leadership. Despite the Secretary General's exhortation 
to the branch leadership to be more vigilant in the future and not 
allow such malpractices, the organisation of the factory was ambiguous 
on their practical role and how they were expected to control manage- 
ment's activities. During the days of the political commissars 
they could have monitored what was going on and reported to higher 
authorities, but with the new set-up which involved them in managerial 
decisions they tended to become accessories to any questionable 
activities. Since managerial decisions were confidential and not 
to be divulged to the workforce, any organised control over factory 
management could only come from outside bodies such as the National 
Executive Council (N. E. C. ). Any input by the workforce as a whole 
to the branch leadership, which was supposed to represent the workers, 
was curtailed. The allegations made against the management of Factory 
A were resolved eventually by the intervention of higher bodies. 
Management had tried to utilise its position in the factory investi- 
gation to clear the accusations by involving the Party branch leader- 
ship in the investigation. There was no real organised follow-up 
of the allegations by employees. In the resolution of the issues, 
the employees were mainly reduced to silent spectators of a drama 
between factory management and higher political authorities in the 
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Party and government. 
"Corruption" as the use of public office or public resources 
contrary to public objectives and principles for private benefit 
is an issue which has touched public administration and public 
sector factories generally. Two factors may be advanced as contrib- 
uting to corruption in public sector factories: (a) the lack of 
systematic control from the political leadership and (b) the lack 
of control or monitoring at the base. This leaves management with 
power to allocate and dispose of resources for private ends. Although 
it has the objective of enhancing one's income or that of associates, 
"corruption" has the contradictory effect of damaging the economic 
condition of the very enterprise on which the employment and incomes 
of managers depends. 
It was argued earlier in this thesis that one of the objectives 
pursued in the creation of the public sector in Tanzania was to provide 
a basis for national and social integration. The retention of some 
sectors in state hands for the common good would enhance societal 
integration, legitimacy and therefore societal stability. The 
emergence of "corrupt practices", occasioned partly by lack of public 
monitoring, threatens therefore to frustrate one of the objectives 
of the public sector. That "corruption" as a social phenomenon leads 
to social discontent is shown by the popularity of the "crackdown" 
on racketeers, price hikers etc. which was attempted in 1983. 
Information from other work-places suggests that the use of 
managerial position to enhance incomes and give favours to other 
people was practised in other public sector enterprises than Factory 
A, and indeed that it was present in not a few enterprises? In 
1982 and 1983 publicised instances of "corruption" and "malpractices" 
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among parastal management reached alarming proportions. These 
practices became much more visible given the shortages of goods and 
services in the general economic crisis of the early 1980's. A 
campaign was launched by the government in an attempt to crackdown 
on racketeers, price hikers and smugglers. 
On Ist April, 1983, the President officially announced that a 
crackdown on economic saboteurs had silently started in March. Two 
kinds of culprits were to be arrested: (a) those who bought goods 
in bulk (often from parastatal enterprises) and hoarded them for 
future sale at hiked prices; and (b) those who dealt in illegal 
transactions of foreign currencies and indulged in the smuggling of 
goods in and out of the country. 
During the months following the launching of the campaign, daily 
reports of those arrested showed the socio-occupational categories 
from whom most of the alleged culprits were drawn as the following 
news items show: 
Daily News, May 23,1983: Acting Regional Manager of the para- 
statal shoe company Bora, arrested for allegedly creating artificial 
shortages of shoes, bicycle tyres and tubes worth one million shillings. 
Regional State Trading Company Administrative Manager arrested 
for selling goods to racketeers. 
Daily News, May 25,1983: Fourteen employees of the National 
Distributors (parastatal distributors) in Dar es Salaam accused of 
stealing sugar worth 6.5 million shillings. 
Daily News, May 28,1983: Crackdown against saboteurs aimed 
at individuals not organisations. 
Daily News, May 28,1983: Seven government and parastatal officials 
accused of economic sabotage in Tabora. 
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Daily News, June 4,1983: Regional Trading Manager (Coast) and 
Marketing Manager arrested for selling goods worth 16 million shillings 
to racketeers. 
Daily News, June 7,1983: Fifteen employees of the National 
Milling Corporation charged with stealing 6 million shillings worth 
of sugar. 
Daily News, June 14,1983: National Chairman of JUWATA and a 
District Party Secretary accused of illegal foreign currency transactions. 
On June 4,1983, the then Prime Minister was reported as saying 
that out of the 1,300 up to that time arrested 50 per cent were 
businessmen, 30 per cent were unlicensed speculators and the rest 
were government or parastatal employees who collaborated with those 
racketeers and saboteurs. 
The illegal activities often involved the distribution of essential 
consumer goods, such as maize flour, rice, sugar, textile products 
and soap, which were handled by parastatal organisations often retaining 
a monopoly over the product. As in the productive enterprises or 
factories, management retained control over marketing and distribution 
activities with limited opportunity for union Party branch scrutiny 
or supervision. Management could use their position to their personal 
advantage without control form "below". Accountability only emanated 
from the top echelons of government as was the case in the campaign. 
A specially appointed tribunal was set up to try offenders. 
Those appointed by the President to sit on it included a Regional 
Party Chairman, a National Executive member, three judges, a former 
Inspector-General of Police, a Personnel Manager of a hotel (former 
Regional Commissioner and former Manager of a cigarette company). 
Initially popularly welcome, the campaign had lost momentum within 
a year. One of the problems seems to have been the limited input 
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from work-place organisations. The whole process was centralised 
in the Tribunals: once again accountability was enforced vertically 
from "above". 
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Footnotes 
1. "Tribalism" is presumed to occur between people who come or whose 
parents came from the same district or region. "Ndugunisation", 
from ndugu (= relative) is nepotism. 
2. In the early 1980's a number of scandals involving high government 
and Party officials attracted public attention. Mlimuka and Kabudi 
[in Shivji (ed. ), 1985] have documented a number involving the 
dramatic remvoal of a Regional Commissioner; a Government Minister 
and a General Manager; the "irregular" sale of a ship to a private 
company; and "frauds" at parastatal stationery company (pp. 76-79). 
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CONCLUSION 
This conclusion summarises the theoretical and empirical findings 
which emerge from our study of the politics of participation in 
public sector factories in Tanzania since 1967. The thesis set out 
to examine industrial relations in Tanzanian public factories: the 
power relations between management and workers; the decision-making 
and implementation processes; and the way management and workers 
articulate their membership of work-place organisation such as the 
Workers' Councils, Party branch and trade union, to deal with factory 
issues. 
Adopting a historical approach to the study of industrial relations, 
as opposed to the conventional approach which tends to consider local 
level relations outside their broad context, this investigation was 
placed in the changing economic and political context of Tanzania. 
To make it possible to relate local-level processes to those at the 
national level, the first three chapters of the thesis explored 
salient features of Tanzania's economic and political transformation, 
including the nature of the state and its policies for industrial 
relations. 
In examining this wider context of change, the study opted for 
an approach which eschews a priori and economic reductionist pers- 
pectives on the state and state policies. Inspired by perspectives 
such as those suggested recently by Mouzelis and others, the 
approach adopted was one which, while not neglecting the ways in 
which the state and politics are constrained by the nature of the 
socio-economic system in a society, tries to consider also the non- 
economic dimensions of state activities and state policies and sources 
of political power. A feature of this approach is that it tries 
to identify empirically the relationship between the political and 
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the economic - granted that state policies and actions are moulded 
not only by the shape of the economy, the structure of class domination 
etc., but also by the nature of the system of political domination 
and by the structure of the state - the type of party organisation, 
type of administration and so on - and by the specifically political 
objectives of those in power. 
Within the above general framework Chapters 2 and 3 discussed 
the orientation of the political leadership, the organisation of 
decision-making and implementation in the Tanzanian political system, 
and state (especially labour) policies after independence. These 
were seen as attempts by the political leadership to institute a 
corporatist political system in the pursuit of societal integration, 
national security and national consensus. This system was charact- 
erised by the twin features of centralised political control and 
domination and regulated popular participation. These factors, we 
argued, have their echoes in work-place relations, which were the 
focus of attention in Chapters 4 to 6. 
The approach adopted in the second part of the thesis stemmed 
from a rejection of structural determinist approaches which tend to 
downplay and pre-judge the interplay between dominant and dominated 
groups. We tried to develop an "action-oriented" approach which 
took into account not only the structural conditions of factories 
(dependent industry and technology, limited workers' skills, limited 
employment opportunities and hierarchical formal organisations) but 
also the way enterprise actors with differential resources utilised 
situations and articulated their relationships to organisations, which 
in turn were viewed as resources or areas of contention. 
From the case material we cannot draw any firm general conclusions 
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about work relations and the organisation of management and 
participation in Tanzania's public sector factories. Nevertheless 
our cases do point to some provisional findings, suggesting hypotheses 
which might be pursued in further work. This is the case on at least 
three levels. 
Beginning, so to speak, from the top, our cases suggest that 
control of public enterprises by the national political leadership 
is uneven. The political leadership have control over the appointment 
of top managerial personnel and the determination of wages/salary 
scales and output prices. They also control the workers' organisations 
via labour legislation and politically by a combination of general 
calls for unity, peace and cooperation and occasional direct inter- 
ventions. However, as far as management is concerned this control 
is not altogether effective. In the absence of local-level political 
monitoring, as was attempted during the "political commissars experiment" 
of the mid-1970's, practices are able to arise in which managers 
dispose of publicly-owned resources as if they were their own private 
property and/or exploit their authority for private individual ends 
(. e. 
"corruption"). Needless to say, this has negative developmental 
implications for the public sector and also generates social discontent 
and instability. 
This finding has a bearing on our criticism of reductionist 
approaches to the relation between economic and political power. 
As just described, the relationship between the national political 
leadership and public sector management in Tanzania is one which is 
not illuminated by the concept of "state bourgeoisie" which delib- 
erately conflates the two sorts of power. The source of management's 
power is control of economic and technical resources, in contrast 
286 
to the politicians' power which is based on state power, the control 
of the means of coercion and legitimation. The complexities, tensions 
and nuances involved stem from the different situations, perspectives 
and motivations of the two groups. 
On a second level, we have found that workers' influence on 
decision-making is very limited, but chiefly for reasons other than 
those emphasised in the literature. In our case study factories, 
management retained power of decision-making and implementation over 
all the central factory issues: employment of personnel, promotion, 
training, planning and organising production, marketing, and so on. 
By judicious intervention in the state-sponsored work-place organ- 
isations they attempted to retain control of them and were generally 
successful. Meetings with union and party branch leaders were held 
mainly to inform the latter about decisions already made by manage- 
ment. Their influence was more marked on matters relating to social 
services: suggestions concerning loans, canteen issues and transport. 
The existence of work-place organisations and the controlled partici- 
pation of workers' representatives did have the effect of limiting 
the crude power of management in cases where victimization might occur. 
Given existing legislation on issues concerning disciplinary matters, 
union representatives had to be consulted and their views taken into 
account. Other normative pressures, for fair play based on the values 
of ujamaa and haki (= justice) and against unyampara (= authoritarian- 
ism) or kunyanyasa (= denigrate, despise), were sometimes helpful. 
Workers' representatives participated in several enterprise organisations 
(not as a united body, in contrast to management who were united), 
but often the key decisions had been previously taken by management. 
The role employees had was limited to being informed and giving 
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suggestions which management could accept or reject. 
It cannot be assumed, however, that this result was inevitable 
given the nature of the work-place institutions themselves. Other, 
powerful factors were operating against a more meaningful partici- 
pation by workers. The work context in the case-study enterprises 
is characterised by dependent industry and technology, a numerically 
small workforce in the urban context with limited skills. Given the 
difficult economic situation of the early 1980's, with shortages and 
problems facing industries and increasingly limited political space, 
workers were obliged to adopt strategies of silent resistance - what 
Cohen [1980] has called "hidden forms of resistance" - such as 
udokozi (= thefts), absenteeism, or utegeaji (= go slow); or else 
to pursue individual approaches to management personnel. This was 
more an appreciation of existing conjunctural realities than the 
result of being hoodwinked, or "bought off", by organisational structures 
as suggested by overdeterministic or overstructuralist interpretations. 
At a third analytical level, the study suggests that the role 
of factory organisations remains ambiguous. Writings on union and 
Party branches have tended to see these as instruments in the hands 
of management, or as under the control of the petty-bourgeoisie, to 
enhance productivity and industrial peace by coopting workers into 
"_the system". Our study indicates that the Workers' Councils and 
the Party and union branches remain arenas of contention. For 
management, the factory organisations were considered as useful for 
mobilising workers towards production and increased efficiency and 
as avenues for informing the workforce and maintaining industrial 
peace. For the workforce, they were considered as a means of advancing 
petitions and redressing grievances - as resources for advancing their 
interests. 
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The contradictions of controlled workers' organisations (which 
on the one hand are seen as means of advancing workers' interests, 
while on the other serving as agencies for assisting management) lead 
to an ambivalent position for the Party and union leaderships. Party 
and union branches were often identified with the branch leaderships 
by employees; employees tended to relate to party and union branch 
in an "instrumentalist" fashion, more as a means of advancing private, 
individual goals than as avenues for collective pursuits. When 
there was an increasing discrepancy between what was spoken and what 
was realised through the organisations, a tendency towards apathy 
and disillusionment set in, manifesting itself in a growing lack of 
interest in attending meetings. 
The incorporation pressures exerted by management were not always 
entirely successful, however, and it cannot be said that a submissive 
workforce is an inevitable result or characteristic of trade union 
practice in Tanzania. Local-level relationships such as those which 
we could discern in the public factory situation reveal the ambiguities 
and ambivalences of corporatist-type political system. In a more 
favourable conjunctural setting these could be expected to be revealed 
in a significantly different pattern of management/worker relations. 
What does all this suggest for future research? The abandonment 
of structural deductionist and economic reductionist approaches opens 
up not only the relation between management and workers, but also 
other work-place relationships as real issues for investigation that 
would facilitate the building of a more comprehensive picture of the 
politics of participation through more local-level studies focusing 
on actual processes rather than formal structures. Such studies 
could take into consideration variations between work-places in 
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technology; by sector (e. g. health, education, transport); by 
region, etc. 
It follows from this that it is not enough to see national 
level processes: we need more local-level, small-scale studies, such 
as studies of factories, if we are to gain increased understanding 
of the way national political processes affect those local-level 
relations and the way people cope with the situations created by 
particular historical conjunctures. It is still true, however, 
that small-scale processes need to be related to national contexts, 
and improvements are needed in the way we go about analysing these. 
The abandonment of economic reductionism is a fruitful starting point 
but this line of investigation needs to be taken further to develop 
a better understanding of the relationship between the different 
irreducible levels of structure and of action. 
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Appendix I 
Exploratory Rearch 
As mentioned in the Introduction, I collaborated with Dr. Harry 
Goulbourne in a research on Labour, Party and Ideology in the Socialist 
Construction of Tanzania, 1967-77. This was intended to get a 
better understanding of the meaning of Party Supremacy and the position 
of the Party in the country's socio-economic transformation. We 
carried out a number of interviews with political personalities; gained 
access to the National Executive Council and Central Committee Confi- 
dential Minutes at Dodoma CCM Headquarters and in collaboration with 
a number of students then at the University of Dar es Salaam made 
newspaper summaries; interviewed management and Party leaders in 
four factories in Tanga (The Ferliser Company, The Steel Rolling Mill, 
Saw Mills, and Ngomeni Sisal and Rope Factory) and interviewed officials 
at the Regional JUWATA office, Tanga. I participated in a Symposium 
on "The Role of Unions in Ujamaa Construction" held at the University 
of Dar es Salaam in January 1980, when I met trade union leaders. 
I also attended JUWATA General Council Meetings and the 1982 CCM 
Electoral Conference as an observer. 
Among political personalities who were interviewed by Coulbourne 
and myself on the History and Activities of the Party and the achieve- 
ments and the tasks ahead for the Party were: 
Name Designation Date, Place 
then 
Msekwa, P. National Executive Secretary 11.9.79 Dar es Salaam 
Ditopile, U. Principal Assistant Secretary 
and Head of Research 13.9.79 Dodoma 
Mhaville, J. Regional Commissioner and 
former TANU National 
Executive Secretary 13; 19.9.79 Dodoma 
Mlaki, C. Head of Finance Planning 
CCM Headquarters 15; 16.9.79 Dodoma 
Muro, D. Head, Foreign Affairs 
Department, CCM 15.9.79 Dodoma 
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Name Designation Date Place 
Ngombale-Mwiru Regional Commissioner 16.10.79 Dodoma 
Nkurlu, M. Member of Parliament 16.10.79 Dodoma 
Ng'hwaya, S. Uhuru/Mzalendo newspapers 17.10.79 Dodoma 
Wambura, R. Regional Commissioner 18.10.79 Dodoma 
Msindai, I. Head, Regional Personnel 
CCM Headquarters 14.9.79 Dodoma 
Kawawa, R. M. Member of NEC and CC of 
CCM 17.10.79 Dodoma 
Kyulule, L. Head, Dept. of Political 
Education 17.9.79 Dodoma 
Lindi, J. Head of Audit, CCM 17.9.79 Dodoma 
Mapunda, G. Member of Parliament 
former Minister of Labour 18; 19.10.79 Dodoma 
Mbutu, J. Principal Assistant Secretary 
(Administration) 20; 21.9.79 Dodoma 
Mponda, A. Regional JUWATA Secretary 1.1.80 Tanga 
Wamba, R. Regional Research 
Officer JUWATA 1.1.80 Tanga 
Chambaka General Manager, 
Steel Rolling Mills 2.1.80 Tanga 
Mapunda, Z. Personnel Officer 
Steel Rolling Mills Tanga 
Mettah, J. Personnel Manager and Acting 
General Manager, Tanga 
Fertiliser Company 3.1.80 Tanga 
Stevens Personnel Officer, 
Tanga Fertiliser Company 3.1.1980 Tanga 
Saite, G. General Manager, 
Rope Factory (Tanga) 4.1.80 Tanga 
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1 TTTT*TTTV 11 
GUIDE QUESTIONNAIRES 
As stated in the Introduction, one of the techniques relied upon 
was in-depth interviews with various actors in the factory. I chose 
the in-depth interview for its advantages in flexibility. Through 
the in-depth interview I was able to discuss issues, reformulate 
questions which were not understood, follow up interesting answers 
with further questions and so on. 
I had a list of issues and topics which I wanted to cover in the 
interviews. These were written on three pages and I would fill in 
the information as the "conversation" progressed. I also filled 
in as soon as possible after every interview some of the information 
I had not been able to note down during the interview. When I 
introduced myself, I told informants I was writing a history about 
workers in public enterprises. 
(a) Guide Questionnaire for Employees 
1. Age, sex; place of birth; parent's home and occupation; marital 
status; number of children; the number of dependents. 
2. Formal Education and Training. 
3. Working life after school: What made him look for paid employment? 
How did he know of a vacancy in the factory and for the job? Who 
introduced him? 
4. What is his actual job now? Who is his leader in the work? 
Who arranges his work? 
5. Income (pay, allowances, overtimes); does he have a shamba-- 
(farming plot)? 
Does he have any activity to augment income? (e. g. small petty 
business, who runs the trade when he is at work? ). 
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6. Do you have a house to let? 
7. What is the occupation of his/her spouse? 
8. What is the job of his dependants who are in town? 
9. Has he borrowed from the employer, the credit union or other 
people? (Who? ). 
10. Has he lent anyone money? Who? How much? When in need of 
money, where does he go for help? 
11. Where does he stay in town and the type of house? Is there 
water and electricity? How much does he pay every month? 
How did he gain access to house (rooms)? Who introduced him? 
12. Transport to and from work. 
13. CCM Membership 
His membership in the Party (TANU and CCM). When did he join ? 
What attracted or made him join? Does he have any leadership 
position in the Party? Is he a member of the People's Militia? 
How much do you contribute every month? Does he attend meetings? 
What is discussed in those meetings. Who is his CCM representative? 
The Chairman of the Branch? Do you have contact with him? Have 
you ever gone to the Party branch or to your representative in the 
factory? What was the issue? How was it resolved? What does 
the Party branch in the factory deal with? 
14. JUWATA Membership 
Are you a member of JUWATA? When did you join? What led you to 
join? How much do you contribute every month? Who is your repre- 
sentative or Chairman of JUWATA? Have you ever contacted them 
for an issue? Which issue? What does JUWATA in the Factory do? 
Have you attended meetings of JUWATA at the factory? What do those 
meetings deal with? What do you think of JUWATA? 
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15. Workers' Council Activities 
Do you know any members of the Workers' Council? What does the 
Workers' Council deal with? Have you ever suggested anything 
to the Workers' Council? 
16. How do you find the life of a worker? 
(b) Guide Questionnaires for Members of Management 
Questions 11 to 16 above plus the following additional questions: 
1. General information about the factory (workforce, history of the 
factory, services programmes). 
2. On their own work and in the execution of their duties how did they 
relate to Party branch and union at the factory; What did they 
think about it? 
3. What they thought about the Workers' Participation Programmes. 
(c) Guide Questionnaire for Party and Union Leaders 
As for employees, plus the additional questions: 
1. History of the organisation at the factory. 
2. How was the branch organised? 
3. What activities were carried out in the factory? How do they 
relate to management of the factory. 
4. How did they assess the membership in relation to the organisation. 
Who are the members? 
5. Do you inform workers what is decided in the Workers' Councils etc.? 
6. Any suggestions by workers to the various sittings. 
7. What did they think of the Workers' Participation Programmes? 
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Appendix III 
Conflict between Party Branch and Management 
at the Tanzania Fertiliser Factory - Tanga 
Drawing on information gathered during the "exploratory research", 
this appendix reports the events in the Tanzania Fertiliser factory 
in 1976, which illustrates some of the ambivalence which existed 
between management and the Party and union branches in Tanzanian 
factories during the time of the experiment with the post of Political 
Commissar between 1975 and 1978. 
The Tanzania Fertiliser Company (T. F. C. ), unlike Factory A or 
B, was a jointly-owned enterprise between the National Development 
Corporation which owned 60 per cent of the shares and Klockner 
Industrie. Company of West Germany owning 40 per cent. Completed 
in 1972, the factory was operating under a 5-year (renewable) 
management agreement through which top management as well as machinery 
were to be supplied by Klockner. in 1972, for example, there were 
43 expatriate staff manning the key posts of General Manager, Technical, 
Electrical and Production Engineers, Finance Manager and Marketing 
Manager. By 1980, the number of expatriates was reduced to 17 and 
some of the senior posts (Personnel Administration, Finance and 
Marketing) were localised through various training programmes in 
Tanzania and abroad or on the job training schemes using senior staff. 
The enterprise commenced with a total workforce of 500 permanent 
employees and by 1980 this had risen to 730 permanent workers and 
a fluctuating number of about 150 casual workers engaged in seasonal 
jobs such as off-loading of raw materials, or as labourers and helpers 
to masons. 
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One conspicuous feature of the work setting in this factory was 
the presence of expatriate staff who held the managerial and super- 
visory positions in the different departments. The differences with 
local employees were exascerbated by differences in income, with the 
expatriate staff receiving over and above the basic salary linked 
to their posts an untaxed inducement allowance of 75 per cent of basic 
salary. Expatriates were also given a fully furnished house, to 
which only a few of the local senior staff were entitled. 
When the factory began production in 1972,34 of the workers, 
mainly machine operators and clerks, were members of the Party. In 
June they opened a factory Party branch. By 1974 the branch had 
420 card carrying members and carried out its activities in an office 
within the factory compound given to it by the management. 
The chair of the branch passed from the original Chairman, who 
was a security guard foreman, to a production clerk in 1974 and a 
medical assistant in 1979. During most of this time the branch 
Secretary was the Personnel Officer, and between 1976 and 1979 he 
was also acting Chairman of the branch when the production clerk 
was transferred. In 1975, however, a Political Commissar was appointed 
from the Party Headquarters to be the Party Branch Secretary. 
According to the Administrative Manager, the post of Political 
Commissar heralded a period of some confusion since the post was not 
well defined in terms of the factory set-up. The Commissar attended 
management meetings and those of the Workers' Council. With expatriate 
management this created some tension and friction. Initially 
expatriate management had worked peacefully with a Party leadership 
which worked to boost work morale as well as push for services (such 
as a canteen and transport). It had served as a source of advice 
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to management on issues and problems affecting local staff. 
However, when the Party and union branches under the Commissar 
began to deal closely with the utilisation of company property 
and the issue of local staff training, tension and conflict came 
into the open. 
The union branch at the factory was as old as the factory; a 
Workers' Committee was formed straight away through the encouragement 
of the District Union Secretary. The Chairman was a senior operator 
who acted also as a supervisor. The Secretary was a laboratory 
supervisor. Other members of the union leadership were drawn from 
among middle rank supervisory employees in different departments. 
Over a number of years, leadership and membership in the Party and 
union branches became an important resource for local personnel to 
advance their interests in competition with a largely expatriate 
management and senior technicians. 
In April 1976, the Political Commissar of the fertiliser company 
revealed to the Press a number of irregularities taking place at the 
factory [Sunday News, 4 April, 1976]. As Party Branch Secretary 
he revealed that the company was in serious economic trouble brought 
about by gross mismanagement. He alleged that there was: financial 
mismanagement brought about by lack of proper accounting procedures; 
extravagant use of public property; and economic sabotage shown by 
the stoppage of factory production bringing losses amounting to 
150,000 shillings. In general, the Party Secretary revealed to the 
Press, there was no proper programme to train local expertise in 
engineering, thus keeping the factory under expatriate managerial 
and technical control. He concluded his allegations by stating that 
employees in the factory were no longer keen on their work and that 
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the factory was in danger of collapsing. He called for a probe 
committee to investigate the company's situation and rectify the 
managerial malpractices. 
These press reports irritated management, who retorted that these 
were unfair allegations and arose from the Party and union leadership 
interferring in managerial duties which was not their function. 
Management understood the function of those agencies as consisting 
in helping in the smooth operation at the work-place, informing 
management on issues which might be sensitive for an expatriate 
management which might not be aware of local cultural practices and 
to be a link between management and the workforce. Their job was 
not to "put their noses in everything". That was interference. 
As for the Party branch leadership at this time, they perceived 
their function in patriotic terms - as the national watchdog on what 
was happening at the factory. Their action was covered by the 
meaning of "Party Supremacy" whereby the Party had to supervise the 
implementation of national policies and the proper utilisation of 
public property and finances. The Party leadership saw it as its 
duty to see to it that there was a localisation programme for the 
managerial and technical posts at the factory. The presence of 
expatriate personnel was fertile ground for some of the local skilled 
personnel to agitate for the posts, and this was done through the 
Party and union branches - activities which would, naturally, make 
the expatriate technicians feel threatened. 
To resolve the crisis which was threatening to engulf one of the 
important manufacturing industries in the country an investigative 
team was formed from the national Party headquarters. The team was 
chaired by a member of the Party's Central Committee and a Secretary 
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from the Party Secretariat. Other members of the team were the 
Minister for Industries; an economist from State House (the 
President's office); the Commissioner for Industries, and an N. D. C. 
representative. 
The team discussed with Party leaders in the region including 
the Regional Party Secretary, District Party Chairman and District 
Member of=Parliament. The team then went to the factory and discussed 
with management and Party leaders at the factory. 
Some of the problems at the factory were related to the management 
contract between N. D. C. and Klockner Industrie in the creation of 
the enterprise. The terms of the contract gave a lot of powers 
to the partners of N. D. C. One of the findings of the team was on 
the relationship between management and Party leadership at the 
factory. The team stated that the branch leadership had the right 
to know and to be informed what was going on in the factory. The 
presence of Party leadership was a fairly new innovation and all 
parties in parastatal enterprises had to adjust to forms of collective 
leadership. 
However, the institutional set-up left power of decision-making 
and implementation with management, making the Party leadership's 
position ambiguous. In a case of local management, as-in Factories 
A and B, this ambiguity could be fudged by the General Manager himself 
being the Chairman of the Party branch or using his influence in 
Party sessions. But the ambiguous role of the Party branch in 
management affairs was much more glaring in the presence of expatriate 
(non-Party member) management as was the case of T. F. C. 
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RTRT_TOr-ID ADAV 
A. Unpublished Documents-, 
(Factories) 
Minutes of CCM Party Branch Council, Factory A, 1977-1982. 
Minutes of CCM Cells, Factory A, 1975-1980. 
Factory A, Training Programme 1981-85. 
Factory A Muster Roll, January, 1983. 
Factory A Muhtasari wa walio hudhuria Mafunzo (those on courses) 
1981-1982. 
Factory A Training Tours, 1981. 
Factory A Minutes Workers' Councils and Executive 
Committees, 1979-1982. 
Factory B 
_Minutes 
Workers' Councils, 1976-1983. 
Tanga Fertiliser Factory, Workers' Councils. 
Factory A: JUWATA, Minutes of Branch Council, 1978-1982. ' 
Factory A: Taarifa ya Kamati Maalum kuchunguza Mashtaka na 
Malalamiko juu ya Mwenendo wa Uongozi (Complaints Probe), 1982. 
JUWATA, (List depicting Warning Forms by Employer and Reaction of JUWATA 
for 1982). 
Schemes of Service, Factory B.. ", 
Documents: History of Factory A, mimeo. 
-, - 
:, History of Factory B, mimeo. 
Training Programme, January-December 1983. 
Mpango 1976 (Plan) Factory B. 
Taarifa kwa Waziri wa Viwanda: 1980 (Report to Minister of 
Industries). 
Factory A, Marekebisho ya Mishahara... (as approved by SCOPO), 
January 1,1981. 
Factory A. Technical Department, Training Programme, 1981-1985. 
Factory A, Minutes of Appointments Committee, No. 1980, 
August 1982 - February 1983. 
Factory A, Circular from General Manager to Factory Committees 
entitled: Utekelezaji wa Kazi, 1978. - 
Factory A, Taarifa ya Mkurugenzi kwa Mwaka, 1981. 
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Factory A, Uchambuzi wa Maoni ya Wafanyakazi August 1982, 
(Review of Workers' Complaints). 
Factory A, Washiriki wä Kozi (list of Courses), 1981. 
Factory A, Mpango (Plan), 1980. 
Steel Rolling Mills Limited, Tanga, Labour Force, Professional and 
Academic Levels as at 31 December, 1979 (compiled by 
Msagati, W. D. S. ). ] 
Factory B, Letter of 7 April 1984 by Manpower and Personnel Manager 
to Labour Commissioner. File Ref. 23273, Vol. II, 57). 
B. Unpublished Documents 
-(Other 
CCM, 1982 (c), Maelezo Binafsi ya Wagombea Ujumbe wa Halmashauri 
Kuu ya Taifa, Orodha ya Mikoa. 
CCM, 1982 (d), Orodha ya Wa 
Taifa Viti (90). 1982. 
a Ujumbe wa Halmashauri Kuu 
Minutes of TANU C. C. and N. E. C. 1967-77. 
Report of Committee of Enquiry into the Problems of Tanga Fertiliser 
Company April 1976. 
Kiwanuka, K. M., 179, The Party and Foreign Policy In Tanzania, mimeo. 
N. D. C., 1969 (? ), Productivity-Councils and Workers' Participation's 
in Management: The N. D. C. Viewpoint. I 
NUTA,, 1967, Minutes of NUTA Executive Council of 19 January 1967. 
NUTA, 1968, Workers' Participation in Management in Tanzania, 
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